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Abstract  
Business continuity management, or resilience as it is increasingly known, has 
blossomed over the last 20 years. It has become an audited, regulated and 
standardised business process which is taught at both undergraduate and post 
graduate levels in several UK universities. There has been a corresponding growth in 
the available literature too. The literature encompasses a body of academic literature 
that can be applied indirectly to professional practice. However, most of the influential 
work is ‘grey’ literature, namely standards, best practice advice and self-help manuals. 
The representative institute in the UK, the Business Continuity Institute (BCI), now 
claims over 8,000 members worldwide, publishes several articles, including a ‘best 
practice guide’ and has influenced the development of several international standards 
(ISOs). The BCI is embarked on what scholars have described as a ‘professional 
project’ and presents the activity of its practitioners as encompassing a defined 
profession.  
The aim of the thesis, as described in the title, is to consider the quality and utility of 
the extant literature to inform ‘professional’ practice. The supporting objectives are: to 
critically review the various categories of literature, to examine the concept of 
professionalism in relation to the literature, and to assess the degree to which the 
literature might be improved. Adopting the term ‘business continuity/resilience’ (BCR) 
to describe this professional field, it provides a review of influential literature in BCR. 
The examination of both academic and ‘grey’ literature reveals a degree of difficulty in 
applying academic works to practice, a paucity of authority in the standards with an 
iterative self-referenced process based on custom and practice, and a dearth of 
combined academic/praxis inquiry. 
It is argued that at present Business Continuity falls short of being a profession. In 
particular, it lacks a knowledge base. This poses a problem for practitioners. Their 
‘plight’ is the discernment of good quality material on which to base their business 
continuity plans. Academic work is shy of quantitative studies in establishing the 
efficacy of the processes, albeit that BCI publications and ISO standards make 
sweeping claims as to their efficacy, and self-help books are replete with hyperbole. It 
leaves the BCR practitioner with insufficient knowledge on which to establish a 
paradigm for their practice. 
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The work concludes with a consideration of other disciplines’ more successful 
attempts to academically validate their activities and utilise academic work in practice. 
This is particularly the case for the long-established literature on military doctrine, 
which could influence BCR to a larger extent than, is currently assumed. It is argued 
that military sources can be seen as BCR’s ‘lost cousin’. Military doctrine formats can 
be applied to BCR at several levels, but this thesis considers the level of doctrine in 
respect of principles and paradigm building that might inform, inspire or assist the BCR 
practitioners in various settings.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
Background 
The term ‘business continuity/resilience’ (BCR), selected as the focus of this research 
is a hybrid term coined by the author to describe the merger of the disciplines of 
business continuity and resilience. This term was recently implicitly endorsed by the 
Business Continuity Institute, the representative body for the sector with over 8000 
members, in their recent white paper, Resilience is your competitive advantage, (BCI 
2017a), when they made the retrospective claim on 12th January 2018 that the BCI 
was, 
Founded in 1994 with the aim of promoting a more resilient world, 
the BCI has established itself as the world’s leading institute for 
business continuity and resilience…for business continuity and 
resilience professionals globally… (p.14) 
Since then the statement on their website has been updated to refer explicitly to 
‘business continuity and resilience professionals.’ (BCI, 2018). As noted by McAslan 
(2010), Alexander (2013) and demonstrated by the publication of the resilience 
standard BS 65000 (2014) the use of the term ‘resilience’ has burgeoned over the last 
few years. Its close association with business continuity was evidenced by Elliott and 
Johnson1 (2010) who used ‘resilience’ as the contextual lynchpin of their report on 
business continuity. This academic endorsement and its frequent practitioner use 
justifies the use of the term ‘business continuity resilience’ or ‘BCR’ practitioner to 
describe the role of the planner in the title. 
The proposition that BCR is important has never been in question. Two decades ago 
Burnett (1998, p. 475), trumpeted that “crisis management has become a booming 
industry.” By implication and association, BCR over the last 20 years has boomed too. 
As noted by Smith (2006, p.1) writing in Smith and Elliott (2006): 
                                                          
1 Professor Dominic Elliott now at the University of West of Scotland was Dean of the School of Social Sciences, University of 
Liverpool where he was the Paul Roy Professor of Strategic Management. 
Dr Noel Johnson who is now at Sheffield University Management School was formerly Elliott’s PhD student at the University of 
Liverpool. 
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THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT that the notion of crisis has now 
become an important construct within management – as both an 
academic discipline and also as a community of practice…There 
is also considerable overlap… between the related terms 
‘disaster recovery’, ‘business continuity’ and to an extent ‘risk’. 
(emphasis in original) 
The essence of BCR is the recovery of a business, potential livelihoods and, in some 
cases, saving lives. For these reasons alone, an inquiry into the quality and resultant 
utility of the literature to planning would be justified. BCR is also a significant business 
sector with considerable investment and large opportunity costs, and a financial 
imperative for determining the knowledge base of BCR is emerging. In common with 
any profitable business, BCR attracts commentators, contributors and charlatans. 
Consequently, it becomes essential for the planner to discern good quality advice from 
‘chaff’. This is especially the case when BCR, despite being a non-regulated activity, 
has thousands of practitioners, makes claims to professionalism, has developed 
international standards and maintains its own institute. Consequently, a study of what 
literature influences the planning process and the eventual plans is of both social and 
commercial benefit.  
The focus of the analysis is informed by Sagan’s complaint concerning spurious 
scientific commentators.  
The well-meaning contention that all ideas have equal merit 
seems to me to be little different from the disastrous contention 
that no ideas have any merit. (1974, p. xii) 
He prefaced this remark using the 19th century term ‘paradoxers’ to describe those 
‘who invent elaborate and undemonstrated explanations.’ (p. xi). This sentiment 
reverberates down the decades with Lindstedt (2007) noting that, ‘Currently as anyone 
working in the field is likely to say, it is not well defined by its practitioners and not well 
understood by its customers’. p 197. Lindstedt summarised his arguments with the 
controversial proposition ‘that there is no well researched evidence that business 
continuity planning is beneficial’. p.203. Wong (2009, p, 63) suggests that despite a 
‘myriad of information about its tactical and operational approaches…the role of BCM 
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at the executive level and the strategic skills of business continuity managers has not 
been well discussed.’ These views contrast sharply with the marketing of BCR and 
implies that there could be some very significant ‘elaborate and undemonstrated 
explanations’ supporting the industry. 
This critique can to be applied to much of the literature on business continuity and 
resilience. Harsh discrimination is needed to winnow the academic wheat from the 
paradoxer’s chaff. Most academic literature which might validate and inform practice, 
as is often the case in developing disciplines, has focused on the formation of theories 
(Boin 2006, p.87). This inductive development of theory commented on by (Pauchant 
and Douville 1992) was often derived from large scale events. As noted by Reason 
2(1997), it privileges more dramatic incidents; oil spills and air crashes have far more 
visceral appeal than a server failure in a single bank. These dramatic extrapolations 
often lack resonance with most planners whose concerns are more frequently prosaic 
and mundane. 
Furthermore, it is believed that few planners take very much notice of academic 
literature even if it has filtered down to them in diluted form, an osmotic concept 
mooted by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009). Rather, they appear to be influenced 
by trade association doctrines, consultants and a plethora of ‘how to do it’ manuals 
which are therefore considered in the literature review. This raises questions as to 
whether planners can claim to be professionals. According to the pre-conditions put 
forward by Larson (1977, p. 40), they are not. She argues that “Cognitive commonality, 
however minimal is indispensable if professionals are to coalesce into an effective 
group.” The evident semantic confusion in BCR, noted by Lindstedt (2007) and 
inadvertently demonstrated by Buckinghamshire New University (2018) indicates a 
lack of emergent professionalism. Evidence for this ongoing debate of definitions and 
consequent lack of coalescence, can be also found in the academic papers of Norris, 
Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum (2008) and Alexander (2013), and in the 
multiplicity of definitions used by several sources; standards, for example BS 6500 
(2014), and self-help books, such as Sterling et al. (2012). 
                                                          
2Reason was Professor Emeritus at the University of Manchester (UoM) and Professor of Psychology at UoM 
1977-2001 
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The research aims and objectives  
The aim of this research is to consider the quality and utility of the BCR literature to 
inform ‘professional’ practice.  
The supporting objectives are: to critically review the various categories of literature, 
to examine the concept of professionalism in relation to the literature, and to assess 
the degree to which the literature might be improved. 
These objectives which support the aim, whilst simple to address in principle, trail with 
them clouds of uncertainty. Implicitly they beg the question as to whether the available 
literature has the power to drive a BCR paradigm without which professionalism of 
BCR is impossible.  
Outline of chapters 
The remainder of the thesis is laid out as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the research methodology employed which was a 
scoping review of the literature. It includes a brief reflection on the process that led to 
this approach being adopted. It explains the typological (as opposed to thematic) 
analysis that was employed whereby the academic literature was distinguished from, 
and reviewed in advance of, commercial and grey literature. This tactic facilitated the 
use of the academic literature as additional criteria with which to analyse the 
commercial and grey literature. Additionally, the chapter identifies the criteria on which 
the literature’s quality and utility to the planner can be judged. This question of quality 
is addressed at some length and strict academic and legal criteria are proposed for 
this purpose. This facilitates an insight as to why the discipline struggles to achieve 
real professional status and how this issue might be resolved.  
The benefit of such an approach is that it avoids repetitious primary research based 
on qualitative reports that merely iterate the plight of the planner. Rather it 
concentrates on what must be done to build the essential doctrinal foundation of the 
discipline. In doing so it embraces complementary work on military doctrine and 
principles. Whilst not commending ‘militarisation’ of BCR, it does suggest that the 
development of doctrine and the underpinning principles are the missing element in 
BCR’s claim to professionalism. 
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Nevertheless, some elements of planning in the public sector are deliberately excluded 
from debate because their planners have little choice but to follow legislative demands. 
Hopefully the thesis might implicitly question the wisdom of the imposition of poor 
standards on the public sector which can as Ritzer (2008) noted, foster the lowest 
common denominator of planning. Similarly, the burgeoning software ‘solutions’ are 
also excluded from consideration, these limitations are elaborated on in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 provides a context for the analysis of the literature. Without such a context 
the analysis would be remote from the plight of the planner. The definitions of the terms 
used are clarified and it summarises the historical development of the discipline and 
its intent. It examines the managerial level of practitioners and offers insight into what 
consensus exists as to what a ‘plan’ actually is. The ‘authorities’ of academic 
commentary, government advice and representative trade institute doctrine are 
summarised as to their relevance to this work. The environment in which practice is 
conducted is considered together with a summary of its current academic teaching. 
This chapter thus reduces the need for iterative contextualisation in later chapters. 
Chapter 4 considers the seminal academic literature which has shaped the discipline 
of BCR. The focus is on the type of literature likely to be included in a university reading 
list, the recommended textbooks, and those works which dominate academic thinking. 
What it reveals is the difficulty of applying academic theory to practice. This is 
especially so when much of the literature is the development of theory and can only 
be applied to the plan with difficulty. It also demonstrates that a great deal of academic 
literature has been reduced to ‘soundbite’ status in the ‘osmotic’ movement from 
academia to practice. Illustrations of this includes phrases such as, ‘risk homeostasis’, 
‘isomorphic learning’ and even ‘risk and uncertainty’. 
Chapter 5 first analyses the relatively limited literature specific to planning. This sets 
a context for the examination of literature which, whilst academic, was not specifically 
authored for the BCR planning discipline. The scope and sources of the literature are 
wide and varied. It touches upon several issues which are of a psychological nature. 
This is because the teams responding to incidents are both individuals and groups 
and their respective psychologies are germane to planning. Curiously, whilst these 
articles were not authored for the BCR discipline, they often seem to appeal to a wider 
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practitioner audience and, sometimes, are better known than some of the key texts 
discussed in chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 examines the highly influential contributions of the BCI, the BSI and ISO 
standards and HM Government advice for the commercial sector (the public sector 
having been excluded from the review for the reasons outlined in the methodology 
chapter). It reveals that the BCI advice is not academically proven, their standard of 
research is pitiful and tainted by commercial interests. The ISO standards, which at 
least in the UK, have become synonymous with best practice as opposed to being an 
auditable standard, are poorly authored, semantically confused and self-referencing. 
In refreshing contrast, HM Government advice is far more credible and measured and 
it has been seen to set the agenda for subsequent developments.  
Chapter 7 addresses the value of the articles that are either referenced works authored 
by practitioners, or academic articles specifically tailored for the practitioner. The 
quality of such material varies. There are some rare well authored gems in a mire of 
process driven offerings which iterate an unproven procedure. The encouraging critical 
issue in this chapter is the notion that academic/practitioner collaboration is useful and 
necessary. It will be argued in chapter 9 that this notion is pivotal to the improvement 
of BCR literature and the development of an enduring paradigm. 
Chapter 8 defines and then considers the degree of professionalism enjoyed by the 
discipline. This is a major question which determines the potential suitability of the 
literature. If BCR is merely a ‘discipline’, then the critique of the literature could be 
unduly harsh if no professional standard is to be maintained. The chapter examines 
the concept of professionalism and compares the practice of BCR to established 
professions and academic definitions. It is argued that, when subject to such criteria 
the discipline of BCR does not warrant the term ‘professional’. Therefore, perhaps the 
limited literature, both academic and ‘good practice’, is wholly appropriate for a 
relatively simple and procedural management discipline; albeit it one remaining 
capable of improvement. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by summarising the key findings, discussing the overall 
status of the literature and outlining the implications. This study’s conclusions will differ 
markedly from the blandishments of the glossy brochures, the elegant self-help books 
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and the exhortations of the BCI. This study uncovers the vulnerable underbelly of BCR 
where bland assumptions and paradoxer’s advice influence the planner far more than 
might be expected and the resultant plans are far from the intended ideal. In terms of 
findings, it will be contended that fundamentally the process of BCR planning lacks a 
sustainable paradigm, as defined by Kuhn (1996) and that Boin’s (2006) and 
Lindstedt’s (2007) plea for quantitative studies into BCR practice has been met by 
several authors, often commenting on the criticality and issues of supply chain 
management but it has not resulted in any significant body of work that quantitatively 
evaluates and endorses the efficacy of the BCMS process. The implications of this 
militate for a consideration of additional literature that does not appear to have been 
considered or applied to the discipline to date and which might offer an opportunity to 
develop BCR doctrine. The key recommendation is that BCR considers emulating 
military planning doctrine and the debate highlights areas for future consideration and 
development. The chapter concludes by pleading for greater collaboration between 
academia and practice. It recommends a leap to more realist quantitative analysis of 
accepted wisdom and a move away from self-serving semantic debate and theory 
building. 
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Chapter 2 Research methodology  
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the secondary research methods used in this thesis to deliver a 
scoping review of the pertinent literature that informs the BCR planner. It is presented 
in six sections. The first section outlines the academic position of the thesis in terms 
of epistemology, paradigms and approaches. Secondly, the research design section, 
offers a rationale for the utilisation of a practitioner conducted, secondary research 
based, scoping study. The third section, on the research process, clarifies the criteria 
by which the literature is selected and analysed. The fourth section reflects on the 
research experience and notes some approaches that were rejected. The final two 
sections conclude by summarising the ethical position and then discussing the relative 
merits of the adopted approach. 
The research design 
As stated earlier, the aim of this research is to consider the quality and utility of the 
BCR literature to inform ‘professional’ practice. The supporting objectives are: to 
critically review the various categories of literature, to examine the concept of 
professionalism in relation to the literature, and to assess the degree to which the 
literature might be improved. These objectives which support the aim, whilst simple to 
address in principle, trail with them clouds of uncertainty. Implicitly they beg the 
question as to whether the available literature has the power to drive a BCR paradigm 
without which professionalism of BCR is impossible.  
As a study of a business activity it was difficult not to have an instinctively positivist, 
realist or pragmatist perspective. However, interpretivism as defined by (Remenyi, 
Williams, Money and Swartz 1998,) appealed more as it reflected the notion that, 
ontologically speaking, individuals and groups (the BCI and several authors) were 
constantly constructing and reconstructing the ‘reality’ of BCR practice. For example, 
the BCI (2017a) report Resilience is your competitive advantage redefined the entire 
intent of the Institute. Epistemologically this ‘reality’, which is defined by the literature, 
needed to be analysed to identify its quality and its utility to the planning process. This 
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was done by a critical inquiry using a methodology of secondary research. The specific 
method employed was identified as a scoping study. 
A number of possible alternative, empirical research-oriented themes for this 
professional doctorate research were rejected. One reason was that the myriad of 
BCR definitions renders many forms of primary research questionable due to non-
uniform participant understanding. For example, Norris et al. (2008, p. 129) offer 21 
academic definitions of the word ‘resilience’ in tabular format. Another was that the 
frequent surveys by the BCI risk ‘survey fatigue’ in participants. Questions related to 
the lessons of large scale catastrophes lack resonance with planners in comparatively 
benign environments. Corporate BCR plans are fundamentally confidential, and the 
planners are understandably protective of their own reputational and employment 
positions. Planners’ qualifications, ages, positions within organisations and experience 
vary considerably. The discipline is relatively juvenile; the BCI was established in 
1994. Cognitive commonality, which was defined by Larson (1977) as a 
predeterminate of professionalism, not a consequence of it, has not yet occurred and 
terminology as noted by Lindstedt (2007), Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & 
Pfefferbaum (2008) and Alexander (2013), remains eclectic, yet despite this ISO 
standards have been authored for corporate use. 
All these factors are illustrative of an immature, emerging discipline aspiring to be a 
profession. This suggested the need for a scoping or systematic review of the pertinent 
literature utilising a secondary research-based approach to provide a better baseline 
of understanding before subsequent investigations, of a more specific nature, can be 
undertaken. 
To justify this approach the following features of the study must be considered:  
• The benefits and limits of a practitioner-based study; 
• The validity of ‘stand-alone’ secondary research;  
• The identification of an appropriate type of scoping or systematic review; 
• The establishment of criteria by which the diverse literature can be analysed in 
terms of its quality and consequent utility to the planner; and 
• The identification of the appropriate literature. 
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The position of the author as a consultant with some 22 years’ experience, and a 
desire to undertake research that would address a pressing informational need within 
the fast-evolving BCR landscape drove the study. The author’s position is important in 
justifying some of the critiques of the literature. At risk of brief immodesty Chris has 
run a consultancy in London for 23 years, working with mainly FTSE 500 companies. 
He has written extensively in the trade press and has presented on four universities’ 
risk management courses. He was awarded the BCI’s Global Consultant of the Year 
Award in 2015. His comments are also informed by being a planner for sovereign 
wealth funds and clearing houses as well as experience as a strategic level responder 
in several international corporate crises from 9/11, whilst working for an airline, to 
recently working on an international corporate cyber blackmail. 
Practitioner research is growing in popularity and credibility. Keane, Shaw, and 
Faulkner (2003), noted the volume of research activity and Shaw (2005, p.1236) 
similarly registered the increase in practitioner research claiming that the practitioner 
researchers outnumbered mainstream researchers, at least in the field of social work. 
Shaw (2002), strongly endorsed practitioner research when it has a “grounding...on 
the basis of a purpose” (p. 3), a view echoed by McLeod (1999), who commended 
“research carried out by practitioners for the purpose of advancing their own practice” 
(p. 8). Shaw (2002, p. 4) summarised two arguments in favour of practitioner research, 
the professional obligation to be self-evaluating and that research and practice require 
a similar skill set, a point also noted by McIvor (1995) 
The starting point is… the twofold belief that practitioners should be 
encouraged to engage in the evaluations of their own practice and 
that they possess many of the skills which are necessary to 
undertake the evaluative task. (p. 210). 
Endorsement of practitioner research does not go without caveat. Shaw (2002) notes 
that many such researchers have “A too conventional writing ‘voice’.” (p.4), that 
“Practitioner research tends to be weak at the very point where it seems most strong 
- its practical usefulness.” (p.2), and that it is often based on “a sadly dilute variety of 
qualitative methods” and “knee jerk semi structured interviews” (pp. 9-10). However, 
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it was conceded that most issues can be mitigated by study within a supervised 
academic environment.  
A very pertinent point for practitioner research was proposed by Kirk and Reid (2002), 
namely distinguishing between science as a source of knowledge and as a model 
showing how practice should take place. This distinction of the degree to which 
academic knowledge informs practice is an essential feature of this thesis. Reid (1995) 
noted the distinct similarities between social work practice and research. Even if the 
analogy is ‘stretched’ in its application to BCR, Reid highlighted the need for “the 
application where possible of evidence-based knowledge, and the discriminating 
evaluation of the outcomes.” (p.2040). This strongly echoes the idealised practice of 
BCR where the critical question is what research can, or should be, applied to practice, 
it is pivotal to this work and is little considered. The practical nature of the potential 
research was also noted by Hall (2001) who commented that. ‘all social research, in 
as much as it is about and results from an engagement with the social world, is 
‘applied’’ (p.58) 
Hall seemed to strike the right balance when he rejected the binary distinction between 
academic or applied research, and this neatly summarises the nature of this approach. 
Secondary research  
Proctor (1993) noted that “secondary analysis of data is fast growing in importance…at 
its best the quality of data obtained in this way is likely to be higher than a relatively 
inexperienced researcher can hope to gain…” (pp. 256-257). Since then, secondary 
research has become increasingly established and popular with its benefits being 
noted. Robson and McCartan (2016) commented that “a change in this edition is the 
greater attention given to ‘desk based’ projects based solely on existing research.” (p. 
xvii). Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) noted that the reticence to use secondary 
data as an approach could be due to academic inclinations to conduct primary 
research. 
…few students consider…the possibility of reanalysing 
data…such secondary data can provide a useful source from 
which to answer…your research question(s). (p. 356) 
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Ehrich, Freeman, Richards, Robinson, and Shepperd (2002) advocated its use to 
“map a wide range of literature and to envisage where gaps and innovative 
approaches may lie.” (p. 28). Grant and Booth (2009) highlighted its utility in 
circumstances in which “either the potentially relevant literature is thought to be 
espcially vast and diverse….or there is a suspicion that not enough literature exists” 
(p. 95). This sentiment echoes the dichotomy between the views of Wong (2009) who 
noted a ‘myriad of information’ (at least at the tactical and operational levels), and the 
Academic Literature an Overview (2015) which suggested a dearth of literature. This 
validates the approach to this work and secondary research facilitates an excellent 
vehicle for the examination of BCR literature.  
Types of reviews 
In identifying a secondary research process, the ‘Scoping Study’, defined by Levac, 
Colquhoun and O’Brien (2010) seemed most appropriate. Writing on health research, 
they elaborated on the six stage methodological framework of Arksey and O’Malley 
(2005) and made several compelling points which have informed this study. They 
described scoping studies as: 
Requiring analytical reinterpretation of the 
literature…researchers can use scoping studies to refine 
subsequent research inquiries.. that may be particularly 
relevant to disciplines with emerging evidence…. Researchers 
can incorporate a range of …published and grey literature (p. 
1). 
The first five points of their methodological framework referred to above echo the 
structure of this work, namely; identifying the research question and the relevant 
studies, studying the selection of literature, ‘charting’ the data and then collating, 
summarizing and reporting results. Levac et al (2010) also noted the practical need to, 
“consider the balance between feasibility, breadth and comprehensiveness…When 
limiting scope”. They went on to say that “researchers should justify their decisions 
and acknowledge the potential limitations of the study.” (p. 5) 
The issue of the methodological quality of the selected literature was also addressed 
by Levac et al (2010) and they cited Brien, Lorenzetti, Lewis, Kennedy, and Ghali 
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(2010) and Grant and Booth (2009) who respectively had noted that the ommission of 
a quality assessment made the findings “more challenging to interpret” and limited the 
uptake of “findings into policy and practice” (p. 8).This scoping study process bears 
close relationship to the notion of a broad literature review in order to elicit specific 
materials for more detailed analysis, and the stated need for quality asessment of the 
content advocates a critical review of the selected literature. 
Systematic reviews, as defined by the Campbell Collaboration (2018) ‘The purpose of 
a systematic review is to sum up the best available research on a specific question. 
This is done by synthesizing the results of several studies.’ are substantially similar to 
scoping reviews. Kitchenham (2004) presents an hybrid document that took medical 
systematic review guidelines and transposed them into a software engineering 
environment. Not only was the approach deemed suitable as a doctorate study, it 
precisely defined a systematic review as, 
A means of evaluating and interpreting all available research 
relevant to a particular research question, topic area, or 
phenomenon of interest…to present a fair evaluation of a 
research topic by using a trustworthy, rigorous and auditable 
methodology. (p. iv). 
Kitchenham (2004) elaborated on the secondary study elements of systematic review 
and noted that in terms of the motivation for performing such a study it offered 
ambitions very akin to the author’s own in this work; 
to summarise the existing evidence…to identify any gaps in the 
current research, ….to appropriately position new research 
activity. (p.1). 
The process offered by Kitchenham (2004) parallels the scoping process outlined by 
Arksey and O’Malley (2005). This illustrates the close relationship between scoping, 
documentary analysis and systematic review. 
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The essential ‘review approach’ has also received recent endorsement by Denyer 
3(2017) as a valid approach specifically in the study of BCR. His academic team at 
Cranfield refered to their approach, somewhat inelegantly, as a rapid evidence 
assessment “REA” which. ‘evaluate claims about what works and provide an 
evidence-informed basis for managerial action…. and is a tool for getting on top of the 
available research evidence within a relatively short timeframe’ (p. 26). 
However, documentary analysis underpins all scoping studies, systematic reviews and 
REA derived work. It is consistently academically defined and at its core there is an 
imperative to gain conclusions by interpreting the literature considered. Bowen (2009, 
p.27) citing Corbin & Strauss, (2008) defined it thus, “Document analysis requires that 
data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding and 
develop empirical knowledge”. Fitzgerald (2007) uses almost identical words in that it, 
“requires readers to locate, interpret, analyse and draw conclusions about the 
evidence presented.” (p. 279). The result of the analysis being described by Merriman 
(1998) as a way to, “uncover meaning, develop understanding and discover 
insights…” (p.118). 
Whilst analysis of BCR literature is ideally suited to an expert practitioner conducting 
a secondary research analysis, two additional criteria must be addressed. The 
literature selected must be illustrative of BCR’s many facets, and it requires 
documentary analysis and scoping/systematic review to be a valid approach especially 
when employed without complementary primary research. Fortunately, Bowen (2009) 
endorsed the view that it could be used as a “stand-alone method” for “specialised 
forms of qualitative research” (p. 29). 
The research process 
Having established the validity of the approach, the critical issue of the analysis criteria 
is now considered. Kitchenham (2004) noted the need for “a fair evaluation of a 
research topic by using a trustworthy, rigorous and auditable methodology.” (p. iv). As 
this work is an analysis of the quality, and thus the potential utility, of the literature the 
identification of a rigorous methodology is essential.  
                                                          
3 Professor David Denyer is the Professor of Leadership and Organisational Change and Commercial and 
Development  Cranfield School of Management 
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To achieve any validity in the critique of such literature, my critique needs to be based 
both on the most appropriate standards of ‘proof’ and the correct academic criteria of 
analysis to ensure that the findings are not a statement of biased personal opinion. 
Summarised below is what is perhaps the fairest and most equitable burden of proof 
and the most appropriate academic criteria that can be applied to the selected 
literature. 
The establishment of the analysis criteria 
The establishment of literature analysis criteria begins with Wallace and Wray (2006) 
cited by Saunders (2009), who offered the simple criteria of ‘credibility and evidence’,  
How convincing is what the author is saying? In particular, is the 
argument based on a conclusion which is justified by the 
evidence. (p. 63) 
However, as Taleb (2010) emphasised, twice, in his book Black Swans, mere repetition 
does not create such credibility and evidence is not mere iteration. 
…successions of anecdotes selected to fit a story do not constitute 
evidence. (p. xxxii). 
…a series of corroborative facts is not necessarily evidence.  
(p. 56). 
Developing the criterion of credibility, this thesis hinges on Minger’s (2000) four 
critiques of ‘rhetoric, tradition, authority and objectivity’ (pp. 225-226). Adapted for this 
work these can be summarised as:  
• A critique of the language and clarity of expression.  
• The critique of ‘conventional wisdom’. 
• A questioning of the ‘dominant view’.  
• The examination of the degree to which the work is ‘value free’. 
Fitzgerald (2007, p. 285) also stressed the need for some criteria to be applied in the 
analysis of literature. She suggested that Scott’s (1990) criteria of authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning should be considered. 
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Stewart (1984) also listed several questions that a secondary analyst should attempt 
to answer. Prime amongst them were the following: 
• What are the credentials of the data? 
• Can the original researchers be assumed to be competent? 
• What evidence is available about the the reliability and validity of the data? 
This summary of academic analysis criteria uses a quasi-legal lexicon but does not 
venture to suggest what level of ‘evidence’ or ‘proof’ is required in a critique. To 
determine this one might turn to the law. Damer (2009), a professor of philosophy, 
quoted Pierce’s (1934) lament that every person, “conceives himself to be proficient 
enough in the art of reasoning already.” (p. 2). Ennis (1996 p, xvii.) noted that critical 
thinking is “a process, the goal of which is to make reasonable decisions about what 
to believe and what to do”. These two comments encapsulate the whole issue 
underpinning BCR advice and the need for pragmatic critical thinking. As noted by 
Damer (2009), the burden of proof rests with those setting forth the position. To 
demand that the practitioner accepts the propositions by shifting the burden by 
suggesting that the proposition is true, unless it can be proved otherwise, is to commit 
the fallacy of “arguing from ignorance” (p.7), that is, without evidence. 
Only criminal acts in the UK demand proof beyond ‘all reasonable doubt’, and the 
criteria of the civil matters seems more appropriate. This is the lesser ‘balance of 
probability’ in UK courts or in US terms, a ‘preponderance of the evidence’. This 
reduced burden of proof is still not easy to discharge, it still requires evidence. 
Evidence is not simply the ‘hearsay’ of iterative statements or circularities of mutually 
supporting opinion. Rather, it requires an ‘argument’ which is defined as an opinion 
supported by some form of, “rational reflections on the evidence” (Damer, 2009, p.14).  
However, the greater the claims, the greater too should be the burden of proof. Perkin 
(1989) noted, perhaps a little harshly, that the professions,  
live by persuasion and propaganda…claiming that their 
particular service is indispensable to the client…By this means 
they hope to raise their status and through it their 
income…With luck and persistence they may turn the human 
capital they acquire into material wealth. (p. 6) 
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This begs the question, does the evidence for materials presented for the practitioners 
of BCR amount to little more than a propagandist syllogistic trap or is it logically sound? 
Professionalism is clearly, according to Perkin (1989), a potentially valuable notion 
and any claim should be comprehensively proven. Furthermore, the onus of proof 
should be on the person or group making the assertion to prove it to an unbiased 
audience. As Jones and de Villiars (2009) noted, the principle, used by Burke in his 
Reflections on the Revolution in France that, “no man should be judge in his own 
cause” (p. 209). Thus, the industry, in this case represented by the BCI and the BSI, 
cannot judge itself. Least of all can it present standards which are referenced only to 
their own work, to justify opinions and publications. Finally, the industry, if following 
the legal principle above, must be open to the counter arguments of its critics. 
Assuming that the BCR literature is seldom criminal, and that the ‘quality of mercy is 
never strained’ (The Merchant of Venice; Act IV, Scene 1), the ‘merciful test’ as to the 
quality of advice remains the test of ‘reasonableness’ epitomised by Lord Denning’s 
legally apocryphal ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’. This was updated by Lord Steyn’s 
analogy of the “commuter on the underground” (Macfarlane and Another v. Tayside 
Health Board (Scotland) [1999]). The principle in this test is that, what is deemed 
‘reasonable’ in a legal context in a civil case, would be that which the normal person 
on public transport felt was reasonable. So, for the purposes of this review the onus 
of proof lies with those making the assertion of professionalism, competence or literacy 
and the level of proof required is simply that of reasonableness.  
The selection of the literature 
If the overall test of the literature’s suitability to the discipline is one of reasonableness 
then it begs the question, what literature is reasonable to include? The question as to 
just what literature influences or should influence the planner is not easy to answer. 
The seductive temptation to validate the selection of influential literature by utilising 
citation records was questioned by Taleb (2010, p. 217). He made a spirited 
denunciation of this means of discrimination which he called the ‘Matthew Effect’. This 
is a condition where the quoted become increasingly more quoted and for little more 
reason than the numbers quoting them, more quoted, (the reverse for the initially less 
quoted also applies). Less stridently, Saunders et al (2009) noted that, “Unlike some 
academic disciplines, business and management research makes use of a wide range 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 25 
 
of literature” (p. 61). This truism nevertheless presents some problems in discerning 
the useful, the persuasive, the well-known and valid literature amongst the resultant 
morass of published work. Saunders4 et al. (2009, p. 258) elaboration on what 
constitutes valid, raw, and/or compiled secondary material is very broad indeed. Their 
definition stretches from journal and magazine articles to minutes of meetings, 
shareholder reports and even video recordings. Nonetheless, this liberal definition will 
be applied, albeit judiciously, in this work. 
Saunders et al (2009) noted that “Often as information flows from primary to secondary 
to tertiary sources it becomes less detailed and authoritative but more easily 
accessible.” (p. 68). Their model, (fig 3.2 p. 69), of primary, secondary and tertiary 
sources is adapted slightly in this case due to the nature of publications in this field 
and, suitably augmented by the author, it justifies the diverse sources considered in 
this work. It is presented below. 
Figure 1 Literature Sources 
First
Academic texts
&
Peer reviewed journals 
&
Indirectly applicable 
academic work
Second
HM Government 
advice (with some 
caveats concerning 
their commercial 
activities at the 
Emergency Planning 
College).
Third
Trade press articles,
BSI Standards
Sponsored BCI 
research papers
‘Self help’ 
Guides and books
Fourth
Blog debates and 
similar ‘advertorial’ 
commentaries
Increasing level of detail
Increasing time to publish
Increasing burden of proof
Increasing commercial interests
 
                                                          
4 Mark Saunders is Professor of Business Research Methods and Director of PhD programmes at the Birmingham Business 
School, University of Birmingham. Prior to this he was Professor of Business Research Methods at the University of Surrey 
where he was also Director of Doctoral Programmes for the Faculty of Business, Economics and Law.  
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Based on Figure 1 above, this admits a raft of literature that is germane to BCR but 
which was authored for other audiences. Notable in the literature are several theories 
concerning decision making. It is not within the scope nor is it the ambition of this work 
to subject this literature to detailed examination from a psychological or decision-
making paradigm perspective. As Luce and Raiffa (1990) proclaimed nearly 30 years 
ago, 
Decision making …. is a vast area! The bulk of theory in 
economics, psychology and management sciences can be 
classed under this heading. (p. 21) 
But they also defined a particular problem in decision making that is germane in the 
determination of the quality of much of the work on resilience and threats. 
Very often the heart of the problem is the appropriate choice of 
the associated index. In many economic contexts profit and loss 
are suitable indices, but in other contexts no such quantities are 
readily available. (p. 21) 
This argument can be seen to be applicable to many of the surveys, white papers and 
thought leadership papers published in BCR literature in which the indices themselves 
remain stubbornly subjective, for example the BCI (2017, b.) Horizon Scan where 
degrees of ‘concern’ was the index term used in the questionnaire, it was subsequently 
changed to the word ‘threat’ in the publication. Therefore, the choice of a potentially 
quantifiable objective index in any article, such as ‘concern’, will be used as a 
benchmark critique of any survey or set of opinions. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) highlighted ‘cognitive biases’ that derived from 
‘judgemental heuristics’, essentially mental shortcuts, used when taking decisions 
under uncertainty which can lead to severe errors of judgement in both lay people 
and experts alike. Therefore, any work seen to influence the planner should be 
subject to the following additional criteria: 
• Does the study or report have an appropriate ‘index’ term which is as objective 
as it can be, and is it maintained in the article? 
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• Is it likely that heuristics (including imaginability) might have led to errors in 
decisions or judgements in the interpretations of surveys, white papers and the 
like? 
If a piece of work is vulnerable to criticisms based on these criteria one might be 
inclined to ‘feel its quality’ and hence its influence on planning should be questioned. 
In relation to the academic works selected, they are believed to be those that are 
potentially most likely to have influenced a planner. Their selection is based on their 
perceived influence, such influence is derived from several factors: 
• The work being taught in universities. 
• The author’s opinion as an ‘expert practitioner’. 
• Direct attribution of the work or theory in planning advice elsewhere. 
• The sonar trace of the original academic work being identifiable in grey 
literature. 
The author has applied some discrimination whereby for example the work of Perrow 
(1999) is included, but an article by Eyre, Crego, and Alison (2008) which deals with 
Electronic Debriefs And Simulations In Defining The Critical Incident Landscape is 
deemed too bespoke for inclusion on the basis that it will have influenced fewer 
planners.  
The focus of the work 
There has been a great deal of literature authored by and/or for the public sector. Often 
it has applicability equally to the public and private sectors and there are several 
references to such publications in the thesis. However, for the following reasons, the 
study does not focus on the responses of public sector organisations. The public 
sector, in the case of ‘category 1 and 2 responders,’ is legislated for under the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004. They are obliged to make contingency plans aligned to BS 
25999, now ISO 22301 (2012). The public sector also enjoys their own training centre; 
the Emergency Planning College. This is now operated by Serco and, although its 
courses are open to the public, its focus remains on the public sector. Additionally, the 
public sector is ‘underwritten’ by the government and is ‘self-insuring’.  
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In contrast, the private sector, with some exceptions such as utilities, is not constrained 
by legislation and only operates within some regulatory boundaries, which are often 
loosely adhered to. The private sector is largely insured by third parties and is profit 
dependent for its existence. In other words, the private sector’s motivation to make a 
plan is more likely to be based on a genuine desire than government compulsion. 
Additionally, public-sector organisations often retain contingency planning managers 
with a sole role; in contrast, private sector resilience planners are a mix of resilience 
managers and staff for whom resilience planning is an additional role. Their 
background disciplines vary from security, to facilities management, IT, and even 
microbiology. This diversity of training might prove to be an interesting factor in 
influencing their approach to resilience, but it remains that they are more likely to turn 
to the literature for help in the formulation of a plan. 
 
The relatively recent development of planning software ‘solutions’ are also excluded 
from consideration for three reasons. In the author’s experience, they are simply 
access database developments which only provides a convenient input or template 
format. Their utility could be also achieved with the astute use of normal office 
systems. In the main they claim to conform to ISO 22301 and BCI best practice. In 
summary therefore, they do not add to the literature, the process of planning, or 
evidence new thought; they merely reflect existing practice and are normally costly 
and unwieldy to implement. It is therefore appropriate to exclude them from this 
analysis. 
Whilst the study references overseas materials and many UK planners work 
internationally and international standards are axiomatically ‘global’ in nature, the main 
focus is on the plight of the UK planner. Therefore, final limitation is that, for two 
reasons, the work relates to BCR practice in the UK. First, the author does not feel 
that the epithet of expert practitioner is sustainable beyond the UK as some significant 
differences in approach and processes exist overseas. Second, were these 
differences to be considered the review would at least double in size.  
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Ethical issues 
The ethical issues associated with this secondary research were considered and 
addressed by satisfactory completion of the University’s Ethics self-assessment form. 
An appropriate ethical exemption certificate was granted. This certificate is attached 
at Annex A. 
 
The research experience  
During the research changing personal circumstances seriously affected my studies 
and the process has had a significant emotional effect on the author. It is tempting to 
maintain the illusion that secondary research was my first choice of approach; albeit 
easier to defend in examination, this would be disingenuous. In retrospect, however 
the secondary research of an expert practitioner is preferable, given the juvenile nature 
of the BCR discipline, to any form of primary research. But this realisation came from 
a process of considering several other approaches which, whilst non-productive, was 
not wasted time and effort and great deal of ‘learning’ occurred in the process. 
My original research inclination was to positivism and as Remenyi et al., (1998) 
suggested, to make “generalisations similar to… natural scientists”. (p. 32). At the 
same time, again as observed by Remenyi et al (1998), it is often required to 
appreciate the “details of the situation…or perhaps a reality working behind them.” (p. 
35), which could be best achieved by interpretivism. At the risk of simplification, this 
led to a choice of deductive or inductive research approach. Was it possible to 
construct a research strategy to test a hypothesis on BCR or was it advisable to collect 
data and develop theory as a result of subsequent analysis?  
Given the paucity of research into validating business continuity practice, the collection 
of quantitative data (a deductive emphasis) seemed important, as did the need to 
understand the meaning that the practitioners attached to the issues (an inductive 
emphasis). In terms, then, of research strategies almost any strategy ranging from 
case study, to ethnography, to survey, to action research offered some potential to 
shed light on the topic in question. With no approach or strategy having any clear 
advantage, a multi-method or mixed method seemed to combine the best aspects of 
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the various approaches. As Saunders et al (2003) noted it can be beneficial to mix and 
match methods to tackle specific purposes in the study and as they suggested, 
“Business and management research is often a mixture between positivist and 
interpretivist, perhaps reflecting the stance of realism” (p. 85). Thus, this beneficial 
compromise of a realist approach suggested the optimal solution of a mixed methods 
approach to gain both quantitative data and appreciate it in a qualitative fashion. 
Consequently, a quantitative survey augmented by qualitative interviewing, seemed a 
logical approach. If Lofland (1971) was correct in the assertion that interviews could, 
“elicit rich detailed materials…to find out what kind of things are happening” (p. 76), 
then it would appear to deliver several benefits with fewer ethical, practical, time and 
cost issues. However, the author was, and is, a practitioner/consultant in the discipline 
of business continuity (BC) and the participants were his peers and in many cases 
clients.  
Fortuitously, the Advanced Research Techniques (ART) taught module offered an 
opportunity to trial this process and a draft questionnaire in line with Mitchell’s (1996) 
advice was piloted for critique by an expert panel. The resulting responses to the 
questionnaire were influential in altering this proposal for the following reasons: 
• The sample would have been skewed towards BCI members.  
• Largely due to the variety of understandings of terms in a specific work 
environment, ‘resilience’ and associated questions were very differently 
interpreted by entities as diverse as the Supreme Court and Rio Tinto Mining. 
Consequently, the feedback revealed that the questions were differently 
interpreted, or misunderstood, by the expert panel. 
• To simplify the questions to the point where they were similarly understood 
would make the questions so anodyne as to lose the insight that was sought. 
At this point it would normally have been appropriate to investigate why the survey 
was differently understood and to take appropriate remedial action. In brief certain 
flaws in the study were apparent and these are noted below so that if further research 
should be undertaken in a similar vein it will avoid these pitfalls.  
• de Vaus (2005) offered the cautionary note, that ‘too often researchers design 
questionnaires or begin interviewing far too early – before thinking through what 
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information they require to answer their research questions’. p,9. I believe that 
in this instance the questionnaire was too rushed, albeit it was a pilot study. 
• Similarly, de Vaus’s comments on the ‘subjective, meaningful and voluntaristic 
components of human behaviour’ p,5 had not been adequately accommodated 
in the question design. 
• Finally de Vaus’s caution that ‘Ideally the groups we are comparing should be 
the same in all relevant respects except in regard to the independent variable.’ 
p,43. de Vaus used the analogy of schools which would be required to contain 
‘comparable students’, in my pilot study it was clear that the participants were 
perhaps not comparable. 
However, this original idea was superseded by a proposed programme of qualitative 
research using semi-structured, non-standardised interviews utilising some members 
of the original expert panel, my clients, as the interviewees. Notwithstanding all the 
background work alluded to above, the ethical issues of my relationship my clients 
remained resolutely problematic and the effort and time that would have been taken 
to compensate for these factors was disproportionately high. 
Therefore, I adopted to the secondary research alluded to above. The research 
experience was bruising but informative and it illustrated to me that the range of 
methods of inquiry is vast. Interestingly, I have found that the rather remote secondary 
research scoping review made me think far more about the literature than I should 
have done in a more modest literature review preceding some form of primary 
research. 
Conclusion 
Because the discipline still displays an immaturity that is largely unchanged since Toft 
and Reynolds (1997) commented on it, as did Lindstedt (2007) a decade later, and 
because the literature still offers a bewildering array of advice, the selection of an 
appropriate methodology was critical. Feyerabend’s (1975) appeal for anarchic 
research was sadly dismissed. 
The interpretivist paradigm combined with the secondary research-based scoping 
study which was adopted, proved an ideal vehicle by which to analyse BCR literature. 
This validated the idea of Saunders et al. (2003, p. 99). They contend that such 
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research retains a positivist and interpretivist stance that results in realism, or in this 
case interpretivism. The selection of the criteria for the admission of various types of 
literature as well as the criteria for the analysis of the literature proved a precise tool 
in the generation of constructive literary criticism. In large measure this hinged on 
Minger’s (2000) criteria for literature analysis, which greatly facilitated the 
commentary.  
The legal concept of ‘reasonableness’, established in the civil case of MacFarlane and 
Another (1999) and the consideration of the degree of professionalism exhibited by 
the discipline were an essential adjunct which attenuated the criticism of the literature 
that had been generated by the review. Finally, the simple caveat of Taleb (2010) 
concerning iteration not being evidence, proved essential time and again in the critique 
of the ISO standards and best practice where referencing is stubbornly circular. 
An inherent difficulty in the case of a scoping study is that thematic analysis is elusive 
and potentially iterative. It is elusive because much of the literature deals with the 
same themes and their selection of the same topics and themes is not the question. 
The question remains resolutely the utility of the literature to the planning process. 
Therefore, the literature itself is grouped in categories ranging from the purely 
academic to the self help book. This tactic avoids the necessity of iterative and lengthy 
comment on themes and as it is oriented to the criteria of the quality of the literature 
selected, it also avoids the propensity to become an annotated bibliography or an 
extended literature review. The critical differences are mentioned by Bowen (2009) 
and Fitzgerald (2007) earlier in this chapter in that the comprehensive or scoping 
review gains insight into what further developments might be required in a particular 
field. Whilst the Literature Review of  Business Continuity/ Resilience etc comprise the 
main part of the thesis, the thesis itself is not only such a review, but it also deals 
extensively with  how the literature can be applied to enhance resilience and how the 
findings of the literature so far have been applied, or not applied or mis-applied in the 
planning process of business continuity/ resilience. 
Thus, the study revealed several defects in most of the BCR literature and thereby 
aspects of the planner’s plight became clarified; this revelation strongly commended 
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the consideration of alternative disciplines’ doctrines and policies to be considered as 
a vehicle for BCR literature’s development of a valid paradigm.  
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Chapter 3 Understanding BCR 
Introduction  
The intent of this chapter is to offer an essential context or backdrop for the subsequent 
analysis of the BCR literature, examining the drivers and scope of the discipline. In 
doing so it utilises works by Kay (2011), Wong (2009) and Lindstedt (2007) as well as 
the research by Elliott and Johnson (2010). It then offers a historical context of the 
development of BCR which leads logically to a consideration of the semantic debates. 
The influences on the planner of HM Government advice, the BCI best practice and 
BS and ISO standards is then considered. Penultimately, the nature of plans and the 
position of the planner is debated. Finally, the BCR body of knowledge and the degree 
of academic interest in BCR is discussed. 
An historical context 
In two decades business continuity has evolved from being a primarily IT recovery 
function to having a broader remit of risk, people, reputation, cyber-crime and physical 
assets. This evolution is illustrated by the following quotations dating from around the 
year 2000 when the millennium bug catalysed widespread business interest and public 
awareness. Van Happeren (1999) advocated a broad risk management slant, stating: 
“a company should direct its efforts more widely…it should apply an all-encompassing 
Business Process Risk Management approach.” (p.19). McIlwraith (1999) focused on 
critical functions, not merely the IT processes, and Springett’s (1996) definition was 
prescient on the threat of what was to become cyber-crime:   
…business contingency, a holistic approach to the survival of an 
organisation rather than just its IT element…Even the threat to 
staff…comes under the business contingency umbrella…as well as 
the menace posed by hackers and computer viruses. (p. 22) 
Kalmis (2000) noted that: “Managers...have extended the planning process beyond 
the data centre to include most business processes.” (p. 10). Whittingham (2000) 
echoes this perspective: “Clearly the way ahead is to…adopt a broader approach to 
managing wider business risk.” (p.16). Other commentators emphasised the 
consequent need for the training and exercising of staff. Bush (2000) noted that the 
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‘comprehensive’ nature of business continuity planning can be achieved through staff 
training. He advocated, “people centred business continuity training ranging from staff 
awareness to…realistic disaster simulations” (p. 18). This view was echoed by 
Jamieson (2000, p. 20) who identified, people, data, infrastructure facilities and plans 
as the five crucial aspects of recovery from a major incident. He rated the ‘people’ 
composing the crisis management team as being the most critical component of the 
five. Without their training and rehearsal, he argued, the plan was less likely to 
succeed. Between them, these authors, many of them practitioners, paved the way for 
the development of the discipline and initiated a far broader perspective of BCR than 
merely IT recovery. 
Elliott, Swartz and Herbane (2002) helpfully conceptualised ‘eras’ of the development 
of business continuity progressing from technological demands to an audit process, a 
value proposition and finally ‘normalisation’. More recently the term ‘resilience’, which 
was considered at length by Alexander (2013) and Norris et al. (2008), has served to 
heal the semantic schisms between business continuity, emergency response, crisis 
management and disaster recovery. This idea of eras is echoed in the development 
of increasingly reliable IT systems where unstable mainframes made way for the 
modern servers and the eventual ‘cloud’. However, whilst developments in information 
technology have been dramatic, the methodology and terminology employed in BCR 
planning has not changed significantly in two decades. 
The semantic debates 
The general noun ‘resilience’ is akin to using the word ‘medicine’ to describe its various 
subdisciplines: pharmacology, physiology, and anatomy, etc. Resilience, as defined 
by McAslan (2010), Norris et al. (2008) and Alexander (2013), encompasses the 
processes of disaster recovery, crisis management, crisis communications and 
business continuity. Hitherto, terminology was sectarian with several artificial 
distinctions being made. Almost two decades ago, Borodzicz (1999) recognised the 
multiplicity of terms used: 
... this phenomenon has become known as business continuity or 
contingency management, and sometimes as corporate risk or 
security management. (p.11) 
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Borodzicz added that business continuity is a response to an event that threatens the 
ability of the organisation to perform its intended function. This tenet is echoed by 
Burtles & Yates (1998) whose rather similar definitions included:  
Contingency plan 
A plan of action to be followed in the event of a disaster or emergency 
occurring which threatens to disrupt or destroy the continuity of 
normal business activities… (p. 10) 
Business continuity plan 
…procedures and information which is developed compiled and 
maintained in readiness for use in the event of an emergency or 
disaster. (p. 10) 
Hiles and Barnes (1999) went into some more detail and defined business continuity 
more broadly as seeking to concentrate on the preservation of an organisation in the 
face of a wide threat array: 
…its reputation and image; its customer base and market share; its 
profitability…product recall, hostage, extortion, kidnap, attack on 
branches. (p. xiii) 
They also commented on the evolution of continuity planning and offered a definition 
of what business continuity had become: 
...the development of strategies, plans and actions which provide 
protection or alternative modes of operation for those activities or 
business processes which, if they were to be interrupted, might 
otherwise bring about a seriously damaging or potentially fatal loss 
to the enterprise. (p. xvii) 
Sadly, terminological debate remains abundant to the point of absurdity. Definitions 
are often irritatingly obvious, for example, “Crisis management provides a business 
firm with a systematic, orderly response to crisis situations.” (Darling, 1994, p. 4), or 
“Plans are really flexible guides to action outcomes” (Heath, 1998, p. 253). Other 
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definitions verge on the pretentious or the banal: “crisis management is the shorthand 
phrase for management practices concerning non-routine phenomena and 
developments,” (Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 2001, p. 15), or “planners need to work 
on the basis that a crisis situation is a situation in which there is a threat to resources 
and people that has little time to be resolved.” (Heath, 1998, p. 261). The best 
illustration of the semantic mire is quoted below; four terms (underscored by the 
author) are used in the same paragraph:  
As the recovery of local businesses is instrumental to societal 
resilience, they should be encouraged to develop a business 
continuity plan. Such a plan helps organisations think about 
setting up an emergency operations centre… 
(Boin & McConnell, 2007, p. 55) 
Rather more maturely, Fragouli, Loannidis & Adiave Gaisie (2013) proposed that 
“despite the origins and evolution of crisis, a unique definition for crisis, its 
management or planning cannot be easily identified” (p. 363). In terms of documentary 
definitions, Crisis Management – Guidance and Good Practice (BSI 11200, 2014, p. 
3) is slightly more pragmatic in its description of crisis management being “the 
developed capability of an organisation to prepare for, anticipate, respond to and 
recover from crises” (p. 3). 
Perhaps the semantic debate is explicable, if unwelcome, as often the terminology in 
question reflects the background discipline of the commentator. As the author has 
previously noted in a good practice guide for the Law Society, business continuity 
planners refer to ‘business continuity plans’; the emergency services talk of ‘major 
incident or emergency response’; IT staff consider the topic as ‘disaster recovery’, and 
PR or media-oriented staff favour the term ‘crisis management’. (Needham-Bennett, 
2011). 
The semantic debate often masks progress, but the term ‘resilience’ has bulldozed its 
way to pre-eminence and is now widely accepted, (McAslan, 2010). The origin of the 
word was related to materials science in the 19th century and now features largely in 
literature related to psychology. Despite its evident parallels with the intended 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 38 
 
outcomes during an incident, the phrase is not without critics, and as early as 2005 it 
was argued by Kaplan (2005) that the word had questionable utility. which made its 
widespread application ambiguous and unhelpful. Nevertheless, the balance of 
opinion is in favour of the increasing use of ‘resilience’ (McAslan, 2010 ;Sims, 2010). 
Although its exact meaning is contextually derived, the term has elements that are 
commonly understood by any organisation. Without re-entering a semantic debate on 
the nature of resilience and conceding that McAslan (2010) has been disputed by a 
number of ecologists, such as Klein, Nicholls, and Thomalla (2004), resilience has 
become increasingly important since the financial crash of 2008-9. The Financial 
Conduct Authority has rebranded its external risk management division as a ‘resilience 
department’ and now conducts ‘resilience benchmarking’ in the financial sector. The 
promotion of resilience is reflected by a growing use of resilience as an overarching 
concept in the development of international standards (ISOs), which have sought to 
set auditable standards for resilience. These include ISO 28002: 2011 – Development 
of resilience in the supply chain, and currently in the developmental stage, ISO 22323, 
Organisational Resilience Management Systems. Once, if, the latter document is 
published it will provide organisational resilience with a common reference standard. 
Echoing this shift from business continuity to the broader term resilience many 
publications now refer exclusively to resilience, a notable example being Roads to 
Resilience, Building Dynamic Approaches to Risk to Achieve Future Success, a report 
by Cranfield School of Management on behalf of Airmic (2014).  
In summary, ‘resilience’ is a frequently heard term in many sectors, including 
psychology, due to its positive connotations of ‘recovery’. Whilst its definition remains 
contextually variable, the ability to bounce back or recover is a common thread. Indeed, 
Rutter’s (1985) simple definition of resilience based on ‘bounce back’ holds well for its 
use in nearly any context. But the popularity of a term brings its own perils; the English 
cricket team middle order batsmen in 2016 were described as ‘resilient’ and its growing 
use, risks resilience losing specific meaning and gaining even more definitions. This is 
a note of caution that was acknowledged in Alexander’s (2013) definitive and 
comprehensive etymological analysis of the word, where three additional opinions of 
Comfort et al. (2001), Park (2011) and Reghezza-Zitt et al. (2012), were cited in 
agreement with the sentiment that, 
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resilience is being used as little more than a fashionable buzz-
word…there is bound to be a sense of disillusionment if the term 
is pushed to represent more than it can deliver. The problem lies 
in attempts to make resilience a full-scale paradigm or even a 
science. (p. 2713) 
Despite Alexander’s caution, the term resilience, when combined with business 
continuity to become BCR is probably the most appropriate term to use in this thesis. 
Contextual academic studies 
Scholarly work dealing specifically with the abilities of the BCR planner is not 
abundant. However, Wong5 (2009) debated two key issues; the ‘role of BCM in 
strategic management and the strategic skills of business continuity managers.’ p ,62. 
In tackling this issue he too noted that these required skills have ‘not been well 
discussed’. Then in arguing the case for the inclusion of BCM in strategic management 
he listed six management skills required of the BC planner, these were; management, 
analysis, leadership, communication, coordination and innovation. Indeed, they are 
skills that many managers should display but, in his conclusion, Wong implied that 
unless these skills were manifested and evident then the role of the BC planner would 
‘remain operational’, p, 67. Interestingly however Wong avoids any commentary as to 
whether or not the current planners have these skills, it is more by implication that they 
do not as if they had already manifested them there would be little point to the article.  
Lindstedt6 (2007), whilst arguing for a narrowing of terms, (as opposed to Wong 
wishing to broaden the remit of the BCR planner), noted in his introduction that 
business continuity planning was ‘not well defined by its practitioners and not well 
understood by its customers’. p, 197. He echoes Boin’s plea for more quantitative 
research to prove the value of the discipline, noting that ‘This is the (mostly unstated) 
                                                          
5 Wei Ning Zechariah Wong PhD MBCI CBCP is a principal consultant at Atkins providing business continuity management 
solutions to organisations across a range of sectors. He is one of the leading experts at the British Standards Institution (BSI), 
where he contributed to the development of the world's first business continuity standard BS 25999. He has written for several 
journals in the area including Continuity Journal and Disaster Recovery Journal. 
 
6
 Dr. Lindstedt is a speaker, author, and champion for business continuity. Along with Mark Armour he founded 
AdaptiveBCP.org and authored the Adaptive Business Continuity book. He is the founder of Adaptive BC Solutions 
(AdaptiveBCS.com). He consults, teaches, and advises on project management and business continuity 
 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 40 
 
assumption that there is rightly a BCP discipline to be learned and that a methodology 
that can be discovered and improved.’ Lindstedt continues his argument later in the 
article, p, 203 when he concludes that,  
The heart of the problem is that there is no well researched 
evidence that business continuity planning is beneficial. While 
many believe BCP provides organisations with the ability to 
survive disasters, this belief is largely based on intuition and 
anecdotal evidence. 
Once again Lindstedt is not critical of the abilities of the planners but his conclusion 
points to a lack of common definitions in the industry and to a step change that will be 
hard to achieve, ‘Business continuity planning should continue to mature, if it can do 
so.’ p, 204 
In summary Wong and Lindstedt highlight a current lack of strategic ability, a dearth of 
academic endorsement of practices and an immaturity which generates a need to 
develop basic managerial skills. However, the works of Wong and Lindstedt are the 
opinions of academically qualified practitioners and neither directly reflected the plight 
of the practitioners; to find such data one has to look to other works. 
Notwithstanding the merits of Wong and Lindstedt as ‘points of reference’, their works 
are at the general level and none of them describes ‘first hand’ the plight of the planner. 
The context and issues affecting the BCR planner is well documented in the study of 
Elliott and Johnson (2010) The Liverpool Report. This research is perhaps the most 
informative study conducted to date. The work was undertaken by the University of 
Liverpool and was sponsored by some of the then leading BCR consultancies, HM 
Government and others. Its focus, on the ‘voice’ of the practitioner, makes it an 
essential comparative to this work. Its thorough, semi-structured interviews of 83 BCI 
members, thematically reported upon, is one of the best ‘summary reports’ available. 
The report offers another benefit in this thesis, namely that of triangulation, Saunders 
et al. (2009, p. 258) and Flick (2006). Thus, the report is also used as a frequent basis 
of critique or point of triangulation in the case of the grey literature which is analysed 
later. 
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It is conceded that first impressions of the ‘Liverpool Report’, Elliot and Johnson (2010) 
might not commend its scholarly nature. It is not peer reviewed, it was little published 
in any format other than privately to a few sponsors, it has almost no known citations 
and was funded by commercial and government sponsorship; as such it is open to 
justifiable criticism. At first instance it does not appear to have the credentials to be 
the basis of a critique of an industry and its practices on which so many reflections 
and comparisons are made in this thesis. 
However, with increasing familiarity with the work, commendable scholarly features 
become more apparent. The work is appropriately and fully referenced. The report 
was authored in an academic environment and it utilised a sound and well detailed 
methodology. It is a large study with 83 semi structured interviews of planners and it 
does not suffer from the ‘protectionism’ or corporate bias that BCI/BSI sponsored 
studies exhibit even though it was sponsored by government and commercial bodies. 
(Unlike the publications of the BCI together with the BSI whose publications are 
sometimes tainted with marketing a specific product, the work of the Liverpool report 
was not influenced in any way by the sponsors and maintained academic 
independence from their ambitions or aims). Finally, it was written by one of the 
foremost authors in this field whose academic credentials are well established; 
notably, Professor Dominic Elliott has not only held several similar managerial 
positions prior to his current role as the Dean of the University of the West of Scotland’s 
School of Media, Culture and Society, he has also published and published 38 
‘research items’ https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dominic_Elliott.  
Notwithstanding, Professor Elliott’s prominence, further endorsement of non-peer 
reviewed materials being utilised in this fashion is required before the use of the 
Liverpool Report can be accepted. The endorsement for use of non-peer reviewed 
articles in secondary research can be found in a number of sources but perhaps the 
most compelling is (Anderson Blenkinsop and Armstrong 2004). The inclusion of non-
peer reviewed articles of credible scholarly merit was fundamental to the systematic 
review of their chosen literature. Anderson, writing as a Professor and Director of the 
School of Pharmacy at the University of Nottingham, together with her colleagues, 
included 13 non-peer reviewed reports with 7 peer reviewed papers in their systematic 
review of an area of pharmacological literature. This preponderance, even 
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dependence, on non-peer reviewed material in their systematic review of the literature 
seems to lend some validity to my selection of just one non-peer reviewed article 
amongst so many other peer reviewed articles that were used, to provide some insight 
into the plight of the planner. Indeed, it is perhaps ironic that the BCR planner similarly 
tends to rely on non-peer reviewed materials as well. 
The remaining and awkward question of the potentially valid alternatives to peer 
reviewed articles was tackled head on and in some detail by Arms (2002) (writing in 
the Journal of Electronic Publishing as Professor Emeritus of Computing & Information 
Science Cornell University). Arms’ essential argument, albeit in defence of non-peer 
reviewed web articles, is based on the proposition that not all peer reviewed articles 
vouchsafe quality and not all non-peer reviewed publications lack scholarly/academic 
credibility. He observes that, ‘Most of the high-quality materials on the Web are not 
peer-reviewed and much of the peer-reviewed literature is of dubious quality.’ 
Arms continues the advocacy for the recognition of the scholarly qualities of non-peer 
reviewed materials using an argument based on precedence noting that,  
There are a few exceptions to this emphasis on peer-reviewed 
journal articles. The humanities have always respected the 
publication of scholarly monographs, and conference papers are 
important in some fields. 
This proposition is followed by the argument that the author’s reputation should also 
to be taken into account. 
a researcher can build a reputation in the online world, outside 
the conventional system of peer review. Meanwhile we have a 
situation in which a large and growing proportion of the primary 
and working materials are outside the peer-review system, and a 
high proportion of the peer-reviewed literature is written to 
enhance resumes, not to convey scientific and scholarly 
information. Readers know that good quality information can be 
found in unconventional places. 
 
Ideally however, I should have wished to rely on a wider and more diverse range of 
peer reviewed commentaries on the status, role and abilities of BCR planners. Sadly, 
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the vast majority of such commentaries are published by the BCI who are not 
unnaturally protective over the sensitivities of their members and hesitate to introduce 
any critique, academic or otherwise, of their own Good Practice Guidelines and the 
ISO standards. Similarly, associated journals such as the Journal of Business 
Continuity & Emergency Planning is edited by Lyndon Bird the former BCI technical 
director and it is reviewed by an ‘editorial board’ whom they cite in their preface as 
reviewing ‘every article to ensure it is practical, authoritative and relevant’ and who 
perhaps understandably maintain a modicum of protectionism. 
Therefore, based on the arguments of Professor Arms, Professor Anderson et al., 
regarding the inclusion of non-peer reviewed literature, it is respectfully proposed that 
the University of Liverpool Report 2010, Elliott and Johnson (2010) has sufficient 
provenance to vouchsafe its credibility as a scholarly ‘key source’. Despite that it was 
not peer reviewed, (it was never intended to be published beyond a discrete audience 
and personal accident precluded its further development) this does not diminish its 
credibility as being a foundation on which scholarly arguments and analysis can be 
based. Incidentally, a personal communication was received from Professor Elliott on 
20th March 2019 who comments thus in respect of the Liverpool Report’s use in this 
thesis: 
I can confirm that the work was undertaken with academic rigour. 
A project funded by Government, public and private sector 
organisations. It was supervised by me. I was, at that time Paul 
Roy Professor of Strategy at the University of Liverpool, a post I 
held 2002-2018. I was Dean of the Management School and, 
more recently, School of the Arts at University of Liverpool. More 
publications would have been produced, but I had a serious 
accident in 2012, which slowed this down. 
Surprisingly, at first reading, this report offers some faintly contradictory conclusions 
which are generated by the detailed and specific comment, elaborated upon below. It 
is perhaps the tension between the ambition of resilience as a paradigm and its actual 
attainments that generates this subtle dissonance. An explanation might be that the 
authors used ‘resilience’ as a contextual lynchpin of the report. If resilience is ill defined 
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as suggested by Alexander (2013) then this might have generated the dissonance. 
Some examples from Elliott and Johnson (2010) follow. 
The report suggests organisations are “demonstrating a serious commitment to BCM” 
(p. 2). However, this progress is offset by the conclusion of the report that 
“normalisation of BCM has not been fulfilled…business continuity has neither 
penetrated…the majority of organisations nor has it been accepted as a core business 
function” (p. 22). 
In potential contrast to the apparent uniformity of approaches to BCR, which is implied 
by the BCI and the adoption of ISOs, the authors note that “Business Continuity is 
defined differently between, and in some cases within, organisations…We do not 
consider this a problem.” (p. 3); but that “Creating definitions is a key step in 
institutionalising and establishing a profession’s identity” (p. 4). This endorses Larson’s 
(1977) precondition of professionalism, namely a cognitive commonality. 
They continue, “The importance of strategy to BCM is reflected in references to 
“holistic and value adding activities, resilience and stakeholders” (p. 6). However, the 
report cautions: “few of our respondents reported a strategic approach nor did many 
appear to possess the necessary tools or mind-set to develop such an approach”. It 
is, therefore, an important question, if in the last seven years, during which time so 
many standards have been published, this would offer them the requisite tools and 
mindset. 
Page 7 elaborates on the change from “Planning to Management”, which perhaps 
reflects the growing influence at the time of BS 25999 and subsequently of ISO 22301 
(2012) on BCMS. Notwithstanding this, the report suggested that the main 
preoccupation of organisations remained with the plan as being an “end in itself”.  
On Page 9 the basic notions of resilience are summarised very neatly with reference 
to the origins of resilience as a physical materials science and/or biological 
phenomena. It is best summarised, as noted in the report, by Walker, Holling, 
Carpenter and Kinzig (2004), who kept the definition closer to the earlier definitions on 
the recovery of deformation from impact. Nevertheless, the elaboration on definitions 
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at appendix 2 (p. 94) amply demonstrates the lack of cognitive commonality which 
infests the definitions in BS 65000 (2014).  
The concluding remarks on the academic context of the study make an unusual claim 
that there exists “rich academic literature relevant to BCM” (p. 21). But interestingly, 
the report also concludes that little reference was made to guides to BCM, which it 
claims are well developed in contrast to “strategy, competitive advantage, resilience 
and social capital.” 
In terms of motivational factors, the report notes the prevalence of “external drivers” 
(pp. 23-29). These include audit commentary, regulation, corporate governance 
demands, client and procurement pressures, and insurance brokers. But all of these 
factors fail to embed the process to the same extent that an internal desire to maintain 
BCM might. Indeed, almost all the external drivers mentioned might be seen to 
privilege the application of ‘standards’ that makes their auditing role easier. 
The report debates the relative merits and the application of such standards. The 
authors describe the standard’s effect using the inelegant term ‘MacDonaldisation’ 
cited by Ritzer (2008). In summary, the report states that standards have been very 
influential and important in the diffusion of BC practice. However, this has, in turn led 
to a desire simply to be seen to be doing the “right thing”, “a safe option”. This gives 
rise to the fear that the rigid adherence to standards might be “detrimental to the 
development of organisational resilience”, and that the “audit trail or accreditation for 
BS 25999 provides evidence of effort but not necessarily effectiveness” (pp. 30-31). 
The most damning indictment was outlined on (p.39). “There was largely an 
unquestioning attitude towards BS 25999. Adherence to it…. was reported as 
desirable because of the legitimacy it would be seen to confer…” These ideas were 
then commented on in more detail in the ‘final comments’ (pp. 80-83) with the standard 
being referred to as a “double edged sword” which could lead to a “game of securing 
certification, …protecting their back…and a stifling of creativity…with a comfort blanket 
of standards”.  
To summarise such an excellent report is a disservice. The precis that follows is 
offered to provide an aide memoire as an analytical tool in the later examination of the 
remaining literature. 
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1. There is more business continuity being done than before, but it is not really a 
strategic concern of the board, or more simply, more people are doing it badly. 
2. The plan is still the focus of effort and an ‘end in itself’. 
3. Standards are good for cognitive commonality but bad for initiative. 
4. Motivation is externalised and transitory in effect. 
5. BCR is mired in semantic conflation. 
One might conclude that the resilience arena is non-strategic, ill-defined and a non-
core business activity whose academic validity is hardly mentioned by the report’s 
respondents. This strongly suggests that the position of BCR is ‘confused’ in so far as 
such comments could not be levelled at other professions with a recognised 
authoritative body of academic literature and a common vocabulary. It also demands 
a closer inspection of the specific academic literature related to resilience. 
HM Government directives, BCI advice and regulatory influences 
Concurrent with academic and practitioner driven development of BCR practice, HM 
Government echoed similar sentiments which were outlined by the Home Office 
Communication Directorate (1996) in their publication, How resilient is your business 
to disaster? This was prepared by the Home Office, now Cabinet Office, Emergency 
Planning College and it carefully avoids ‘labelling’ their advice at all, although the 
foreword refers to ‘business recovery plans’ in response to ‘natural and man-made 
threats’. The article is amply illustrated with depictions of the emergency services in 
dramatic situations and concludes with an endorsement for companies to mirror the 
emergency services operational, tactical and strategic response system. HM 
Government had also recognised the broader issues of disaster, and in the Home 
Office (1999) publication Dealing with Disaster, large sections are devoted to detail of 
the ancillary issues of incidents such as section 5, ‘Information and the Media’, which 
goes beyond the narrowly focused business continuity interest in the recovery of IT 
systems. 
The government’s efforts were augmented by many industry bodies publishing their 
own advice such as: the Institute of Directors (IOD) guidelines (Nash, 2000); the 
Business Continuity Institute (BCI 2000); the Confederation of British Industry (CBI 
1999), and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (Power, 1999). 
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However, despite the Y2K catalyst which generated a considerable volume of debate 
comparatively little change to the processes and methods of conducting a BC project 
was generated. Then, for about 16 years nothing changed. This is not to say that 
nothing was done; far from it, a lot was done – it is just that what was done, was pretty 
much the same. It is difficult to account for the apparent stasis other than to iterate 
that there has been little effective to challenge to the basic processes adopted around 
the year 2000. Quite clearly it is not in the industry’s interest to make too many 
challenges to a process that has been adopted by so many organisations. A detailed 
comparative of the contents of books on the topic is offered in table 2, A Comparative 
of Literature Development on page 130. The author, using the Microsoft Search 
Network (2000) on 20th June 2000, entered the key search words ‘contingency 
planning’. The result offered six web directory sites and 54,977 web pages. ‘Y2K 
contingency planning’ accounted for some 18,414 entries in the aforementioned 
category and key words of ‘contingency planning management’ offered 49,307 hits. 
On 8th October 2013 the author entered the key words ‘business continuity’ on Google; 
the search raised exactly 29,000,000 results in 0.15 seconds. In terms of scale, or 
bulk, even taking into account the growth of the web, progress is quite evident. In terms 
of the development of ideas, progress is less impressive. This is a large claim that 
needs further evidence, and it is touched upon later in the review. For the sake of 
simplicity at this stage, it is argued that the content, format, style, process and method 
of business continuity planning has not changed in any significant way since about the 
year 2000. This contention is supported later in the work in an analysis that contrasts 
the topics and order of The Definitive Handbook of Business Continuity Management 
(TDH), (Hiles and Barnes,1999), with subsequent books and documents authored 
over a decade or so later. 
The BCR discipline is broadly represented by the Business Continuity Institute and 
their influence on practice must be acknowledged. Whilst the processes might not 
have changed in 20 years, the Business Continuity Institute has grown from less than 
1,000 members in 1996 to eight times that number in 100 countries today. The BCI 
should be deemed an authoritative source of information. Their perspective of the 
industry can be derived from their Business Continuity Institute Horizon Scan Report 
2017. The terminology used from the outset consistently refers to ‘BC and resilience 
professionals’ (p.32). It claims 8,000 members in 100 countries. The demographic 
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annexes indicate that 78% of the 726 respondents in 79 countries worked as, 
‘business continuity or risk managers; in finance, professional services, public 
administration and defence and ‘IT comms’. Notably, the vast majority, some 80% 
worked in Europe, North America and Australia. 
Despite some diversity, it is a western centric discipline with a focus on the commercial 
sector. In terms of ‘trends’, the document claims that only 21% of organisations 
proposed increasing their budgets in this field in 2017, and it was estimated that “63%, 
more than 2 out of 3 organisations, use ISO 22301 in guiding their business continuity 
programme” (BCI 2017, p. 3). Naturally this is an incomplete picture of the industry as 
it only includes BCI members; suffice it to say that the number of people involved in 
BCR, in the UK alone, is significant.  
As importantly, the BCI is engaged in a ‘professional project’ and uses the words 
profession, professional and professionalism 21 times within a few pages in their 
Professional Ethics Guidelines (BCI. 2018). If BCR is indeed professional, then it 
seems logical to expect the quality of literature to be of an appropriate standard. The 
logical corollary of the BCI’s claims is that BCR literature should stand up to scrutiny 
along with established or acknowledged professions such as law or medicine. This 
ideal will serve to inform the penultimate chapter, wherein the degree of BCR 
professionalism will be used as an additional criterion with which to judge the literature.  
Further evidence of the importance of BCR is reflected in the increasing legislation, 
regulation, governance and standardisation applied to or demanded of the discipline. 
Highly influential corporate governance reports requiring formal risk statements to be 
made by large companies were authored by Cadbury (1992), Hempel (1998), Turnbull 
(1999), and the Financial Reporting Council (2005) and (2012). These reports 
catalysed a focus on business continuity as part of the overall response to risk. The 
UK Government promulgates advice and encourages regulatory bodies to “reduce risk 
and increase resilience through the medium of continuity planning” (Gov.UK., 2016). 
Regulatory bodies including the Financial Conduct Authority (formerly the FSA) and 
the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) proliferate, and corporate advice is offered 
by the Business Continuity Institute (BCI), the Bank of England (BoE) and the Institute 
of Directors (IOD), as well as by most local council authorities. Organisations operating 
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or responsible for critical infrastructure are bound by legislation (the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004) to make appropriate continuity plans. In response to this 
impetus, self-help books are legion, and continuity forums blossom While special 
interest groups (SIGS) like Business and National Government (BANG) or the BC Law 
Forum wax and wane, international standards (ISOs) are well established. The 
Cabinet Office (2013, (a) and (b)) maintains a National Risk Register and the Home 
Office (1998) and (2003) also issues advice. Even without a growing number of minor 
consultancies (all the ‘big four’ accountancy/auditing firms have a business continuity 
consulting practice), BCR has become established as a business in itself. 
Plans and planners in context 
The title of the thesis highlights the ‘plight of the planner’. Just as all organisations 
differ so do the style and content of their plans. Similarly, the status and role of the 
planner within the organisation varies. Nevertheless, some academic consensus on 
plans exists and outline descriptions of the planners’ role and corporate position can 
be made. Therefore, some consideration of consensus views on plans and an outline 
of the demographics of planners is required to complete the contextual backdrop to 
the thesis.   
In reference to crisis management, (Fragouli et al., 2013) described a plan as a 
“documented set of activities and actions designed by experts, to be referenced when 
a crisis occurs to save time and maintain orderliness” (p. 369). The notion of it being 
written is common to most authorities on the matter. It was noted by Reason (1997, p. 
49), having been expanded on in a little more detail earlier by Register (1987), that: 
the importance of making written plans cannot be understated. Too 
often, however, plans to confront crises, if they exist at all, exist only 
in the minds of a few key individuals. (p. 74) 
This endorsement of written plans is echoed by modern standards, and BS 11200 
(2014) suggests that of the four key elements of preparation in crisis management, a 
plan is the first priority. “The…specific elements key to preparing for crises are: the 
crisis management plan” (BS 11200, 2014, p. 10). Therefore, this study focuses on 
what literature might influence the written response plans; whether they are called BC 
plans, DR plans or crisis responses, or even resilience responses, is unimportant. 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 50 
 
The nature of adverse events being reason or cause for the invocation of a BCR plan 
varies considerably. The author has witnessed plans being invoked for data loss, 
abandoned babies, suicide in the atrium of a bank, and embezzlement of £1.2m by a 
partner in a law firm. However, the common themes are to safeguard people, premises 
availability, IT systems access and reputation. To achieve this a Business Continuity 
Management System (BCMS) is followed (BCI Good Practice Guidelines, BCI GPG, 
2013). This process determines the strategy and scope of the project, reviews risk, 
identifies business criticalities and sets recovery times, and all this results in a plan 
that can then be rehearsed to prove its validity. Recent terrorist events have again 
broadened the scope of BCR and plans often include annexes for ‘active shooters’ 
and ‘people tracking’ mechanisms. Other supposedly ‘specialist’ areas of planning 
include disaster recovery site design and supply chain audit; however, most of these 
sub disciplines are or should be inherent in the plan. 
Plan detail, format, cultural sensitivity, scope, processes, management systems, 
reporting mechanism and team composition varies tremendously from organisation to 
organisation. The only tenable generalisation in the UK is that there will probably be 
three elements to management responses which would be controlled by strategic, 
tactical and operational teams, as advocated by the Home Office (1999).  
Interestingly, the claimed benefits derived from having a plan are surprisingly scant. 
In 1871, unusually for an ‘arch planner’, Field Marshall von Moltke observed that “No 
plan survives contact with the enemy with any certainty beyond the first contact with 
the main hostile force.” Hughes (1993, p. 92). However, von Moltke was not implying 
any futility in planning, merely that it does not offer certainty of outcomes. The 
sentiment that the value of the planning process is worth more than the resultant plan 
comes from both an academic and a military source. Boin, t'Hart, Stern, & Sundelius 
(2005) suggest that “crisis planning helps more than crisis plans ever will in 
coordinating crisis response operations” (p. 146). However, Eisenhower pre-dated this 
notion in his widely attributed remark, cited by Bland (2013, p. 58) that: “In preparing 
for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning indispensable.” It is 
also worth noting at this point that the analogous doctrines, policies and procedures 
of military planning appear to have been studiously ignored by almost all BCR 
commentators. 
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Planners 
The corollary question is: what manner of person is doing the planning and what 
managerial status do they enjoy? Barclay Simpson specialise in corporate governance 
recruitment, and their Market Report Security and Resilience (Barclay Simpson, 2017) 
is an ideal reference to explain the nature and role of the BCR manager. Interestingly, 
the document’s title gives primacy to ‘security’ under which sits a resilience function, 
largely represented by the business continuity manager. Although Barclay Simpson is 
a commercial company with vested interests, the report is relatively bias free and 
includes negative evidence. Their summary of market analysis notes: “Resilience 
recruitment is steady but down on the recent past... Crisis management is a 
developing area...falling somewhere between corporate security and resilience” (p. 8). 
Additionally, the burgeoning need for cyber security experts was noted constantly in 
the report (p. 12) and that “resilience consultancies continue to grow particularly within 
the big 4” (p.18). This brief catalogue illustrates the multiplicity of roles and ill-defined 
reporting lines. 
In terms of income, a head of business continuity in “a major financial services group” 
(p. 21) might expect an income of between £100-150K (in London), one of the top 
earners in the corporate governance security section of the Barclay Simpson report. 
Paradoxically, however, a business continuity consultant is the least well remunerated 
of the related consultant categories, albeit still at £500 per diem in London. So, in 
summary, the most senior of business continuity managers is relatively well paid, 
comparable to the pay of a Brigadier in the British Army at £102K pa (Armed Forces, 
2018), who commands up to 7,000 staff. But strangely, whilst this elite but often 
academically unqualified group earn considerably more than the highest paid ‘salaried 
GP’ at some £85K (BMA, 2018). their role still lacks the essential cachet of a 
‘profession’ which is enjoyed by both the medical and military professions. 
This Barclay Simpson analysis presumes that the BCR manager is a specific role. The 
author’s own client base is very diverse ranging from cheese factories to major law 
firms and mining conglomerates. Approximately 40% of clients do not retain a specific 
BCR manager. The role is distributed between the following functions: security; 
compliance; H&S; facilities; legal; IT; insurance, and, in one rare case, HR. In most of 
these cases the practitioners are not members of the BCI nor are they academically 
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qualified. Their BCR duties are an adjunct to their primary role, and it is especially 
interesting to determine, in so far as it is possible, what literature might appeal to them 
and thus influence such practitioners. 
The development of BCR  
Wong (2009) and Elliott and Johnson (2010) reported an abundance of literature on 
BCR and this study is an examination of the quality and therefore utility of the literature 
in so far as it informs the planner. Consequently, it adopts the criteria of Saunders et 
al. (2009) that “Unlike some academic disciplines, business and management 
research makes use of a wide range of literature” (p. 61).  
But the development of knowledge on the topic was noted as ‘shaky’ in the dedication 
to Key Readings in Crisis Management (Smith and Elliott, 2006). They observed that 
many years earlier “the body of literature was felt to be too much in a state of flux to 
produce a book that would do justice to the complex nature of risk”. (p. x) It was notable 
that of the 23 “truly seminal” chapter selections for inclusion for publication, some 18 
chapters had been authored prior to 1994. This appears to echo a decline in ‘seminal 
publications’ and it is contended that little, at least in terms of process development, 
appears to have happened between 1999 and 2017. 
Yet the existing processes, which have not been validated academically, Boin (2006), 
are being ‘standardised’ into ISOs, which risks ‘cementing’ dubious processes into 
best practice. The academic work on the topic filters osmotically to inform practice, but 
the extent to which many theories are incorporated in practice is debatable. 
Additionally, it appears that the discipline lacks underpinning doctrine, as opposed to 
theory, and that some existing military literature has gone almost unremarked in the 
development of practice; this will be debated in the concluding chapters. Thus, the 
study has the requisite degree of importance, and its potential to develop insights and 
new understanding of the field is evident. 
Recently BCR has gained a growing level of academic interest. The BCI has allied 
itself closely with Buckinghamshire New University, and although BCR specific 
courses remain scarce in comparison with mainstream topics, the universities in the 
following locations offer courses which are complementary to BCR: Nottingham, 
Liverpool, Cranfield, Coventry, Portsmouth, Leicester, Benfield Greig Hazard Centre, 
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and University College London (Barclay Simpson, 2017). In addition to trade press 
magazines, peer review journals have been established, the Journal of Business 
Continuity and Emergency Planning, a quarterly, 100-page journal published by Henry 
Stewart Publications. One might term the academic underpinning as ‘more than 
embryonic but less than juvenile’. Courses exist, but they have differing emphases, 
focus, origins and interests. As Toft and Reynolds (1997) noted the management of 
fortuitous and organisational risk “is not a mature activity” (p.1), and the passage of 20 
years does not necessarily vouchsafe full maturity. 
In all this time, academia has hesitated to quantify any financial advantage in BCR. In 
reference to the earlier work of Knight and Pretty (1997), an analysis of share prices 
before and following incidents, it was observed by Cockram and Van Den Heuvel 
(2012) that  
... the losers sustain approximately 15% drop in value, winners 
transform their crises into value-creating events (up to 15%) and 
emerge with enhanced reputations. (p.15). 
But Fragouli, et al. (2013) were slightly more cautious in their endorsement of planning:  
it can be implied that any organisation which lacks appropriate 
crisis management preparedness outlined through a CMP will 
suffer greater losses. (p. 369) 
Nevertheless, according to Burnett, (1998), “crisis management has become a 
booming industry” (p. 475) and insurers and auditors advocate BCR planning of some 
description, even if they are strangely reticent to value it in terms of reductions in their 
premiums. 
Discussion 
Essentially BCR is a comparatively new discipline which has grown quickly over the 
last two decades. This growth has been accompanied by a broadening of the scope 
of its activities from its origins in IT mainframe recovery to the current wider remit of 
resilience. Whilst BCR practice is encouraged by HM Government and alluded to in 
corporate reports it lacks regulatory or legislative compulsion and has no barriers to 
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entry to the profession. The standards which have been developed to support BCR 
have the benefit of being a common point of reference, but they risk becoming a ‘tick 
box’ exercise which does little to vouchsafe the quality of plans. Indeed, some 
commentators perceive standards to be counter-productive in that they inhibit 
innovation and creativity in the planning process which was advocated by Lengnick-
Hall, Beck & Lengnick-Hall (2011, p. 247) and the standards promote the idea of a 
direct and linear process which is the antithesis of Kay’s (2011) oblique and flexible 
approach to managing the complexity of the event. 
As a new discipline it has taken considerable time for any academic work to permeate 
to inform its practice and the main source of guidance stems from the trade association 
the BCI. The discipline’s infancy is demonstrated by a focus of semantic debate which 
indicates an attempt to achieve cognitive commonality but little challenge to or 
development of processes has taken place. Albeit some high-level consensus exists 
as to the idealised plan, the plan remains an ‘end in itself’ and BCR has so far failed 
to capture strategic recognition within most organisations. Three reasons might 
account for this. The first is that motivational factors for BCR are reported to be 
external and transitory in terms of durable effect. The second factor is the planner, 
with a multiplicity of roles and ill-defined reporting lines often lacks the corporate 
authority to effect significant change in the implementation of plans. The final factor is 
that the planner is of insufficient calibre to have the mind set to develop a strategic 
approach to BCR. However, it could be argued that the development of such an 
approach would depend on BCR having an effective paradigm on which to base any 
planning. The implication of this apparent lack of a paradigm is a critical issue that is 
central to the subsequent examination of the BCR literature. 
Whilst a great deal of discussion has been undertaken within the paragraphs of this 
chapter, it has outlined a comprehensive context of the nature of the industry, its 
origins, development, influences, issues, contributors and practitioners. This allows 
the subsequent debates to be seen against the backdrop of the industry and thereby 
the analysis is more purposeful and informed. Most importantly, it places the planner 
at the centre of the debate and demonstrates their ‘plight’ when confronted with a 
morass of literature, regulations, guidance, best practice and standards. 
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Chapter 4 BCR as an academically informed profession 
Introduction 
If BCR is a profession, then one might expect to discover strong academic 
underpinning foundations. Consequently, this chapter is designed to challenge the 
degree of influence of academic work on professional practice, what utility it maintains 
and what it suffers in its application to a plan.  
The format of the review in this chapter is three-fold. Firstly, a description of the 
materials is offered, followed by an assessment of its quality based on the criteria 
established in the methodology chapter (usually the criteria outlined by Minger (2000) 
will not apply as academic quality is assumed). Finally, an assessment of the degree 
to which it offers utility to the planner is suggested. 
The academic literature is categorised in terms of its specificity and utility to the 
planner. The chapter first deals with the issue of utility and then considers the literature 
which is focused on BCR practice and a crisis management approach to it. Secondly 
the literature considered to be significant in academic terms is reviewed. Finally, 
literature which offers retrospective insights, thereby informing future planning, is 
debated. 
BCR specific literature 
The relationship between academic work and professional practice is an uneasy one. 
Westley and Mintzberg (1989) mused on the transition of concepts from practice into 
research and what was lost in the process. 
A strange process seems to occur as concepts, culture and 
charisma move from practice to research…these concepts as 
they enter academia become subjected to a concerted effort to 
force them to lie down and behave, to render them properly 
scientific. In the process they seem to lose their emotional 
resonance, no longer expressing the reality that practitioners 
originally tried to capture. (p.17) 
The reverse is probably true; one can imagine the despair of academics as their 
carefully constructed research is misquoted, unattributed, or popularised to fit practice. 
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At particular risk seems to be the literature that has coined a term to describe the result 
of the research. Prime examples are: Janis (1982) ‘Groupthink’, Toft and Reynolds 
(1997) ‘isomorphic learning’, Taleb’s (2010) ‘Black Swan’, and Adams’s (1995) 
‘homeostasis’. Perhaps because of their brevity, they can be used easily and 
inappropriately as ‘factoid soundbites’. However, the genuine difficulty encountered by 
practitioners in applying academic work uses the analogy of osmosis, whereby 
academic work filters in slowly to underpin practice. A good example is to be found in 
BS 11200 (2014), wherein section 3.2 deals with ‘The potential origins of crises’. It is 
an encouraging but, in some ways, rather forlorn attempt to backfill some information 
to assist the planner. It is clearly redolent of at least three of the academics quoted in 
this chapter (Borodzicz, Turner and Toft), but this cannot be said for certain as the 
academic works remain un-attributed in the standard. This illustrates the osmotic 
movement of ‘ideas’ (for want of a better term) from a high concentration of academic 
content through a semi-permeable membrane of commercial interest to a location of 
low academic concentrations. ‘Commercial interest’ is introduced here as being the 
‘semi-permeable membrane’ required of osmosis. The selection of ‘commercial 
interest’ is based on the comments of Gower (1997) who, as a tutor of Scientific 
Method at Durham University, lamented that “some sorts of enquiries are deemed 
more important by those who pay” (p. 3).  
The utility of a piece of relevant academic work to the planner can be best expressed 
as the ease with which the work can be applied to the planning process. The 
contention of this thesis is that a lot of academic literature is either difficult to apply or 
worse still it has been ignored completely. An adjunct to this proposition is that much 
of the academic work that does survive the transition to practice is so diluted as to 
become little more than a homeopathic reference. Two examples are offered below to 
illustrate this contention. 
The work of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is incredibly complex, but it makes a clear 
differentiation between decisions made under either risk or uncertainty. I would not 
expect any BCR planner to be familiar with the work, but this differentiation is lost in 
(BS 65000, 2014, p. 2) where risk is defined as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives”. 
The authors then offer five clarification notes which also define uncertainty and 
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objectives. These illustrate the genuine difficulty when academic work fails to inform 
practice and its application is forlorn. 
Similarly, Lagadec’s (1997) advocacy of sensitivity to weak, ambiguous alarm signals 
as precursors of incidents is potentially influential to planning but very difficult and 
arguably costly to apply. For example, he notes: 
What is missing is the characteristic feature of an emergency: a clear 
trace that would justify triggering the warning procedures and 
mobilising resources. Lagadec (1997, p. 25).   
Given Lagadec’s statement, one can appreciate the difficulty of devising a reliable 
method whereby ambiguous signals would not also create false alarms. It is incredibly 
difficult to apply this in practice. 
Since 1996, the author has never been asked by any client to include any such 
theories or concepts in a plan or even to be mindful of them in its authorship. The 
themes that we will see emerging time after time are that pure academic articles tend 
to require purposeful application and manipulation to inform resilience practice. They 
are of limited appeal, often soundbite summarised and are little read beyond relatively 
few academically-qualified practitioners. 
Smith and Elliott (2006) included twenty-three essays in their classic reader on ‘Crisis 
Management’. Eighteen of the twenty-three essays selected, almost 80%, were 
published prior to 1994. As Saunders et al (2009) proposed that “…as information 
flows from primary to secondary to tertiary sources it becomes less detailed and 
authoritative but more easily accessible.” (p. 68) one might therefore expect, that these 
works would, by 2006 or at least by 2018, be informing professional BCR practice and 
that their influence might be evident in the plans and standards that have developed 
subsequently. In assessing if this is the case, there is of course a critical difference 
between an ‘absence of evidence’ for this proposition and a far more powerful 
argument of the ‘evidence of absence’. In the first case one just accepts that no 
evidence is apparent, in the second case one purposefully searches out evidence for 
the proposition that such works influence practice and, in this case, finds that there is 
indeed evidence of absence. 
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The Good Practice Guide and relevant International Standards reference none of 
Smith and Elliott’s carefully selected authors. BCI and HMG guidance is similarly 
devoid of references to these works albeit one can not discern how they might have 
influenced their author’s thoughts. The definitive guides such as they are, except for 
Heath (1998), only refenced to trade press articles also show no evidence of having 
been informed by these works. 
The reason that there is an evidence of absence of these texts informing practice is 
perhaps due to three factors. The first is the division of the texts by Smith and Elliott 
into sections, in which only section 4, with four authors, is entitled ‘Crisis management 
in Practice’. Thus, they implicitly admit the difficulty of applying the other nineteen 
works to practice and in this case the practice of planning. The second explanation for 
the evidence of absence of these works in practice is also implied by Lindstedt (2007) 
and Wong (2009) who outlined the strategic and managerial requirements of planners 
who could struggle to apply the nineteen more theoretical essays in the reader. Finally, 
one might also suppose that given the diversity of backgrounds of BCR planners, 
Barclay Simpson (2012), that those who hail from other disciplines such as security, 
IT or facilities might not reasonably be expected to have read this reader.  
From the 23 essays, two have been selected to illustrate the proposition that despite 
the reader’s persuasive power and high credentials the articles have not as Saunders 
et al suggest flowed into accessibility for the planner. The first essay is by Boin who 
writes seeking the paradigm for crisis management, the second considers one of the 
‘Crisis Management in Practice’ articles by Smart and Vertinsky.  
Boin (2006), cited in Smith and Elliott (2006), offered a chapter on ‘Organisations and 
Crisis’. For the practitioner this is pleasingly easy to read. On (p. 86) Boin makes a 
disarming admission that “Academics rarely agree on key terms”. He develops this 
argument to explain (p. 87) that this caused a disposition amongst early authors to 
engage in inductive searches for general theories. Whilst helpfully explaining the 
tendency towards semantic debate that the industry maintains, he also explains the 
‘ubiquitous’ nature of crisis and relates his thoughts precisely to Turner, Perrow and 
Shrivatava, whose concepts he summarises beautifully. He concludes by arguing that 
“Empirical research is scant…a situation that favours style over substance...these 
articles must be tested in empirical research”. (p. 94). Boin essentially has just 
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summarised the author’s argument that, the utility of many great and worthy academic 
works is limited and by implication much of the ‘grey literature’, which is examined 
later, lacks any rigour by being uninformed by these works. 
Smart and Vertinsky’s (2006) chapter deals with ‘Designs for Crisis Decision Units’. 
Their commentary touches on many of the topics outlined elsewhere in this thesis in 
chapter five, for example, the cognitive process, information distortion and group 
decision making. They take their work one stage beyond Boin by offering detailed 
summaries in Table 1 (p. 331). Thankfully for practitioner purposes, these are easy to 
assimilate. Their identification of the problems and their description of the 
“Characteristics and symptoms” are excellent. Unfortunately, their “Prescriptions” for 
the solution might appear slightly naive in practice. For example, they note that a crisis 
response group might have “Reduced cognitive abilities as a result of increased 
stress”. (p. 331) One of three “prescriptions” they offer is to “Develop stress profiles 
on leaders and use stress reduction techniques (TM [Transcendental Meditation], 
relaxation)”. This appears to be their own rather personal solution to the issue they 
identified and as such it might lack credibility in the workplace. It remains questionable 
if a practitioner of limited ‘rank’ in an organisation could persuade a Board or Exco to 
indulge such practices and consequently its utility to the planner is impaired. The ‘real 
politick’ is that Smart and Vertinsky are wholly correct in everything they propose but 
its application in most organisations would be either impossible or career limiting. 
The comments above are not meant to denigrate any of the authors’ work, rather, they 
argue very strongly indeed for a greater cooperative effort by academics and 
practitioners to author together applicable and realistic texts. 
 
BCR a crisis management approach 
This broadening of the BC process in the name of resilience is not unwise despite 
finding little favour with Lindstedt (2007). The inclination to broaden the perspective 
was academically considered before the burgeoning influence of ISO 22301 since its 
publication in 2012. Elliott, Swartz and Herbane (2010) and Elliott et al. (2010) in 
addressing business continuity from the perspective of crisis brought a partly new 
dimension to the debate. They have glued into the mental framework of planning a 
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degree of structure and proactivity that hitherto was hard to determine and is indeed 
absent from many of the documents used by most planners. They summarise the crisis 
management approach, and those elements of the approach germane to the planning 
process and which inform questions are outlined below: 
1. Emphasise the contribution that managers may make to the resolution of 
interruptions. 
2. Assume that organisations themselves may play a major role in ‘incubating the 
potential for failure’. 
3. Recognise that, if managed properly, interruptions do not inevitably result in 
crises. 
4. Acknowledge the impact, potential or realised, of interruptions on a wide range 
of stakeholders. 
5. Clearly recognise that a crisis unfolds through a series of salient phases, often 
providing managers with several points at which an intervention can be made 
to limit the impact of the threat faced by the organisation. (p. 4) 
These give rise to several critical questions as to the way or nature by which such 
issues are reflected in the plan or the planning process. For instance, Elliott et al. 
(2010, p. 117) note with approval the anticipation of events and a commendable lack 
of corporate complacency by Virgin Atlantic, who have a web page in reserve 
(ironically partly written by this author) ready to be released in the event of an air 
accident. Such broadening of the concept, whilst perhaps not intentional, can be seen 
to be validated by Elliott’s work and appears, at least presently, to be the future 
direction of the discipline. This document has considerable planning utility, the advice 
is logically derived and clearly presented. Notably, it verges on being akin to laying out 
some principles of planning. For example, point 5 above suggests that the plan itself 
could be phased to reflect the crisis unfolding. This is practical, useful advice to a 
planner. 
Significant academic contributions 
In some contrast to literature designed specifically for the BCR practitioner there is a 
body of work that is seminal in most university courses on the topic of BCR. These 
works are not prescriptive, they are more suggestive of considerations to be taken into 
account in the planning process. Their influence remains considerable, albeit the 
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tangible effect of their consideration is a lot less easy to determine in the planning 
process. 
Isomorphic Learning  
Twenty years ago, Toft and Reynolds (1997) identified several issues concerning the 
effective planning for contingencies. They noted the immaturity of the academic 
analysis of risk management. They observed that if the degree to which academic 
tuition is available is an indicator of maturity of a topic then the management of 
fortuitous and organisational risk is “...not a mature activity...”  (p.1). They considered 
the human and organisational factors that inhibit effective risk management. They 
debated the subjective nature of risk and the eclectic response. Toft and Reynolds 
(1997, p. 4) also gave a useful summary of the major problems of risk management, 
which could be said to bedevil resilience planning as well. They are paraphrased 
below: 
• The dispersal of the hazard concealing its extent and frequency. 
• Litigation hindering disclosure of information. 
• Staff embarrassment over their responsibility. 
• Information available not being amenable to analysis. 
• Difficulty in dissemination of lessons. 
• Management not learning through experience. 
• The impossibility of quantifying ignorance. 
• The unreliability of past experience in predicting future performance. 
One is tempted to think that this work is more recent than 1997, reflecting again the 
impression that little has changed. However, the work of Toft and Reynolds (1997) 
must be viewed from the perspective of how their research can be utilised to improve 
the planning process. They summarised their essential argument as  
Organisational learning may be defined as a cumulative, 
reflective and saturating process through which all personnel 
within organisations learn to understand and continually 
reinterpret the world in which they work by means of the 
organisational experiences to which they are exposed. (p.18) 
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Importantly they also note (p. 88) the perils of poor organisational memory, whereby 
invaluable lessons, due to incremental changes, drift over time into “organisational 
forgetfulness”. 
Therefore, the importance of Toft and Reynolds’ (1997) work to BCR planning is that 
an organisation which has a retentive corporate memory would incorporate such 
lessons and knowledge in their resultant plans. This allows them to actively anticipate 
incidents, and predetermine to some extent, and to initiate a response structure for 
them. Perhaps Toft and Reynolds’ enduring legacy is the plea for ‘isomorphic learning’ 
to occur so that the lessons from one industry can be applied to another. This is not 
often evidenced in the eventual plan but rather in a change in the mindset of the 
planner, which does influence planning considerations. The increasing use of the case 
study from the original and influential Hiles and Barnes (1999) Definitive Handbook to 
the more recent and very well researched (BP, 2006) Booklet 14 (comprising a 
catalogue of various incidents and lessons learned) reflects this desire for isomorphic 
learning. 
In this case, the essential academic idea has withstood the translation into practice. 
This successful transposition is perhaps due to the basic simplicity of the idea (often 
attributed, incidentally, to Bismarck) that the wise person learns from the mistakes of 
others. 
Turner’s six stage model 
An academic whose work is universally highly regarded and whose ideas should be 
applicable to resilience planning is Turner (1978). Briefly, he proposed the following 
model to explain the ‘pathology’ of disasters:  
Stage 1 – Notional Normal Starting Point.  
Stage 2 – The Incubation Period. 
Stage 3 – Precipitating Event. 
Stage 4 – Onset. 
Stage 5 – Rescue and Salvage. 
Stage 6 – Full Cultural Readjustments. 
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His work was highly influential on other academics, notably Perrow, Toft and 
Borodzicz. The systems theory approach to the examination of disasters and 
potentially improved planning for the future should be highly informative to the planner, 
but the elegance of the work of Turner must be balanced against its utility. The work 
of Turner (1978), Man-Made Disasters and the concept of the failure of socio-technical 
systems, was arguably seminal in this field, and his ‘Six Stage’ model has withstood 
the scrutiny of time and has shaped many public and judicial inquiries into disasters. 
However, the complexity of organisations is a major issue as noted by Browning and 
Shelter (1992), and despite favourable endorsement by subsequent studies, Toft and 
Reynolds (2005), Cox and Tait (1991) and Horlick-Jones (1990), the sheer complexity 
and interdependencies of modern systems with myriad permutations militates against 
easy analysis of the systems in advance of failure. 
Turner’s model is not simply difficult to apply because of complexity of systems that 
have evolved; (A point emphasised by Kay (2011)), the model itself is retrospectively 
oriented. In this model, latent defects incubate over time until a 'precipitating event' 
causes disaster and finally a learning process occurs. The snag lies in the application 
of such a model to current planning processes in a complex organisation. As a tool for 
planning it is difficult to apply. The problem is the near impossibility of being able to 
know or understand that which is not known or understood by the organisation 
concerned. For example, how can 'unnoticed events’ (in stage two of the model) 
become noticed? Although the model is useful in challenging the organisation to be 
self-questioning, it does not, in itself, provide a predictive risk management framework 
that can be utilised easily in the planning process. Add to these factors the comments 
of Elliott and Johnson (2010) that “few of our respondents reported a strategic 
approach nor did many appear to possess the necessary tools or mind-set to develop 
such an approach.” then one can appreciate why Turner’s work is seldom 
contemplated in advance of any incident. 
Risk Homeostasis 
The success of the ‘soundbite academic work’ is rare but fortunately Adams (1995), 
who referred to ‘risk homeostasis’ or the ‘displacement’ of one risk for another, 
survives translation into practice. The metaphor of a lump of clay is appropriate. Apply 
pressure in one place and the clay moves and alters according to pressure and 
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direction, but the lump retains the same volume and mass. In the same way, the net 
risk might remain the same despite focused actions in one specific area. If there is an 
application to planning, it is that an awareness of the phenomena might promote a 
more balanced risk assessment and an avoidance of scenario-based planning that 
ironically risks displacing risk.  
This notion seems reasonably well appreciated by practitioners who have seen the 
concept reflected in trade press and text books. Consequently, there has been a 
discernible move away from scenario-based planning to a broader more generic 
approach as advocated by Darling (1994, p. 7), Boin and McConnell, (2007), BS 
11200, (2014, p. 10), Regester, (1987, p. 75), Smith, (2013, p. 7) and Heath, (1998, 
p. 255). However, it does question if this was due to Adams’s work or whether ‘fashion’ 
dictated such a shift. Again, like Toft and Reynolds’ (1997) ‘isomorphic learning’, a 
simple but sound academic concept can survive the osmotic membrane to inform 
practice. Whether this is because of the essential simplicity of the idea or its 
phraseology having some intuitive appeal is less easy to determine. 
Social Capital And Supply Chain Resilience 
If following Boin’s and Lindstedt’s pleas, academic interest was not on the validation 
of the BCMS processes, then where was its focus? Two related issues had gained 
prominence which added new dimensions to BCR. The first was the burgeoning notion 
of ‘social capital’. Almost every commentator on the matter has sought to define it but 
Burt (2005 p 5) conveniently summarised Putnam, Coleman and Bourdieu’s 
commentaries and suggested that they would agree on the metaphor that, ‘social 
structure is a kind of capital that can create for individuals or groups an advantage in 
pursuing their ends. People and groups that do well are somehow better connected.’ 
The second area of growing attention is, perhaps since the Nokia /Ericsson, Phillips 
supplier failure in 2000, the ‘elephant in the room’ of ‘supply chain risk management’, 
Norrman and Janssen (2004), or what might now be termed supply chain resilience. 
Interestingly both topics are related; Uzzi (1997) highlighted that increased social 
capital strengthened supplier networks, (notably in this case with entrepreneurs’ 
bankers hence the essential relationship between social capital and supply chains), 
and Cohen and Prusak who noted that,  
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The size and intricacy of organizations, the proliferation of critical 
information, and the increasing complexity of tasks make 
connection and cooperation—social capital—increasingly 
important. (p.13) 
Despite their evident relationship it is easier to deal with the two topics separately. 
 
 
Social Capital 
Dealing first with Social Capital, the term was first coined, according to Cohen and 
Prusak (2001), in a discussion of school community centres in 1916, so, theoretically, 
it has had plenty of time to mature academically. In its current incarnation it offers an 
intuitive appeal to many businesses, the implications of ‘organizational advantage’ as 
described by (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998) and their ‘relational’ aspect of social capital 
which hints at a competitive advantage gained thereby are of obvious commercial 
appeal. The cosy, trusting relationships described by (Cohen and Prusak 2001) in their 
case studies echoes most case studies used in this field where notably ‘communities’ 
come together in the face of adversity is an attraction to any resilience planner. The 
concepts offered by (Adler and Kwon, 2002) and the community responses catalogued 
by the Liverpool Report implies that the ‘banked’ social good can be used to generate 
positive, cooperative responses in the face of adversity. This sounds like an almost 
Arthurian ‘Holy Grail’ for a planner where all the goodwill they have nurtured and built 
up over the years is returned ‘karma like’ in their time of adversity, when they most 
need help.  
It also sounds faintly naïve and one might reasonably suppose that since 1916 some 
common metric might have been developed to measure and demonstrate the claimed 
advantages and that companies might publish their social capital rating in the same 
way they proclaim their ‘triple A’ ratings and similar financial measures of approval. 
However, perhaps paradoxically whilst some embryonic ratings, based on corporate 
social responsibility endeavours exist, few such ratings which are internationally 
recognised are published by companies, and, as this thesis examines the plight of the 
planner, we must examine why no such quantification appears to be available.  
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Academic explanations are plainly evident; social capital is despite its potential 
advantages both ephemeral and occasionally counter-productive. In their balanced 
critique of social capital, Cohen and Prusak (2001) came close to echoing the ideas 
of Janis and ‘groupthink’ when they suggested that it could generate too cosy a 
relationship which thereby inhibited dynamic debate and consequent innovation. Other 
commentators have suggested that it is simply too difficult to measure and perhaps 
the critique of Coleman (1988) offers the best explanation of the comparative lack of 
uptake of social capital by many companies. In essence Coleman argues that the 
intangible nature of social capital when compared with financial, physical or human 
measures makes its attainment slightly ephemeral. Perhaps controversially, Coleman 
also saw the creation of this type of capital as inadvertent or unintentional. It is 
therefore little wonder that aside from the very pertinent and commendable examples 
offered by some case studies, (largely of physical, geographical communities in 
adversity), there appears to be little focus on this issue being manifested by fiercely 
competitive organisations.  
Thus, despite the identification of the advantages of social capital and its clear direct 
bearing on critical supply chains the planner is left with a conundrum. Social capital 
sounds like a good idea but it can be counter productive, and it is almost impossible 
to measure. It is little wonder therefore that in times of economic stringency, building 
social capital does not appear to be a priority for the BCR planner. Albeit a slightly 
personal perspective, in 23 years as a consultant neither I nor my six colleagues have 
been asked to assess any client’s social capital in respect of their resilience. 
 
Supply Chain Criticality  
In dealing with the second issue; supply chain resilience, or supply chain risk 
management, has clear links to BCR which were established by Norrman and Jansson 
(2004). As Christopher (2016) implied, it is perhaps impossible to understate the 
criticality of globalised supply chains in an increasingly internationalised trading 
environment. They are not merely important to the company or organisation concerned 
but to the consumers themselves and this issue should be uppermost in the minds of 
BCR planners.  
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In terms of definitions, it is most helpful to note the basic complexity, fragility and 
criticality of the supply chain issue as described by Chopra and Sodhi (2004) as a, 
delicate balancing act to keep inventory, capacity and other 
elements at appropriate levels across the entire supply chain in 
a dynamic, fast-changing environment. (p. 53)  
and its path to resilience is achieved by, 
continually stress testing their supply chains and tailoring 
reserves, managers can protect and improve the bottom line in 
the face of many types of supply-chain risks. Like Ericsson, smart 
companies do not wait for lightning to strike twice before taking 
action. (p. 61) 
If resilience can be termed a response to threats then the threats to the supply chain 
are perceived to be global, wide ranging and, admittedly with the benefit of hindsight, 
immediately following 9/11 the risk posed by international terrorism was commented 
upon by Sheffi (2001) and echoed later by Christopher (2016) with his prediction of 
globalisation of supply chains. The proposition therefore that supply chain resilience 
is an essential consideration for any BCR planner would appear to be almost self-
evident. The very nature of organisations, their dependency on supply chains and their 
fundamental symbiotic links through them to other organisations suggests that the 
preservation of such links through BCR measures would be axiomatic. However, what 
should be the case, is not always so. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive, authoritative work on global supply chain 
management was authored by Christopher (2016). The work highlighted (almost in 
social capital terms) ‘the relationships with suppliers and customers in order to deliver 
superior customer value at less cost to the supply chain as a whole’. Christopher also 
proposed that globalisation of the supply chains is inevitable and a ‘wider perspective’ 
to manage the ‘complex web of relationships’ is required. (p.3). Christopher (2016 p 
3) noted several interesting points. The first is that supply chain management is, 
relatively speaking, a new concept being brought to prominence in 1982 by authors 
Oliver and Webber writing for the consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton. They coined the 
phrase, ‘supply chain management’ and implicitly therefore its preservation. One can 
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make a good argument that the management and resilience of supply chains is so 
important it might be deemed a separate and distinct discipline with its own body of 
informative literature. Several companies retain staff specifically to manage the supply 
chain and the internal corporate departmental tensions in it which were commented 
on by Oliver and Webber. However, in other companies the mantle of dealing with at 
least supply chain disruption has fallen to the BC managers. Evidence for this 
proposition is identified in the BCI who by 2018 had published 10 annual summaries 
on what they term ‘Supply Chain Resilience Report (2018)’  
Naturally areas that are more prone to potential disruption and consequently the 
interest of insurers have attracted considerable academic attention. Lloyds has joined 
this movement and some of their literature authored by (Bichou, Bell and Evans 2007) 
places a commendable emphasis on practical shipping guides which are informative 
and usable whilst being academically informed. Complementing the baseline of 
guides, several detailed sub specialisms such as maritime logistics and port 
operations on which so much supply chain movement depends have arisen and 
considerable detailed insight into the relationships of the parties involved has been 
gained. An example of this genre is (Kwesi-Buor, Menachof and Talas 2016) whose 
work suggested an important relationship between the regulations and the industry 
actors’  
It is therefore clear that supply chain management and resilience is a hugely important 
aspect of any BCR planner’s remit. However, in addressing the plight of the planner 
the existence of considerable academic thought on the matter does not vouchsafe a 
coherent and diligent response. Nevertheless, so important is the matter of supply 
chain resilience that the BCI have devoted considerable effort to producing a series of 
annual reports on the matter the BCI Supply Chain Resilience Report (2018). 
The ‘call to arms’, of the well-established Supply Chain Resilience Report (2018) 
commentaries had a commendable response with 589 respondents in 76 countries. 
Just over half of the respondents had had some form of supply chain disruption in the 
last year (mainly at tier one level, that is to say their immediate suppliers). Of the 
respondents, 62% reported the incident’s total cost an estimated at less than €50.000, 
(p 18) Almost 20% of respondents were happy to accept take the financial impact 
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without insurance and a rather puzzling 52% did not know why the insurance did not 
cover the loss! 
Interestingly the report was quite self-critical and it highlighted ISO standards, ‘top 
management commitment’ as evidently a key factor. On page 3 it was noted that 
‘strong top management commitment …declines from last year (41-33%). 
Furthermore respondents…do not analyse the full extent of their supply chain in case 
of disruption compared to last year (from 22 to 30%), a feature described as ‘shocking’ 
on page 4 
On page 4 Jean-Pierre Krause, Global Head of Risk Engineering at the Zurich 
Insurance Company noted that, 
In many cases it would appear that many businesses do not 
really know who is supplying their key components and materials 
beyond tier one and have no practical contingency plans in place 
to deal with a disaster should it occur. 
This seems to imply that despite the availability of compelling literature such as the 
arguments of Kwesi-Buor, Christopher, Sheffi or Norrman and Jansson the attention 
devoted by some planners to the intricacies of supply chains is limited. Perhaps it is 
worth putting this in some form of comparative context so as to appreciate why this 
might be the case as it appears to be counter intuitive. First the respondents were 
members of the BCI but 589 responses out of 8,000-10,000 members, just over 7%, 
suggests some lack of concern or disconnection with the topic by the membership. 
However, 62% of 589 respondents loosing up to € 50,000 each gives a maximum 
possible loss for this section of respondents at just over €18million worldwide. It almost 
appears that there is an apathetic acceptance of the unlikely event occurring and a 
total likely loss of less than €50,000 at the individual corporate level. This 
‘uncomfortable truth’ might be to do with the fact that the cost of employing someone 
to remedy this small and unlikely loss is simply not worth it. Add to this the two thirds 
of ‘top management’ who only manifest disinterest in the topic and even most of those 
who are interested only looking as far as tier one suppliers and it paints a curious 
anomaly of a picture of how critical supply chain risk is really viewed by the BCR 
planner.  
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However, the commercial world seems to be increasingly split, if not neatly, at least 
into two groups. The first group is the very heavily supply chain dependent and the 
second group are those almost virtual companies which appear to have no need of 
specialist supplies aside from connectivity e.g. Colt, Verizon, Amazon, Microsoft, over 
which they exercise virtually no control. The first group are typified by companies that 
for instance depend on shipments of a single product or item, for instance regular 
biomass shipments from China to Irish power stations or reprocessed material to 
nuclear power stations. Other members of the first group include the incredibly diverse 
complex global supply chains which typify supermarket chains. Albeit one can argue 
that the former should stockpile biomass or refined plutonium and the later can run out 
of a few products without imperilling the viability of the whole organisation the second 
category is perhaps a product of modern times. Whereas, a hedge fund, for example, 
has almost no supply chain that cannot be sourced easily and quickly elsewhere; 
premises, systems, access, staff even are all relatively easy and quick to relocate or 
even replace. It would be convenient to presume that the BCI sample came from those 
organisations with less supply chain dependency and that corporate security 
precluded those with more significant events from declaring them. Unfortunately, this 
notion remains surmise as the study did not concentrate on this growing disparity of 
supply chain typology. 
CONCLUSION 
In respect of its academic credentials, the BCI 2018 report on supply chain was, once 
again, entirely unreferenced. It appears that the difficulty noted elsewhere in the thesis 
of the application of academic research in this area remains problematic. Once again, 
we are left to surmise that of the 294 responders who had actually had a supply chain 
incident few are concerned enough to go beyond cursory examination of their tier one 
suppliers. Perhaps as puzzling is the inclination, yet again, to conflate terms. The 
same table of threats that is used in other BCI horizon scanning studies is replicated 
and commented upon in the context of supply chains and not unsurprisingly cyber-
crime and hacking is now seen as a major global supply chain threat. 
Even despite there being a raft of germane academic material to inform supply chain 
resilience it appears that the BCR planner, if typified by the BCI membership 
responders, is unaware of a lot of the available literature. However, unless the 
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message is interesting, pertinent and makes cost savings the message could be lost 
on a commercial organisation. Just as is the case with the other analysis of the BCMS 
process in this thesis, social capital and supply chain management perhaps share the 
fate of other academic endeavours of not being easily applicable to the strategically 
limited BCR planner of the commentaries of Wong (2009), Lindstedt (2007) and Elliott 
and Johnson’s 2010 report. 
It is worth noting here that even the most well informed of advisors or consultants on 
BCR have omitted the vital area of supply chain management. The recent HE 
resilience guidance document Resilience in Higher Education Institutions (2014) 
makes no reference to social capital and supply chain resilience is entirely omitted. It 
is not that the two topics are mentioned in passing, they are absent from any word 
search or physical scrutiny. Whilst one might suppose that Universities with 
burgeoning league table obsessions should be interested in their social capital rating 
and concerned over many of their complex international supply chains. Nevertheless, 
the template for universities, written by Drs Eyre and Easthope and the ‘project 
owners’ being the Association of University Chief Security Officers makes no mention 
of either issue. 
 
Disturbing as the omission above might be, it is impossible to argue with any credibility 
that supply chain should not be a critical aspect of a BCR planners work in globalised 
supply systems, be they physical or virtual. Yet the conclusions of the report seem to 
suggest some worrying issues. The numbers of respondents were numerically high 
but a small proportion of the potential responders. Losses were comparatively low and 
the degree of scrutiny of supply chains was largely limited to tier one suppliers. 
Possible explanations include, the mind-boggling complexity of extensive chains, a 
disinclination to disclose possible losses and perhaps a lack of understanding of how 
the problem might be analysed and quantified and therefore justified to management. 
In a similar vein social capital certainly does not have any ease of application, utility, 
quantification or established tangible benefit to the planner. In contrast supply chain 
resilience has a raft of supporting academic validation and several proposed and 
pragmatic methodologies that would satisfy Lord Kelvin’s plea for measurement.  
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Explanatory studies 
For want of a better term, ‘explanatory studies’ ranks third in terms of influence on 
planners. They are not specific instructions, nor are they a priori considerations. They 
are tools whereby prior errors can inform future planning or, they can compensate for 
the complexity of the organisations concerned. However, given the limited strategic 
grasp of the practitioner, described by Wong (2007) and Elliott and Johnson (2010), 
they are not likely to be considered in most corporate planning processes. 
Retrospective explanations 
In the analyses above we see some simple ideas being reduced in detail and 
potentially applied to complex organisations. However, not all academic ideas are 
simple, and their complexity is often exceeded by the organisational complexity of the 
recipients. Many large organisations, for whom business continuity is a genuine 
priority, are, by any standards intensely complex. Browning and Shelter (1992) 
suggested the propensity for multiple realities to be perceived by various departments, 
units and potentially even countries. A view similarly alluded to, albeit retrospectively, 
by Reason (1990): 
Each participant's view of the future would have been bounded by local 
concerns...there would have been a multitude of individual stories 
running on in parallel towards the expected attainment of various distinct 
and personal goals. (p. 215) 
In planning terms, this suggests a need for the development of effective internal 
communications so as to maintain a common operational picture and to reduce any 
perceptive dissonance. Perhaps an echo of this can be seen in BS 11200 (2014) and 
the encouragement of situational awareness, even if the definition is ironically at odds 
with the academic concept of situational awareness offered by Endsley (1998). 
Thus, adding to the plight of the planner, we note three elements at work: complexity, 
differing perceptions and a retrospective focus in the literature. Turner’s model 
appears to have more utility as an explanatory tool than a predictive model and the 
predilection for academic hindsight, as introduced by Reason above. This might also 
explain the poor adoption of such theories by practitioners, and the distortions of 
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'hindsight bias', Fischoff (1975), have been noted by several commentators. Most 
especially pertinent in the critique of the application of retrospective studies is the 
degree to which ‘outcome knowledge’ causes overestimation of what could have been 
known at the time. Reason (1990) compassionately observed that 
Before judging too harshly the human failings that concatenate to cause 
a disaster, we need to make a clear distinction between the way the 
precursors appear now, given the knowledge of the unhappy outcome, 
and the way they seemed at the time. (p. 215) 
Whilst it is welcome that Reason provides such a strong caveat against hindsight 
judgmentalism, his last comment is paradoxical. If one was to be able to gain an 
unvarnished view of what a manager thought before a disaster, then presumably he 
or she would state that everything was ‘fine’. Thus, even a clear understanding of 
victims’ antecedent beliefs could be of little value in predicting failures and disasters. 
The latter point explains why, despite presenting some risk management advice 
based on retrospective analysis, the findings could still be denied by the parties 
involved. Their perception would be that they are not in a risk-prone situation. Whilst 
the work of Turner (1978) and Borodzicz (2005) have recently been briefly and 
anonymously utilised in recent ISOs, very little of their work appears to have 
permeated into the risk management elements of the BCR process where one might 
expect to discover some more detailed analysis to identify those hidden, latent 
incubating defects. This illustrates the difficulty of the application of the literature in 
practice. 
Complexity 
Perrow (1999) suggested that “the solutions to most human performance problems 
are technical rather than psychological.” (p. 233). His plausible logic was that it was 
easier to change the workplace and organisation rather than the minds of the individual 
workers. Perrow’s further work in (1999) highlights the complexity of systems and 
stresses the dangers of ‘tight coupling’ and interdependent systems in which 
“…failures are inevitable” (p. 5). However, he shifted the ‘blame’ for errors from the 
operators to the context in which the operators work. This idea was combined with the 
potential organisational rigidity of responses, process and procedures that can inhibit 
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operator initiative when confronted with systems failure. Therefore, the work of Perrow 
and others is useful in identifying just how far activities described as ‘contingency 
strategy’ can be determined in advance and to what extent contingency ‘policy’ has to 
be made during the incident. Nevertheless, the notion of ‘changing the workplace’ to 
reduce poor responses in the event of risk management systems failing is a utopian 
dream for most planners.  
However, Perrow (1967) had suggested that two aspects of an organisation’s activity 
determine the extent to which responses can be pre-programmed. These are, firstly 
the number of ‘exceptional cases’, i.e. novel situations and unexpected events liable 
to occur during the work and, secondly, the nature of the search process required to 
tackle the problem (is the solution a skills, rules, or knowledge-based issue). If the 
resilience plan can be conceived of as a response to an ill-structured and chaotic 
situation where the ‘rules and skills’ of risk management have failed, then any solution 
will require innovation and imagination. Therefore, any contingency plan needs to be 
broad enough to encompass the novelty and knowledge-based processing required 
for a successful resolution. Whilst encouraging and challenging, this idea of generating 
a plan which encourages such innovation is perhaps beyond the remit of the planner, 
who, is never encouraged to adopt Kay’s (2011) ‘Oblique approach’ to planning and 
who earlier in this chapter, was described by Elliott and Johnson (2010) as strategically 
challenged. 
Perrow has thrown down an interesting gauntlet that subsequent studies have 
declined to pick up. In planning, it is difficult to be specific as to which element is likely 
to contribute more to the human performance problem of running a contingency plan. 
Certainly, there are several psychological hurdles that, unless overcome, render the 
most technologically proficient system useless. Generally speaking, based on the 
author’s experience, a good team of bright individuals can make a poor plan work quite 
well, whereas a poorly led or motivated team of low calibre staff can frustrate the best 
laid plans irrespective of their technological advantages. However, if Perrow’s work 
suggests that the BCR manager begins overhauling the organisation for error-prone 
areas, this might be deemed as impractical as searching for Turner’s latent incubating 
defects. 
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Discussion 
This discussion is not designed as a consideration of the academic works themselves, 
rather it is illustrative of the utility and applicability of the work. The overall impression 
is that some theories/models/concepts are too complex to implement. Similarly, some 
organisations themselves are too complex in which to implement ideas uniformly. 
Good academic work and definitions seldom survive translation into ISO standards. 
Retrospective explanatory analysis models are difficult to apply. In an increasingly 
complex, globalised and interconnected world, as alluded to by Boin et al. (2010) and 
Perrow (2011), increasing ‘tight coupling’ is not going to go away and ‘unknown 
unknowns’ remain usually exactly that. However, some theories even when reduced 
to the soundbite like ‘homeostasis’ are nevertheless useful in informing planning 
considerations. 
However, the ‘fault’, if there is one, lies not wholly with the academic literature; it is 
shared by the industry being unable to apply them. The reason for this is that even 
given the abilities of the planners, proposed by Wong (2009) and outlined in Barclay 
Simpson (2017), and their status implied by the BCI (2017, b.), the planner simply 
lacks the skills to utilise them. This provisionally encourages a revision of the format 
in which academic literature is presented to the planners. This is to some extent an 
adaptation of Perrow’s ideas; in this case, it is probably easier to change the 
presentation of academic literature than it is to alter the academic inclinations or 
strategic limitations of planners. 
Thus, despite Smith and Elliott’s (2006) superlative compilation of 23 learned articles. 
(The book covers every aspect of the topic and is of an impeccably high academic 
standard.) much of the content remains difficult to apply, perhaps due to their lack of 
practitioner considerations. As noted by Boin (2006), empirical research as opposed 
to theory building is scarce and theory building is difficult to apply in practice. Toft and 
Reynolds (1997) on the other hand offers the idea of learning from the errors of others. 
The concept sounds ideal and, as described by the authors, it is highly beneficial. 
However, it really deals with risk management before an incident rather than a 
response to it and the deployment of a BCR plan, thus its utility is limited at least in 
the planning process. Elliott and Johnson (2010) is excellent in terms of gaining an 
understanding of the issues planners face and thereby increasing awareness, it is 
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probably one of the most authoritative works available. It is highly beneficial in 
informing the planner’s thinking as opposed to offering specific guidance to a planner. 
Turner’s seminal work in (1978) is superlative as an analytical framework for 
explanations of why something occurred and where the problem lay, and mentally one 
can bear these lessons in mind. However, it is more useful to an inquiry than a planner. 
It is very difficult to apply Turner’s work. Latent incubating defects or operational 
difficulties that are ‘normalised’ away would be notoriously difficult for anyone, let alone 
the planner, to identify. So, whilst all these works are of the highest possible academic 
credibility, they lack an ease of application by the planner and their translation into 
plans is thereby limited.  
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Chapter 5 Wider Academic literature germane to planning  
Introduction 
This chapter wrestles with a curious issue. There is relatively little specific planning 
literature offering advice to the planner, yet there is a wealth of literature that is not 
specific to BCR planning, but which can nevertheless inform its practice. The basis for 
its relevance is that people are responsible for planning and people operationalise 
those plans. They will do so under conditions of stress and uncertainty. This chapter 
considers the human factors that should be taken into account in BCR planning. It has 
several parallels with the type of literature that has influenced cockpit resources 
management, (CRM) Bennett (2006) who noted the possibly detrimental effects of 
automation on ‘sheer pilot skills’. In the world of BCR responses, similar skills remain 
a vital ingredient. Therefore, the chapter considers: the specific planning literature; the 
perceptions of risk; cognition; creativity; behaviours of groups; the principles of 
planning, and team structures. It concludes by questioning why such a body of 
literature with such evident application has not had a stronger effect on planning 
considerations. 
Plans and efficacy 
It would be perverse if the study neglected academic comment on the BCR plan itself. 
Yet it remains a topic which attracts comparatively little attention and is strangely not 
even apparently a focus for ISOs and the trade press (Du Bruin, 2013). Nevertheless, 
it is valuable to investigate what materials can be identified as being useful in the 
construction of a BCR plan. Surprisingly, there are some shared academic views but 
despite their commonality the resultant plans are not so uniform, nor is any 
commentator willing to give any definitive quantitative judgment or endorsement of any 
plan style or format (Parnell, 2014). Perhaps this is the ultimate irony in the plight of 
the planner as the outcome of all their work seems the least regarded feature of the 
process. This is despite Elliott and Johnson (2010) reporting that the resultant plan 
and not the process remains the goal of most planners. 
Academically, extensive scenario-based planning, which, despite being inherently 
criticised by Kay (2011) remains popular with some organisations and practitioners 
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(possibly because of audit pressure to have detailed plans), is generally not favoured. 
It is described as “folly for managerial leaders to spend a great deal of time conjuring 
up all the crises their firms potentially may face in the future” (Darling, 1994, p. 7). This 
perspective was endorsed by Boin and McConnell (2007):  
Developing plans that work for the endless array of complex, 
chaotic and destructive scenarios that arise from interlocking and 
often mutually dependent infrastructures may be all but impossible. 
(p. 53) 
Supporting documentary sources reflect the academic perspective. BS 11200 states 
that “the CMP should be as concise as possible…The CMP should be focused on the 
provision of a generic response capability” (BS 11200, 2014, p. 10) (CMP crisis 
management plan). 
This latter statement in BS 11200 (2014) recommends a generic plan and advocates 
the merits of brevity. This injunction is widely supported, “the plan should not be too 
rigid and specific, however, nor too long” (Regester, 1987, p. 75) and “the larger the 
‘plan’, the less likely it is that the plan will actually be used in an emergency” (Smith, 
2013, p. 7). However, Heath’s caveat balances the debate to some extent: “For large 
organisations or those organisations undertaking work that entails complex risks, 
plans need to be specific and extensive” (Heath, 1998, p. 255), and he also importantly 
notes “do not over plan as this adds inflexibility”. (Heath, 1998, p. 261)  
There appears to be a tension between the academic and ISO injunctions for brevity 
and the desires of auditors who, in the author’s experience, find longer, more scenario-
based plans more acceptable. This might reflect their commercial drivers, where the 
usual audit of a plan takes two to three days or more for larger organisations. Such a 
duration of visit would be exploitative if a good plan was potentially too short and 
concise. This tension between academic advice and commercial audit requirements 
is not likely to be resolved easily. An example of this is a university plan, known to the 
author, only one section of which, exceeded a total of 200 pages. This perhaps reflects 
the advice to Universities offered by their own BCR body whose recommendation is 
55 pages long in the first instance. (UCISA, undated) 
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However, might the auditors have a point: could brevity be to the detriment of efficacy, 
and, if so, how might efficacy be determined? Unlike the world of clinical trials, the 
assessment of resilience planning efficacy is stubbornly subjective and non-empirical. 
When confronted by the ‘efficacy question’ commentators start to refer to ‘intuition’ 
and heavily caveat their statements.  
Although a positive link between crisis readiness and crisis 
management effectiveness is intuitive, it is well established that 
effective crisis management is a function of both preparation and 
improvisation. (Parnell, 2014, p. 4) 
the existence and use of a formal plan do not by any means 
determine the effectiveness of the crisis response. (Boin, t'Hart, 
Stern, & Sundelius, 2005, p. 146)  
Other commentators focus on what might be termed a ‘results-based retrospective’. 
In this model “effective refers primarily to such factors as productivity, survival, and 
maintaining morale”. (DuBrin, 2013, p. 3) Naturally this perspective lacks predictive 
validity and DuBrin protests that “theory and research about what constitutes effective 
crisis leadership characteristics are less abundant than opinion and advice about the 
same topic”. (DuBrin, 2013, p. 3)  
Evidently, without any control group, objective measurement of potential plan efficacy 
remains elusive, but perhaps it might be informative to consider the proficiency of the 
responders. Could efficacy be a reflection of the capabilities of the staff? If so, then 
what are the capabilities that are essential? Clearly good quality decision making is 
key to the resolution of a resilience issue. “The speed with which a crisis develops 
means that crisis decision-making is crucial in determining success in handling a 
crisis.” (Elsubbaugh, Fildes, & Rose, 2004, p. 121). Some emphasis has undoubtedly 
shifted from planning to people and team training: “Rather than trying to think of 
everything a team should be ready for, it is more realistic to develop a team that is 
ready for everything.” Bland (2013, p. 57). Lengnick-Hall, Beck & Lengnick-Hall (2011, 
p. 247) also found merit in this idea of creativity and innovation being at least as 
important as planning. They referred to US Navy SEAL training which enables their 
commandos to:  
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develop well-practiced responses that enable them to make sense 
out of their situation, develop creative solutions, and adapt in ways 
that accomplish their missions. 
Heath, who is quite conservative in his advocacy of detailed planning, verges on being 
quite radical in his description of the zenith of resilience planning:  
Probably the best level of planned readiness is to be able to discard 
references to the plan because the response, tasks and objectives 
are familiar to the users. (Heath, 1998, p. 262) 
However, this ‘grail’ is almost unattainable outside of the ‘blue light’ or armed services 
who have the luxury of comparatively extensive training time.  
The academic consensus on the plan that remains is that it should be as short as 
reasonably possible and be a mechanism by which decisions can be taken speedily. 
This does not seem to have translated well into the auditable standards and 
‘professional’ advice. In a private communication to the author (dated 23-03-17) the 
resilience planner of a government department complained that an auditor (from one 
of the larger accounting practices) had demanded not only an incident response plan, 
but also a business continuity plan, a crisis management plan, a disaster recovery plan 
and, finally, a communications plan. Again, the planner is left with the plight of: 
academic endorsement of a short plan being at odds with audit requirements; the 
constraint of having to use the existing staff (who are seldom US Navy SEALS), and 
to have little time to rehearse a plan that must work for any potential scenario. 
Psychological literature related to planning 
Risk perceptions  
We now add the personal, group and/or psychological issues to this catalogue of 
woes in the utility of academic theory informing resilience practice. Wagenaar & 
Groeneweg (1988), commenting on a review of shipping accidents, echo Reason’s 
work and Perrow’s consensus on complexity, but they add a human feature that of a 
simple ‘belief’ that the accident is impossible: 
Accidents appear to be the result of highly complex coincidences 
which could rarely be foreseen by the people involved. The 
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unpredictability is caused by the large number of causes and by the 
spread of information over the participants...Accidents...occur 
because people do not believe that the accident that is about to 
occur is at all possible. (p. 42) 
It is acknowledged by (Reason, 1997) that even a trained observer might not be able 
to identify the impending disaster which, to a lay commentator after the event, could 
have been easily identifiable. If BCR can be defined as a response to the known 
threats and risks, then something else is required to deal with events which are either 
unforecastable by even prior expert analysis or are catalysed by the antecedent 
beliefs of the organisation. If this is the case, then the need for effective resilience 
planning for unanticipated events is justified. This leads the literary trail of 
‘breadcrumbs in the wood’ to risk perceptions and cognition. 
Most academics agree that risk has multiple definitions and that it is inherently 
subjective, at least in its appreciation. Lopes (1987, p. 255) made a useful suggestion 
of how risk can be viewed as a decision made between knowledge and ignorance. 
Most of the decisions made in planning fall into the category of being neither fully 
quantifiable nor made in complete ignorance of the probabilities; they are often classic 
decisions made under uncertainty. However, the complexity of a business 
continuity/resilience team is compounded by being a ‘group’ of people. As Lopes 
(1987) also noted, their degrees of optimism, pessimism and risk appetite will vary. 
They will probably have trained together, and the group will be chaired by the most 
senior person, yet they have to deal with poor levels of information and make decisions 
in a high pressure, tense environment. Furthermore, they will all think differently and 
have differing perceptions of risk and, behaviourally, ‘groups’ are different to 
‘individuals’. The planner’s plight is therefore to try to accommodate all these variables, 
in advance of an incident, in a plan. The following literature was selected to shed some 
light on what features should be taken into account in the planning process.  
Notable is the work of Kahneman & Tversky (1979), which suggested that people are 
likely to be prone to the ‘reflection effect’, p 268 and be risk-seeking in the face of 
potential losses. It was also noted that in such cases of gambling, the subjective values 
attached to probabilities do not behave mathematically. This is vitally important, as 
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most BCR teams will be operating under the condition of potentially making a loss. It 
should be imperative to consider such biases in the planning process, especially in the 
risk assessment section of planning, to offset such a risk-taking propensity. However, 
it is difficult to believe that these theories are even known to most planners. In two 
decades of practice, no practitioner or client has ever asked the author for such 
concepts to be considered in the risk assessments or for an ‘offset’ for such potential 
predilections to be built into the plan. 
Whereas Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979), subjective expected utility theory and 
prospect theory, which was alluded to above, might be good indicators of preferences 
in the initial planning, what other psychological factors can be traced throughout the 
risky event? It would seem reasonable that if one is dealing with an incident or crisis 
in a corporate environment then motivation to succeed would be high. The 
'personologist's' perspective of risk is illustrated by Lopes (1987). This was 
demonstrated by the 'ring toss games' in which motivation, probability and incentive 
were examined. The experiment studied subjects’ optional distance from a target over 
which rings had to be thrown. The resultant deduction concerning the  
compromises that must be made between certainty and 
incentive...or the motive to achieve success and the motive to 
avoid failure... (p. 259) 
are again useful indicators and illustrative of a wide diversity of approaches to the 
same risk. However, it is difficult to extrapolate a child's game into the resilience 
planning situation where the situation is far more complex. Notwithstanding this, 
ignoring the perceived situation and motivation of response staff in the planning and 
response phase is arguably unwise. 
Whilst useful in identifying preferences, the application of a raw theory to BCR 
planning should be cautioned against. Apart from any other limitations, such theories 
are almost exclusively based on gambles where the participant is powerless to 
influence outcomes. In practical terms this seems to differentiate gambles from risks, 
in the corporate environment a decision can be varied and amended in response to 
circumstances, made on the basis of feedback. Something that is amenable to change 
after the initial decision is a risk. Something where the odds are fixed or unknown is a 
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gamble. A horse race is a gamble in that no bets are taken after the race commences. 
A risk decision could be likened to amending bets during the race. Once again, the 
concept is fascinating but of limited applicability. Lopes’s experiment is delightfully 
simple but the issues of motivation and reward being taken into account in planning 
are probably beyond the scope of the average BCR planner. Similarly, the niceties of 
distinctions between gambles and risks are not of great utility in the planning process. 
Cognition 
If the application of a plan is an ongoing process in a risk situation that can be altered 
by intervention, then the generation of thought in planning and dealing with an incident 
must be vital. If so, then at least some recognition of thinking (cognitive styles) should 
be considered in the drafting of an idealised BCR plan. Research by Saarinen (1973), 
which developed concepts proposed by Briggs (1971), indicated, through the medium 
of the drawing of maps, a preference to attach greater importance to objects which 
were either familiar or important to the participants of the study. One might suppose 
that, faced with a diverse set of risks to be managed in a crisis, the responders would 
preferentially deal with those with which they have some familiarity or intuitively attach 
importance to. Therefore, without awareness of this cognitive phenomenon, it is likely 
that such a plan would be more a reflection of the experiences of the planner not the 
responders. Potentially the planner will lack the balanced approach to accommodate 
the importance of issues as perceived by the responders. Therefore, a convincing 
case can be made for any plan to be ‘sanity checked’ by a non-planner to ensure that 
concentration on a specific issue is neither over nor under stated. 
Wason (1968) and Wason & Johnson-Laird (1970) conducted studies showing that a 
negative sentence or statement took longer to interpret and was more likely to be 
misinterpreted than a positive one. They also noted that subjects tended to search for 
conforming instances of rules rather than, as might be logical in certain cases, to 
search out non-conformances. The relationship of these studies to BCR is difficult to 
discern as the results are more obviously linked to what most observers would call 
ability to ‘spot a risk’. However, the studies do suggest that unless one searches out 
non-conformities then possibly some risk will have been misconstrued as not existing. 
If all the observer does is seek conformity to endorse notions of how something should 
be, then it is less likely that any flaw in the plan will be spotted. For example, in a 
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planning process it could be the case that information or 'intelligence' would be sought 
in support of the plan rather than by identifying challenges to it. The importance of this 
to the planning process is the constructive criticism or review by a third party to ensure 
that non-conformances are welcomed and not glossed over. 
Hudson (1966) similarly differentiated two cognitive styles. Convergent thinking, a 
logical seeking of a 'right' answer, seemed most common in subjects who were 
'science' oriented at school. Divergent thinking, a more creative, innovative, 
unconventional style, was associated with those good at 'arts' subjects. The possible 
relationship to BCR planning can be seen in the preference for objective, quantitative 
analysis by convergent thinkers and a predilection to favour qualitative information by 
divergent thinkers. The additional importance of a divergent approach lies in the 
potential flexibility of response teams to come up with innovative and powerful 
solutions to unexpected situations. This can be contrasted with a more convergent 
approach that would favour a strict rehearsal of identifiable risk and crisis scenarios. 
It would therefore appear that some balance of thinking styles should be the best 
foundation on which to build an effective contingency plan. This would be a plan which 
utilises the best strengths of the available responders and does not exclude unlikely 
scenarios and solutions. Yet again, in 22 years of practice, the thinking style of any 
team has never been remarked upon by any client nor, as far as I am aware, has it 
informed any plan that I have had to review. 
Creativity  
One of the limitations of any BCR plan is budgetary. 'Blue sky' options are unaffordable 
to most companies. How then can the BCR planner get the best possible response 
without overrunning prudent costs? This is seldom addressed in any specific literature 
but the issue can be seen to have been considered obliquely. A study by Glucksberg 
(1962) revealed the disinclination of subjects to utilise a logistic resource (in this case 
the tray of a box of matches) for a purpose other than that for which it was designed. 
In similar fashion, unless a company’s resources are viewed with recognition of their 
obvious alternative functions, extra costs might be incurred, or opportunities lost in the 
maximisation of effectiveness of a contingency plan. In short, an effective BCR plan 
avoids ‘functional fixedness’. These ideas are also closely allied to the Gestalt 
'Einstellung' limitations to thinking where thinking about options at the very boundaries 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 85 
 
of a problem, seems to become increasingly limited, a point echoed by Miller (1956). 
Potentially it requires the solutions offered by de Bono (1977) of lateral thinking. The 
idea of brain-storming being a solution that maximises the synergy of a work group is 
now well established in business. Certainly, there seems little doubt that it should be 
used as a planning tool in the BCR plan. However, it is the author's experience that 
brainstorming sessions are more appropriate for identifying problems than proposing 
solutions. The proposition of solutions seems to require a greater degree of thought 
and consideration than brainstorming can offer a point implied by Pauchant and 
Douville (1992).  
Ghiselin (1952) proposed three stages of creativity in response to a problem. The 
process goes from familiarisation with the topic, which could take considerable time, 
to incubation, an unconscious process of deliberation, followed by activity when the 
results of the unconscious cogitations are captured. Whilst the compilation of a 
corporate contingency plan is arguably less dramatic than composing music, poetry or 
mathematical formulae, at least some of the problems posed require a comparable 
thought process. Given limited resources, time and complex problems, such as 
terrorism or an active shooter, then such a creative approach might be warranted more 
often than is allowed for in the usual corporate desire for plans to be constructed to 
auditable standards and implemented as soon as possible. A personal communication 
to the author 110518 by the head of continuity for a German bank in London endorsed 
the view that the process is ‘little more than a tick box exercise’. The evident question 
of ‘Is the planning recognised as a creative process?’ remains almost entirely 
disregarded by standards and, naturally of course, and possibly most critically, ISO 
auditors. It might be just too problematic to have a standard for BCR creativity. 
Group/Team Behaviours  
Almost all resilience responses are conducted by groups of people and there is a lot 
of potentially important academic work on this matter. This apparent conformity and 
inclination to unquestioning standardisation, alluded to above, is addressed in large 
measure by Janis. His vehicle for debate was an analysis of flawed US foreign policy 
decisions. In the preface to his second edition, Janis (1982) describes the thoughts 
that led to his writing the book.  
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I began to wonder whether some kind of psychological 
contagion, similar to social conformity phenomena observed 
in studies of small groups had interfered with their mental 
alertness. (p. vii) 
The similarities between the decision-making groups in Janis's book and the corporate 
groups (risk policy units and crisis management teams) are evident. They both 
determine the survivability of the unit concerned and have similar hierarchical 
characteristics. Both groups also deal with decisions made under conditions of 
uncertainty. It therefore seems reasonable and worthwhile to include the dimension of 
Groupthink in the analysis of corporate contingency planning procedures.  
The danger of Groupthink in BCR responses is far greater than Groupthink concerning 
policy decisions. Whereas policy decisions at least can be reviewed, the short time 
frames in the implementation of BCR plans preclude the luxury of review; they have 
to be right first time. If the ‘Plan’ fails to achieve its aim, the company may not survive 
the incident. Groupthink also has increased pressures due to its seriousness and as 
Janis (1982) mentions 
...the advantages of having decisions made by groups are 
often lost because of psychological pressures that arise when 
members work closely together, share the same values and 
above all face a crisis situation in which everyone is subjected 
to stresses that generate a strong need for affiliation. In these 
circumstances, as conformity pressures begin to dominate, 
groupthink and the attendant deterioration of decision making 
set in. (p. 12) 
BCR responses based on a plan are normally made by a group of people. Whilst one 
person may apparently be in overall charge of the group the decision is technically a 
group decision. 
Janis's précis (p. 175) of the seven defects in decision making which contribute to 
failures in adequate problem solving is as follows, and it amply illustrates the topic’s 
relevance to contingency issues: 
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1. Incomplete survey of alternatives. 
2. Incomplete survey of objectives. 
3. Failure to examine risks of preferred choice. 
4. Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives. 
5. Poor information search. 
6. Selective bias in processing information at hand. 
7. Failure to work out contingency plans. 
And most critically he notes  
...members consider loyalty to the group the highest form of 
morality. That loyalty requires each member to avoid raising 
controversial issues, questioning weak arguments, or calling 
a halt to soft headed thinking. (p. 11) 
Who, if anyone, should challenge groupthink in the context of resilience planning in 
the corporate environment? Few managers have either the moral courage or the 
confidence or the strategic vision, as noted by (Elliott and Johnson, 2010) to do this. 
The reasons for this inability to play devil’s advocate and break the chain of groupthink 
is deeply ingrained in the training of many such managers. 
Several psychological phenomena, cognitive processes and the propensities of 
groups are relatively well publicised and known by many practitioners; however, the 
issues have not translated at all well into mainstream advice and practice. In contrast, 
whilst Janis’s work might be appreciated by practitioners, it might not be a ‘job prospect 
enhancing act’ to bring it to the attention of the very board members and superiors 
who might be prone to Groupthink 
Planning principles  
Principles 
If academic theories remain difficult to apply to the practice of BCR, it still might be the 
case that academic work can, nonetheless, inform the development of underpinning 
resilience planning principles and doctrines. A general overview was compiled by 
Pauchant & Douville (1992, p. 46), who summarized the works of 24 authors writing 
on crisis management and related issues. Although their study focused on crisis 
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management it remains a useful summary of the literature of the field up to 1991. 
Notably it tends to highlight, albeit inadvertently, the inapplicability of theory to practice. 
In summary of the work of Pauchant and Douville, they observed that authors 
concentrated on the construction of theories (an issue raised later by Smith and Elliott 
(2006)), and on three other areas of interest:  
• technological issues,  
• subjective/cultural issues,  
• and social criticism.  
More minor topics investigated included issues of 
• structure,  
• strategy,  
• communication  
• and management of diverse stakeholders. 
Searches by Pauchant and Douville showed that 80% of the literature on crisis 
management had been published post-1985 thus illustrating the infancy of this field of 
research (a point noted by Toft five years later). Of the articles analysed, the dominant 
theme of ‘theory building’ was also seen to endorse the juvenile stage of the field of 
research. The authors proposed a definition of crisis that they felt would be acceptable 
to most commentators:  
crises are disruptive situations affecting an organisation or a given 
system as a whole and challenging previously held basic assumptions; 
they often require urgent and novel decisions and actions, leading 
potentially to a later restructuring of both the affected system and the 
basic assumptions made by the system's members. (p. 46) 
They found that their research endorsed that of others, which indicated a 
fragmentation of the field and a lack of an overall paradigm. However, eight specific 
topics of research could be identified; their findings are summarised below. All the 
factors identified are relevant to the construction of BCR plans. 
1. The process of a crisis evolves through different stages and requires proactive 
or reactive measures depending on the stage of the crisis. 
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2. Crises and crisis management efforts can be grouped into families and thus 
give a rationale to managers on which to base strategy. 
3. Crises are the result of complex, systemic interrelationships among many 
different variables whose analysis requires a broad perspective rather than a 
detailed analysis of a few variables. 
4. The importance of the interrelationship between human and technological 
systems. 
5. Given the stages of a crisis and the system’s relationships, proactive 
preventative methods and management actions, including the identification of 
early warning systems, have been proposed. These include simulation, 
training, risk reduction, assessment and issue management. 
6. The proposition of factors likely to limit the effects of a crisis or accelerate 
recovery of the system. 
7. The identification of characteristics of crisis-prone and crisis-resilient 
companies and the need to audit companies to identify the degree of crisis 
vulnerability. 
8. The identification of positive spin-offs of crises in the generation of positive 
changes. 
It seems, therefore, that one of the more useful outputs of this work could be the 
establishment of ‘principles’ on which the contingency plan should be based. This 
notion might be ‘seen through a glass darkly’ in the authorship of strategy and scope 
documents in the resilience process, but it will be revisited in the concluding chapter. 
Team structures and corporate culture 
If the doctrines and principles are difficult to discern, then at least the applicability of 
academic work on planning within the domain of the corporate culture might be easier 
to assimilate into the BCR planning process. Inherent in any plan is the requirement 
for crisis management teams to take decisions within the context of a company’s 
existing hierarchy and culture. If cultural sensitivity is included in the plan, this could 
improve the ability of the team to take better quality decisions, thus literature on this 
topic is worth including in this review. 
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Morgan (1986) discusses various types of “species of organisations” (p. 57). He 
suggests that an “adhocracy”, a term coined by Warren Bennis, is often formed for 
specific tasks. It is usually comprised of project teams for a specific task and is 
disbanded after its achievement. Adhocracies often use a matrix structure of 
organisation and, if properly utilised, this can encourage “flexible, innovative and 
adaptive behaviours”. This ideal is not too far removed from Ghiselin’s (1952) 
commentary on the need for creativity mentioned earlier. Whilst Morgan rather 
concentrates on their employment in development projects, it seems apparent that 
their characteristics are akin to those needed in BCR teams. But, as a caveat, Morgan 
notes that such units have two major drawbacks, namely: the staff can tend to identify 
more with their original department than the newly formed team and this divided loyalty 
can erode the effectiveness of their contribution; and secondly, such units can become 
dominated by meetings that become time consuming.  
In the context of BCR planning, both drawbacks are likely to be damaging to effective 
and speedy decision making, but there does seem to be an appeal for ‘creativity in 
crisis’ which might be seen to outweigh the disadvantages of the adhocracy. 
At the macro level, Peters and Waterman (1986,pp. 89-327) cited in Morgan (1986, p. 
61) proposed eight basic practices of successfully managed companies. Paraphrased 
from the American into a more English-friendly idiom they are as follows: 
1. A bias for action. 
2. Closeness to the customer (rapid stakeholder communications). 
3. Autonomy and entrepreneurship. 
4. Productivity through people. 
5. Hands-on, value-driven. 
6. Concentration on core business (critical activities identified in the business 
impact analysis). 
7. Simple form, lean staff (small BCR teams with high levels of autonomy). 
8. Effective command and control whilst retaining empowerment (the Home Office 
concept of subsidiarity). 
Almost all of these can be identified as the requirements of a successful BCR 
management unit. The question remains as to how these features can be built into the 
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unit in the formation phases of contingency planning. If, indeed, there is any doctrine 
that informs planning without it being acknowledged or apparent, it is these comments. 
They illustrate the possible translation of the ideas into the planning principles, or what 
might in the final chapter be termed ‘doctrine’. 
Fundamental to the efficacy of the crisis management effort is effective decision 
making. Morgan (1986) suggests that from Herbert Simon’s theories of human 
rationality it follows that an organisation can be understood as an institutionalised brain 
that “fragments, routinizes and bounds the decision-making process in order to make 
it more manageable”. Morgan cites Galbraith’s research on the relationship between 
uncertainty, information processing and organisational design. Morgan comments 
that:  
Uncertain tasks require that greater amounts of information be 
processed between decision makers during task performance. The 
greater the uncertainty, the more difficult it is to program and 
routinize activity by preplanning a response. (pp. 81-84) 
The more normal corporate responses to this problem are to increase both slack 
resources and self-contained tasks and, concurrently, to increase information 
processing capacities. This latter task is not merely an improvement in the IT 
capability, but rather the development of lateral communication and matrix forms of 
management. Therefore, it seems apparent that the design of any contingency plan to 
operate in conditions of uncertainty has to facilitate greater-than-usual information 
flows between decision makers.  
Discussion 
Despite a considerable body of academic literature germane to BCR planning, its 
application remains hampered by the position and status of the planner within the 
organisation. The Planner described by the Barclay Simpson (2017) summary, Wong 
(2009) and the BCI (2017, b.) Horizon Scan is simply incapable of applying most of 
the ideas in this literature. As long as the planner lacks strategic capacity and as 
importantly strategic status such a body of literature is unlikely to ever be taken into 
account in the planning process in the majority of cases. Whilst there are no standards 
of entry to BCR planning and the BCI maintains such relatively low standards of entry 
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to the institute, then it is likely that the status of the practitioner will be perpetuated and 
whatever academic work is conducted will languish in some obscurity. The majority of 
current planners do not have easy board level access and to imagine that they can 
undertake detailed analysis of behaviours, cognition, and risk perceptions that could 
influence their plans is simply naïve. This situation therefore demands that the 
academic literature be rephrased and made more accessible. 
The review of this literature which potentially informs BCR practice is not particularly 
encouraging in evoking any conclusion other than that BCR is only marginally informed 
by dilute literature. Economic pressures driven by regulation and audit practice appear 
far more influential on a planner’s mind than the differentiation between risk and 
uncertainty, and the brittle egos of many executive boards may perpetuate Janis’s 
Groupthink. What survives to inform practice are a few phrases, a homeopathic 
quintessence of wisdom, which is often misquoted and misapplied. Cognition, 
perception and creativity are mentioned obliquely, sometimes amongst my peers, but 
such topics go wholly unremarked in the new proliferation of standards which were 
intended to professionalise BCR practice.  
To the author’s knowledge, almost none of my client contacts, who are generally 
senior managers in FTSE top 500 companies, have read any of the works mentioned 
above. In informal conversation, one client had heard of ‘groupthink’ but could not 
recall what it was until prompted. Informally, their consistent explanation is one of time 
pressure and not knowing of the articles’ existence. This is a swingeing critique of the 
educative process inherent in the BCI’s professional development programme, as 
many of them are members or fellows of the BCI. In a slightly ‘Rumsfeldian’ way, they 
do not have time to discover their ‘unknown unknowns’. Their plea is to have the works 
précised and published in a ‘chunk’ that would be readable on a short train journey, 
and, preferably, the academic principle contained in it would be related to a case study. 
Perhaps the translation of purely academic articles into mainstream readership is best 
illustrated by a snapshot sample taken from the Journal of Business Continuity and 
Emergency Planning Vol 9 No 1 Autumn/Fall 2015, Henry Stewart Publications, 
London. This is an interesting publication with largely practitioner authors and an 
editorial panel of practitioners only some of whom are academically qualified. This 
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particular issue published 10 essays on diverse set of topics. Most were referenced 
some in considerable detail. However, of the 157 references only twenty-one might be 
considered to be academic works, (interestingly seven of the twenty-one academic 
references were in one article authored by a Cranfield University masters graduate). 
The remaining references were to authoritative but non-academic sources such as 
‘ready.gov’ or FEMA articles, trade reports and articles or census surveys. 
Notwithstanding the ratio of academic sources (13%) it is encouraging that such work 
is being authored and one can sense the desire for authorities to be evident and 
consequently professionalise the articles, yet it still illustrates the propensity of the 
practitioners to use non-academic sources and it is reflective of what genuinely 
influences planners. 
All the works above are genuinely difficult to apply to the planning process. 
Nevertheless, they should be read by the planner whose education and insight would 
be enhanced by the experience. So, it is with some trepidation that the chapter ends 
with a slightly forlorn introduction to the next chapter, which debates the influence, 
quality and utility of the ‘best practice’ and the rash of these recent standards. Perhaps 
it is simply the case that BCR lacks the academic power to be a paradigm, a sentiment 
alluded to by Pauchant and Douville (1992) and Alexander (2013).  
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Chapter 6 BCR best practice guidance 
Introduction 
The format of this chapter is based on a critique of the best practice guidelines, the 
HM Government advice, the BCI materials and a number of non-academic text books. 
The critique is preceded with some caveats concerning the criteria of analysis which, 
whilst retaining those alluded to earlier, sets a ‘weaker’ standard for non-academic 
texts. The chapter also utilises the responders’ opinions in Elliott and Johnson (2010), 
Kay (2011), and the work of Smith and Elliott (2006) as means whereby practitioner 
opinion can be contrasted with the literature presented. Also noted is the frequent 
semantic dissonance to which less academic works are less prone. A caveat is also 
offered that most of the BCI materials and the ISO standards are commercial and are 
not value-free having often been heavily sponsored by interested third parties. 
‘Repetition’ is not an authority 
If academic thought struggles to inform BCR practice, then, given the previously 
referenced boom in BCR, (Burnett, 1998), the discipline should logically be informed 
by more practice-orientated literature. If it is thus informed, then it is vital, if BCR is a 
‘profession’, that the literature is of a correspondingly high standard, albeit perhaps 
not aspiring to peer review and detailed academic referencing. However, this high 
standard would not accommodate the simple repetition of ideas and circular 
referencing; such a ‘fausse autorité’ is caveated against by both fictional literature and 
academic comment. The words of a commercial author, le Carré came to mind: 
By repetition, each lie becomes an irreversible fact upon which 
other lies are constructed. 
John le Carré, Absolute Friends, 2003, Hodder and Stoughton 
A more academic parallel of the same sentiment is found in Taleb’s (2010) book:  
…successions of anecdotes selected to fit a story do not 
constitute evidence.          (p. xxxii) 
…a series of corroborative facts is not necessarily evidence.”  
(p. 56) 
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As the focus changes from the tightly disciplined academic works to the less 
regimented ‘grey literature,’ one might also expect an element of bias and commercial 
interest to emerge. However, one should expect articles not to be overtly ‘advertorial’ 
in nature. One might expect some ‘filtered’ academic work to be evident in ‘good 
practice’ advice and standards. Naturally, the idea that ‘greater claims require a 
heavier burden of proof’ should be addressed perhaps not by references but at least 
by detailed case study.  
At risk of prejudicing the reader, the ‘standards’ and ostensibly titled ‘best practice’ are 
mired in semantic debate and confusion which makes even the most convoluted of 
academic issues seem lucid. As a preamble to the chapter, a brief overview of the 
evident issue between academic definitions and lay interpretation is offered below. 
Academic definitions; their translation into non-academic texts  
Most of the self-help manuals and standards reference the same fundamental terms 
or themes: risk, uncertainty, strategic, tactical and sometimes operational levels of a 
response. In many cases the terms seem to be used incautiously (‘strategy’ in ISO 
terms being synonymous with plans and procedures as noted in ISO 22301 (2012)) 
and are unrelated to mainstream academic definitions. The most concise definitions 
of strategy are offered by Ansoff (1987) who wrote on corporate strategy. He recalls 
the military definition of the word as being “a broad rather vaguely defined, grand 
concept... for application of large scale forces…” (p. 114). He correctly distinguishes 
tactics as a “specific scheme for employment of allocated resources.” Very usefully he 
also further distinguishes policy as being distinct from strategy: “Policy is a contingent 
decision, whereas strategy is a rule for making decisions”. As the words ‘risk and 
uncertainty’ are also often used incautiously, his definitions of them can be useful: 
‘risk’ - alternatives are all known and so are their probabilities and ‘uncertainty’ - 
alternatives are known but not the probabilities. 
Whilst his definitions are based on mathematical concepts and models, their precision 
is useful to the contingency planner as it better defines activities. However, there 
appears to be a predilection for the BSI, and by implication the ISO, to redefine 
definitions. For example, BS 65000 (2014) refers to “top management” (p. 2), 
(presumably the strategic group), as the “people who direct and control an 
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organisation at the highest level”, but who, in an immediate note to the definition, 
execute the “direction provided by the governing body” (p. 2), thereby making them de 
facto, not the ‘highest level’. Similarly, ‘risk’ is defined as the “effect of uncertainty on 
objectives”. This definition immediately mixes two distinct and critical academically-
defined words. Then, their definition uses ten lines of text in five notes to explain the 
definition of the definition. Paradoxically, the meaning becomes increasingly obscure, 
multiple meaning is encouraged and the original simplicity lost. Quite clearly 
terminology (or definitions) do not translate easily from academic work to standards 
and guidance. With some regret, this mangling of words sets the tone of the chapter. 
The context for the analysis  
The documents in this chapter are highly influential on planners. Their claims use 
hyperbolic superlatives such as ‘best’ or ‘definitive’, and in some cases they add the 
term ‘white paper’ to gain governmental connotations of authority. Their publications 
are not peer-reviewed and go largely uncriticised, yet the BCI enjoys a privileged 
position as the representative association for the industry. Juvenal coined the phrase, 
‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ (By whom are the guards themselves guarded? 
Satire VI, lines 347–348). This question can be added to the criteria of analysis and 
asked of the authors of the standards and best practice. Whilst still retaining the criteria 
of analyses of Minger, Damer, Stewart, Saunders and Lord Steyn, some additional 
forms of analysis or comparison seem appropriate for works that are influential but not 
academic. The standards and best practice are commercial documents and they make 
considerable claims as to their efficacy. Consequently, it would seem reasonable that 
the more any standard or ISO ‘promises’ then the more proof of such claims might be 
expected. The slightly strange paradox in trying to comment academically on the 
standard of a standard, especially standards that do not reference any academic 
sources, is problematic. The issue requires the identification of some credible work 
that has the breadth and depth to offer an academically informed comparative critique 
against which to contrast the claims, methods and contents of the standards and best 
practice. 
Albeit that the Elliott and Johnson (2010) report was published a few years before the 
bulk of the BS and ISO works (hereinafter ‘standards’) were published, PAS 56 had 
already gained considerable publicity, adherents and devotees. The report’s 
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persuasive power is based on the interpreted or stated opinions of 83 BCI members. 
It is referenced to considerable numbers and varieties of academic sources and it 
remains one of the most credible studies published recently. The report was, therefore, 
selected and utilised as a neutral contrast, context, foil or comparative for the contents 
of the standards and much of the rest of the ‘Grey’ material considered. In other words, 
the report ‘guards the guards’. These criteria are applied in addition to those criteria 
noted in the methodology chapter. Outlined below are some observations from the 
report that have shaped the following critique. 
The ISO 2230 is an auditable standard; however, it has often become synonymous 
with best practice. Elliott and Johnson (2010, p. 31) cites at least four respondents 
who rejoiced in the publication of standards (in this case PAS 56, the precursor of BS 
25999 and ISO 22301), which offered ‘best practice’ ‘rule book’ status and obvious 
pragmatic help.  
‘Respondent 17’ Elliott and Johnson (2010, p, 31) complained that “Business 
Continuity…suffers from being deliberately overcomplicated” by vested commercial 
interests to the detriment of lay understanding and consequent disdain and 
disempowerment. Therefore, one could presume that the standards should be as 
simple as practically possible. In many respects, the over complication manifests itself 
as ‘goal displacement’ and a multitude of definitions proliferate; sadly (see annex 2 to 
Elliott and Johnson (2010, pp. 94-95)) these semantic debates often substitute for 
serious analysis. Few commentators, aside from Borodzicz (2005), admit the 
possibility of a spectrum of terms from incident to disaster where, by analogy, the 
difference between, say, blue and turquoise or red and maroon is left to the observer 
who can then get on with the business of dealing with the issues rather than attempting 
futile categorisation. One might therefore hope that the standards were not too 
prescriptive. 
Elliott and Smith (2006), writing in the context of stadia and crowd safety, noted that 
the adoption and application of standards limited responses to compliance with the 
standard, which one could term the ‘lowest common denominator’, rather than seeking 
imaginative solutions to exceed the demands of the standard. The capacity of 
burgeoning and of inter-related standards to stagnate thought and innovation is 
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encapsulated in the modern term ‘McDonaldisation’, coined by Ritzer (2008). Ideally, 
one should see allowances made to foster individualism and initiative within the 
auditable framework that standards offer the practitioner.  
In summary, if (in addition to the existing criteria) the guidance, standard or best 
practice is over complicated, semantically confusing or if a standard is conducive to 
complacency, then some criticism is warranted.  
Best Practice Guidelines 
The BCI is not shy of publishing. It publishes frequent documents of varying relevance 
for example: Business Continuity Institute, (2012, a.) BCM The Time is Now, (2012, 
b.) Engaging the Board, (2012, c.) Measuring BCM, (2012, d.) Safeguarding 
Reputation, (2013) Case study Yvonne Martin Beauty Clinic.  
Fortunately, ‘in response to BCI membership requests’, the growing mass of BC ‘good 
practice’ and associated documents were conveniently catalogued according to two 
criteria, business sectors (ranging from Banking to Agriculture), and by typology. The 
BCM Legislations, Regulations, Standards and Good Practice (2014), (BCM LRSGP, 
2014, p. ii) very usefully distinguishes typologies as:  
• Legislation, which was defined as ‘legally enforceable’.  
• Regulation, which could ‘reasonably be construed as having implications on an 
organisation’s BCM provisions’.  
• Standards from ‘accredited national standards bodies’.  
• Good Practice published by various ‘authoritative bodies’ which would be ‘well 
used and accepted as credible advice by BCM professionals’.  
The list is caveated in that some entries are ‘indirectly’ related to BCM. Nevertheless, 
some 84 pages of references are listed (including the possibly little appreciated 
Kazakhstan Government Regulation of 30 Sept 2005, Instruction #359). Two important 
issues arise from this detailed, if tedious, cataloguing. The first is the compelling 
evidence for the geometric growth of BC documentation, if not ‘literature’. The second 
is the implication that the legislation, regulation, standards and good practice are 
significant motivators and sources of reference for those tasked with the planning 
process. This, therefore, justifies an inclusion in the literature analysis of the Standards 
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and Good/Best Practice that is available and relevant. Notably, the legislation in the 
UK is not included as it does not apply to all business sectors. Similarly, regulation is 
also excluded as normally it pertains to specific sectors and varies in scope, detail, 
intent and sanction. Therefore, only standards and good practice documentation are 
analysed as, logically, these documents will also inform those bound by legislation and 
regulation as well as those that are not.  
Therefore, following the BCI’s own proposition (BCM LRSGP, 2014) that ‘Good 
practice’ will be ‘well used by professionals’, a number of documents books and 
standards are now considered. 
The ‘Business Continuity for Dummies’ guide (BCFD) 
The, perhaps inadvertently patronisingly titled, Business Continuity for Dummies 
(BCFD), authored by Sterling, Duddridge, Elliott, Conway and Payne (2012), can be 
argued to be ‘authoritative’ best practice by the BCI’s own definition in BCM LRSGP 
(2014) in so far as it was authored in partnership with the Emergency Planning Society, 
the BCI itself and the Cabinet Office. Its creation was catalysed by the UK Government 
wishing to “give guidance to SMEs following the Strategic Defence and Security 
review” (p. 283).  
The advice offered is basic and pragmatic, for example it suggests:  
If following an exercise, you’ve identified changes to make or new 
procedures to introduce, make doing so a priority task…You may 
want to record amendments to your plans as version changes 
and give the date this happened. (p. 187) 
This is not to imply that any of the advice is wrong or foolish, rather that it is authored 
at, as the book’s title implies, the most basic level. This is further illustrated by a plan 
template on (p. 133) for staff evacuation, which one might argue is a fire evacuation 
plan. In terms of identifying any academic work which has filtered into or influenced 
the book, this is not apparent. The references, such as they are, are on page 2 and 
they refer only to the BCI Good Practice Guidelines, (BCI GPG (2013), BS 25999, 
PAS 200:2011 (Crisis Management) and the Cabinet Office’s National Risk Register. 
The authors, sponsors and members of the reviewing panel tend to be consultants, 
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practitioners and the former technical director of the BCI, and no academic input or 
peer review from any source or university is mentioned. 
BCI Good Practice Guidelines (BCI GPG) 
If Stirling et al. (2012) is informed by the BCI Good Practice Guidelines (BCI GPG, 
2013), then this authoritative good/best practice document should be considered next. 
It offers some 115 pages of practical advice, the format and content of which naturally 
bears some comparison with the Dummies Guide albeit its style is more business-like. 
The correlation of advice is unsurprising, but the similarities are perhaps little more 
than rephrasing. An example is; Stirling et al., (2012, p. 187) “now make sure your 
next exercise embraces all the changes you’ve made…you may want to run a new 
quick test on how well the new requirements work”. Contrasted with the BCI GPG 
(2013, p. 99) “Consideration should be given to re running an exercise after corrective 
actions have been put in place, where significant issues have been identified.” This 
similarity does not imply covert or accidental plagiarism, as Pitt and Goyal (2004) 
astutely observed, “Most of the models include the following [same] phases of a BCP.” 
(p. 88) 
The BCI GPG (2013) is not academically referenced nor are there any obvious or 
oblique academic allusions. The only external reference is to ISO 22301, (2012) 
terminology which is seen to be “relevant throughout these Good Practice Guidelines” 
BCI GPG (2013:5). In turn, ISO 22301 is described as  
principles and terminology generally accepted by the BCI…they 
should be seen as complementary (to the GPG) and addressing 
varying audiences with different purposes and objectives. (p.11) 
However, and very importantly, the debate concerning BCR’s relationship to the BCI 
GPG (2013, p. 8) suggests that “BC is one of the key disciplines required in any 
organisation who aims to be a resilient organisation”.  Crisis management is referred 
to as “forming an integral part of building capability to respond to and recover from 
situations which are wider than operational disruption”. 
Returning to Juvenal’s caveat and not wishing to personalise criticism, the documents 
reviewed above have evident similarities and all were heavily influenced by the BCI 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 101 
 
and, specifically, by the then technical director of the BCI. He was the editor of two of 
the documents and a sponsor of the other. It is very difficult, therefore, to avoid the 
conclusion that their contents are supportive of each other and no external critique 
(that might echo peer review) has been entertained. 
International and British Standards 
Without doubt, as they are cited by the BCI and used as an authority by the BCI GPG 
(2013), the British Standards and the International Standards (ISOs) have had a major 
impact on the practice of business continuity/resilience. The chapter now reviews 
those standards most allied to and applied to the professional practice of BCR. 
BC ISO standards 
The two complementary or integrated disciplines referred to in the GPG, crisis 
management and BC resilience, inform and relate to ISO 22301 (2012), and a 
consideration of this standard and related guidance is essential. 
ISO 22301 (2012) outlines the auditable requirements for a business continuity 
programme but, in some respects, paints itself neatly into the corner of being a 
resilience standard. It refers to dealing with “disruptive incidents” as being the focus of 
the plan (p. v) and makes reference to business continuity creating a more “resilient 
society”. This notion of resilience is echoed on (p. 2, para 3.4) where business 
continuity is defined as “a framework for building organisational resilience”. On (p. 4, 
para 3.19) the document further defines an incident as being “a situation that might be 
or could lead to, a disruption, loss, emergency or crisis”. One cannot avoid noting the 
circularity of definitions and the inevitable links to other terms (emergency/crisis) which 
might obscure, rather than clarify, definitions. Finally, on (p. 1), it makes the impressive 
claim that meeting the requirements of the system can “protect against, reduce the 
likelihood of occurrence, prepare for, respond to and recover from disruptive 
incidents”.  
The term ‘strategy’ (p. 16) is used somewhat uneasily to describe the selection of what 
Ansoff (1987) would term tactics. These strategies apparently deal with various issues 
arising and (p. 17) details “procedures” as being the item more commonly associated 
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with plans which is technically listed as a separate Para 8.4.4 (p. 18) where the words 
‘plans’ and ‘procedures’ are then used interchangeably.  
The language used is confusing and Para 8.5 (p. 19) claims that exercising and testing 
can “minimise the risk of disruption to operations”, though just how this “minimises 
risk” is not addressed. The bibliography references complementary standards and 
other national standards. No academic source is referenced to validate any of the 
considerable claims made. The order of paragraphs is perplexingly eclectic. Para 8.4.2 
‘Incident Response Structure’ comes after the ‘procedures or plans’ that they, the 
product of the structures paragraph, would be implementing.  
Given the lack of detailed explanation, in what is admittedly the auditable standard, it 
is unsurprising that ISO 22301, the ‘Requirements’, is accompanied by ISO 22313, 
(2012) ‘Guidance’ on the Requirements. This welcome guidance disappoints 
immediately. In the ‘Introduction’ (p. v), it ironically states that “It is not the intention…. 
to provide general guidance on all aspects of business continuity”. It begs the question, 
just what ‘aspects’ of business continuity have been omitted? The ISO 22313 
maintains a similarly imprecise tone to ISO 22301. On (p. vii) business continuity is 
perhaps correctly, or at least consistently, defined as focused on dealing with 
“disruptive incidents”. Later in the same paragraph, however, the astonishing and 
wholly unsubstantiated (if not ‘plain wrong’) doctrinal statement is made.  
Any incident, large or small, natural, accidental or deliberate 
has the potential to cause major disruption to the 
organisation’s operations and its ability to deliver products and 
services. 
This notion is diametrically contradictory to the risk assessment section at Para 8.2.3 
(p. 20). Here it is claimed that the ‘risk assessment’ can analyse risk “in terms of 
consequence and likelihood”. Inherently this suggests risks are bounded and that not 
all risks have the same potential for major disruption. It then references ISO 31000 
(2009) – which, of course, one can then purchase – to do the risk assessment 
correctly. In common with all the other documents so far commented upon, no 
academic references are available in the bibliography, which only references other 
standards. The documents begin to appear to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
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references are stubbornly circular, a feature that Taleb (2010) would doubtless 
condemn. 
Complementary Crisis Management guidance 
BS 11200 (2014, p. 1) offers guidance on Crisis Management and, claims it “is one 
aspect of a more resilient organisation”. It claims it has close links to the standards 
concerning business continuity, resilience information security and exercising and 
testing. BS 11200 distinguishes a crisis from the ‘disruptive incident’ that business 
continuity deals with (see ISO 22301 above) by defining a crisis as “an abnormal and 
unstable situation that threatens the organisation’s strategic objectives, reputation or 
viability”. The difference between Incident and Crisis is expanded upon at some length 
in a table, (p. 4). Despite some curious linguistic tension in that ‘Incidents’ are 
“generally foreseeable” but can be “no notice”, the comparative table evidently reflects 
several of the writings of Borodzicz, especially on the nature of crises and their 
unpredictability. However, no reference is available to support this similarity, 
notwithstanding the fact that Borodzicz is known to have been on the drafting team. 
Similarly, para 3.2.c (p. 5) on the origins of crisis seems to be an homage to the work 
of Turner and his Six Stage model, with the key words ‘latent’, ‘defect’ and ‘incubating’ 
being mentioned and elaborated upon but none of the phrases being referenced nor 
attributed to Turner. This referencing neglect could be a rather serious oversight in 
any other type of work. 
Although the guidance offers a great deal of common-sense, pragmatic advice, some 
of the ‘Principles of crisis management’ (p. 6) seem somewhat self-evident, such as 
advice to “achieve control as soon as possible”. It is often more akin to the Dummies 
Guide. 
The guidance also introduces some military or quasi-military/aviation industry terms 
and applies them to crisis management in an awkward fashion. Notable amongst these 
is the paragraph on situational awareness (p. 11). The application of what was 
essentially an aviation/military concept to crisis management has the potential to be 
uneasy or inelegant, and indeed it is. Endsley (1998) defined situational awareness 
as the perception of the environment with reference to the near future. Dominguez, 
Vidulich, Vogel, and McMillan (1994) added that it had the qualities of integrating 
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information from the environment to create a mental picture of the current situation 
and thereby anticipating future developments. In aviation terms the accepted definition 
is taken from the Manual of Evidence Based Training, first edition (2013) published by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization. It focuses on the comprehension of 
available information and anticipation gained thereby. This contrasts strongly with the 
terms ‘uncertainty and containment’ in BS 11200 noted subsequently; 
Perceive and comprehend all of the relevant information 
available and anticipate what could happen that may affect the 
operation. 
 EBT ICAO Manual Doc 9995 First Edition (2013) 
https://www.osmaviationacademy.com/blog/core-competencies-for-pilots-situational-awareness 
Without any apparent endorsement, BS11200 adds to these established definitions 
that situational awareness deals with “the degree of uncertainty, the degree of 
containment,” (p. 11) and declines to further define or reference these terms.  
In section 5 (p. 15), “crisis management” is differentiated from ‘normal business’, albeit 
the list of differences does not appear that different from the high-pressure activities 
in normal business. As to leadership (p. 17), it observes that “leadership in a crisis is 
not a special skill set” and then, in the same sentence, states that “it might not be 
within the skill set of all the organisation’s senior leaders, even those that are highly 
successful…”. This appears to be somewhat contradictory and arguably insulting. 
In most other respects, such as “participants” (p. 13), BS 11200 (2014) suggests 
similarities with the likely staff to be involved with business continuity, albeit the 
seniority levels could vary. It is the author’s experience that even if companies 
distinguish between business continuity (disruptive incident management) and crisis 
management, the resultant teams will not differ significantly. However, BS 11200 
differs slightly from the ISO 22313 guidance in that it does seem to be informed (or, 
rather, influenced) by literature beyond other ISOs, even if it is not acknowledged or 
referenced. 
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Additional complementary guidelines  
The complementary ISO 22398:2013 Societal Security – Guidelines for Exercises is 
authored in the same style as the other documents, but pragmatically, in this case, 
tasks are sometimes ascribed to named roles such as “exercise programme manager” 
(para 3.8, p. 2). It has both more helpful direction and a distinct flavour of emergency 
services exercises illustrated by the concentration on exercise safety plans (5.2.14.3, 
p. 19). The proposition that multi-day exercises are likely (5.3.1, p. 19) seems very 
naïve to most commercial practitioners, a sentiment voiced by the respondents in the 
Elliott and Johnson (2010, p. 52) survey. This feature confirms a slightly public-sector 
or emergency services-oriented authorship. Crucially, this ISO differs markedly from 
many others in that the language is more erudite, balanced and precise, certainly less 
patronising, and axiomatic advice is offered. For example, “After action review” (para 
5.4.3) offers the insight that the “same format for the critique of exercises should be 
used for an actual incident to allow for comparison between simulated and actual 
events”. This suggests some intellectual, if not academic, rigour or common sense. 
This trait is echoed in the annexes; Annex E (p. 33) makes a clear but unreferenced 
link to academic input with “ethnographical methodology” and “primary and secondary 
research” being used to inform and thus “enrich” exercise scenario construction. This 
is arguably the first ISO (in this area) to promote an overtly academic process to 
‘enrich’ a process, even if one senses, yet again, the work of Borodzicz. 
Resilience standards 
BS 65000 (2014) Guidance on organisational ‘resilience’, which is, according to ISO 
22301 (2012), the “product or result of business continuity”, presents an unusual 
document. It paints a utopian vision of how ‘resilience’ can make an organisation 
“adaptive, cooperative, agile, and robust” and able to “adapt to everything from minor 
everyday events to acute shocks and chronic or incremental changes”. (p. 1). (Do bear 
in mind that this is the apparent paradigm on which resilience planning is based.) It 
presumes the reader can define an acute shock or chronic change. It does all this 
whilst defining resilience in ten ways in the first five pages alone: 
Resilience is a strategic objective…  
Resilience is a relative dynamic concept… 
…resilience is a goal, not a fixed activity (p. 1) 
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Resilience involves dealing with disruption, uncertainty and 
change…  
Resilience is therefore a strategic concern… 
Resilience is inherently relative…  
…resilience should be informed by effective risk management…  
…resilience is also closely aligned with the concerns of most 
managers… (p. 3) 
 
…resilience is therefore an outcome of good governance (p. 4) 
 
Resilience requires the ability to make good decisions… (p. 5) 
All these comments might be correct; however, so many quasi definitions of the key 
topic suggest semantic confusion, intellectual puzzlement or dissent amongst the 
authors. Norris et al. (2008) helpfully and deliberately summarised 21 academic 
definitions, however, even universities such as Buckinghamshire New University, 
Bucks.ac (2018) appeared to struggle to describe the position of their own masters 
level resilience degree course in their advertising literature. 
 https://bucks.ac.uk/courses/postgraduate/management-and-professional-
studies/pt/organisational-resilience-pt  251118 
Organisational resilience requires, because of the growing inter-
relationship and blurred boundaries between the various 
elements, and the constant development of new risks and the 
need to mitigate them; the development of organisational and 
individual capability and knowledge across a range of 
contributing areas and of the organisational behaviours needed 
to support them. Therefore, this programme is designed to attract 
and educate those with a specialist interest in the following areas 
and sub-disciplines: 
• security 
• business continuity 
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• crisis and incident management 
• emergency management 
• disaster response and recovery 
• threat risk and impact perspectives. 
Clearly given the ‘sub disciplines’ noted above, the university inclines to the sentiments 
of Wong (2009) who argued that ‘the discipline of BCM should encompass far more 
than the common activities covered by business organisations,’ p.64. However, in 
trying to accommodate all the complex relationships in a single paragraph the meaning 
becomes somewhat opaque. 
The actual definition of organisational resilience is very broad indeed (para 2.3, p. 2): 
“ability of an organisation to anticipate, prepare for, and respond and adapt to 
incremental change and sudden disruptions in order to survive and prosper”. This 
definition goes far further than the original definitions noted by Norris et al. (2008) and 
Alexander (2013) on the properties of wooden structures. In doing so, it paints the 
authors into a corner of portraying resilience as a corporate panacea which would 
arguably take vast and disproportionate resources to achieve. Para 5.4 (p. 8) typifies 
an un-costed and unsubstantiated proposition of what needs to be achieved to deliver 
resilience. It is not wrong per se, but it makes no attempt to indicate just how this 
Sisyphean task could be tackled and controlled. Instead it blithely suggests that it 
needs at least 21 corporate “operational disciplines to be integrated”; commercially 
coincidentally, 13 of these disciplines have an accompanying ISO or BS 
documentation. This “deliberate over complexity for commercial gain” was noted with 
some disdain by respondents in the report of Elliott and Johnson’s (2010, p. 31).  
Like ISO 22398, BS 65000 (2014) contains some academic inferences such as para 
5.5 (p. 10) which, momentarily at least, evokes the work of Toft and Reynolds (1997), 
but by para 5.6.2 the tone has reverted to a hyperbolic vision of “shared expectations” 
that will apparently “strengthen its resilience”. Figure 2 (p. 12) and figure 3 (p. 13) are 
undoubtedly more pragmatic and applicable in nature. 
Information technology standards 
Information Technology standards are included in the review because they specifically 
allude to business continuity in their title. (ISO 27031, (2011)) Information technology 
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– Security techniques – Guidelines for information and communication technology 
readiness for business continuity.   
This document retains the same essential format as the other guidance documents. 
However, the advice seems more precisely phrased, the terminology is far less 
dramatic and excessive claims are eschewed. Even in para 5.4 (p. 7), where the 
benefits are listed, caveats are appropriately inserted. It notes that compliance can 
allow the company to “potentially gain competitive advantage…”. It advocates that a 
company “has ICT services that are cost effective and not under- or over-invested…”; 
this cautious language is at odds with the purple prose of BS 65000 (2014). Whilst 
different authorship might account for some variation, ISO 27031 (2011) does appear 
to be a more prosaic and measured guidance document. It is interesting to speculate 
that the more concrete, procedural nature of IT recovery catalyses a more pragmatic 
approach than does the rather conceptual notion of resilience. 
BCI and HMG supporting publications  
Having now reviewed Good Practice Guidance and the ISO standards, that are often 
used as indicative of best practice, attention now turns to advice, studies and ‘white 
papers’ that are likely to be influential on practice and which originate from the BCI 
and HM Government. One might expect them to be authoritative, well researched and 
value-free. The selection of the literature is both recent and broadly representative of 
the overall tenor of their publications and the resultant body of knowledge. 
Commentary on the BCI Horizon Scan (BCI 2017)  
The BCI Horizon Scan (2017) was selected for inclusion as it was as up-to-date as 
possible at the time of authorship; it should represent the peak of the BCI’s work and 
be a part of what is, in effect, a longitudinal study (it is the 6th horizon scan). It should 
give a valuable insight into the ‘state’ of BC 2017 and beyond; its exclusion would have 
been neglectful. 
In the foreword (un-numbered pages on a downloaded version) the BCI Executive 
Director and the BSI Chief Executive make some sweeping but unreferenced claims. 
The former notes: “Cyber-attacks and data breaches continue to cost organisations 
billions of dollars annually…” and that extreme weather events are becoming “less and 
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less predictable with apparent acceleration of climate change”. (There is a body of 
research that indicates that they are becoming more predictable, Bazerman (2006) 
and Scafetta (2012).) The BSI CEO quoted a ‘PwC’ report two years previously that 
“90% of large organisations’ suffered a ‘breach’ of data.” (Breach and data are not 
defined in his foreword and the exact PwC report is not listed). He added that, 
“Organisational resilience reaches beyond risk management towards a more holistic 
view of business health and success”. All this is claimed whilst (in a communication to 
the author 03-03-17) the author of the report, the BCI ‘Senior Research Associate’, 
admitted that the BCI did not hold data on the actual BC/resilience spend or budget, 
even in percentage terms, of the organisations concerned. It just does not appear to 
lend any credibility to claims of efficacy when the annual spend on resilience in the UK 
(or elsewhere) is not known by the representative institute. 
Essentially the work focuses on the threats and disruptions summarised in section 2 
(p. 7) In brief, respondents were asked to examine a list of 29 potential causes of an 
incident (which the authors of the report then termed ‘threats’). These ranged from 
‘Animal disease’ to ‘Social civil unrest’. The question asked, with multiple responses 
being allowed and five levels of concern being offered, was, 
Based on your analysis, how concerned are you about the 
following threats to your organisation in 2017? 
The results were then described, in an homage to Top of the Pops, as the “top 10 
threats”. With resulting comments, (p. 6), such as “new laws and regulations enter the 
top 10 this year…meanwhile health and safety incident drops out of the top 10.” Further 
comparisons by country, sector and size are then offered to illustrate regional 
differences.  
Fundamentally and most critically, however, the ‘index term’, namely the expressions 
of ‘concern’, have been transposed by the authors into ‘threat’ assessments and 
renamed. The numerical endorsement of 54% of responders saying that they are 
extremely concerned about cyber-attack catapults it into first place for the third year 
running. Readers of the report might be tempted to perceive that cyber-attack is the 
top threat to organisations, therefore they too must pay cognisance to it and thus the 
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heuristic of availability cycles onward. Even those who selected this category will feel 
vindicated by their decision.  
It is very difficult not to see this type of horizon scanning as being heavily prone to the 
cognitive biases described by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) heuristics. It appears 
to foster a classic case of judgements made under uncertainty with strong elements of 
‘availability’ and high levels of ‘imaginability’ which prejudice objectivity. Notably, the 
transposition of the term ‘concern’ to ‘threat’ is also a misuse of the ‘index’ term in the 
question. Being ‘extremely concerned’ (the highest level of descriptor) about an issue 
might well refer to the potential damage or effect cyber-crime could cause, as opposed 
to its probability in a well-protected organisation. It appears just too elastic to 
metamorphose the index term ‘concern’ into a ‘threat’. 
In terms of ‘reasonableness’, is it acceptable to view this ‘scan’ (the ‘horizon’ was 
surprisingly limited to one year, 2017) as indicative of opinions and, as the question 
originally stated, ‘concerns’? The regional and other variations are of genuine interest 
and it gives a succinct overview of several issues and is valuable for that alone, even 
if it did not warrant 32 pages of print. However, it arguably lacks credibility as a 
persuasive horizon scan when it is based on nothing other than cumulative perceptions 
and delivered with overblown rhetoric. (Note Taleb’s (2010) caveat of repetitious 
statements not constituting evidence.) The other alarm bell that is sounded by this type 
of work goes back to risk homeostasis and Adams’s (1995) contention that focus on 
risk in one area can leave others dangerously neglected. Might this survey with a clear 
focus on technological issues neglect others at some peril? The authors also do not 
seem to have appreciated the work of Slovic (1987) who cited Wildavsky (1979), Starr 
(1969) and Fischoff et al. (1978). All of their work was oriented to the perception of 
risks and the curious ways in which responses are skewed by various factors such as 
benefit, voluntariness, expert and lay opinions, and to some extent the degree of 
publicity attached to the risk. A single reading of Slovic (1987) should prompt any 
reader of the BCI (2017) Horizon Scan to recall Wildavsky’s (1979, p. 32) prescient 
‘crie de coeur’:  
How extraordinary! The richest, longest lived, best protected, 
most resourceful civilisation with the highest degree of insight 
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into its own technology, is on its way to becoming the most 
frightened. 
Even if we apply the test of reasonableness to this work, it fails. It is unreasonable that 
the ‘academic’ researchers of the representative institute transposed an index term of 
‘concern’ to become ‘threat’, failed to appreciate any heuristics biases, tendencies or 
other factors to balance the stated opinions and provided no references for the claims 
made. One also suspects that, whilst the BCI is a representative body, its Horizon Scan 
might not be entirely value-free. 
The BCI 2020 UK Group White Paper 
This document was the BCI’s response to the burgeoning use of the term resilience. It 
was authored by the BCI’s Senior Research Associate assisted by the BCI 2020 ‘Think 
Tank’, some 15 of the “best minds in BC and related fields” (p. 12) 
It is written in an unusual style with unattributed, highlighted quotations stretching 
across the pages at regular intervals. Many of the quotations conveniently lend 
credibility to the relatively short commentary, some nine pages with considerable ‘white 
space’ and scarcely 1,500 words. 
The quotations are hard to understand as they seem to embrace too many ill-defined 
management phrases: 
Business Continuity is integral to resilience as long as it displays 
cross boundary collaboration, understanding of networked risks 
and agility during crises. (p. 2)  
The main text is authored in a similar rather obtuse ‘sound bite’ style: 
Business Continuity has a leading role in building this quality 
given its understanding of a business and where value is 
generated within it. (p. 2) 
The not unexpected fundamental point being made is that BC is the “focal point of 
co-ordination” (p. 4), for the complementary disciplines involved in resilience. 
Consequently, ‘practitioners’, ‘professional bodies’, ‘regulators’, ‘universities’ and 
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‘business leaders’ should support the growing focal role of the BC managers in taking 
on the mantle of resilience. Notwithstanding the essential simplicity of the argument, 
no data is offered to support such a practice and the rhetoric turns to repetitive 
exhortations. These exhortations have varying degrees of compliance with English 
grammar and syntax and are spiced with frequent unfortunate choices of metaphor. 
Maintaining trust and performing obligations among 
organisations, their suppliers and regulators, as well as their 
wider network will remain essential. (p. 6) 
However, they need to use their background as a ‘scaffold’ for 
acquiring complementary competencies, knowledge and 
experience from other disciplines. (p. 10) 
While many disciplines have their own reporting at top level, 
there is a gap in professionals who can combine these insights 
into a readily understandable and actionable format for 
presentation to top management. (p. 5) 
There are 11 references offered; only two stem from sources beyond the BCI. One 
cannot help feeling disappointed that such an opportunity to debate the changing 
nature of BCR and the managerial competencies required was treated so shabbily. 
Just quite what a practitioner is now meant to do, or is enabled to do, having read this 
remains unclear. It lacks evidential authority, is poorly written and avoids any coherent 
debate of clearly important issues. This rather harsh critique is warranted by the BCI’s 
claim that their senior research together with the input of 15 of the “best minds in BC” 
authored it. The ‘White Paper’ is far from clearing the critical hurdles erected by 
Minger’s (2000, pp. 225-226) four critiques of ‘rhetoric, tradition, authority and 
objectivity’. Stewart’s (1984) questions of credentials, competency and evidence, 
together with Damer’s (2009, p.7) burden of proof resting with those setting forth the 
position and Lord Steyn’s definition of reasonableness, make even the title of ‘White 
Paper’ risible and any further analysis nugatory. 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 113 
 
A handbook for managers. Home Office (1999) 
HM Government’s advice is almost as prolific as the BCI’s. Titles from the Cabinet 
Office include: (2011) Why Exercise Your Disaster Response, (2012, a.) Emergency 
Preparedness, (2012, b.) Emergency Response and Recovery: Non Statutory 
Guidance Accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, (2013, a.) Exercises and 
Training, (2013, b.) National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies. 
However, an earlier document was selected for analysis, namely the Home Office 
Business as Usual, Maximising business resilience to terrorist bombings. A handbook 
for managers. Home Office (1999). Arguably it set the tone of the resultant debate and 
subsequent publications. It is especially interesting as it pre-dates 9/11 response, the 
engendered interest in the millennium bug and the subsequent UK legislation. 
Critically, it also first introduces the notion of resilience and gives it a very effective link 
to business continuity. Retrospectively it can be seen as a sane and cost-efficient idea 
in what became a debate to which every commentator appeared to want to add their 
own definition, 
A Business Continuity Plan should be drafted in such a way as 
to cover all risks…Our aim is to show how such an all risks plan 
can maximise the resilience of businesses… (p. 4) 
It ‘trusts the reader’ by using case studies to illustrate points. Its doctrines are 
introduced gently and without hyperbole, the case studies being presented quite 
neutrally. Indirectly, it commends a phased planning approach from initial actions, 
recovery, lessons learned and explains the ‘Gold Silver Bronze’ system without 
actually endorsing it for civilian use, (p. 12). The point so often made in subsequent 
advice and standards that the “commitment of management at Board Level” (p. 15) is 
important, is mentioned, but not over emphasised. The three stages of planning, 
‘incident’, ‘recovery’ and ‘continuity’ seen in so many iterations are offered as practical 
advice. In terms of prioritisation, it offers a four ‘P’ reminder: People, Premises, Product 
and Purchasers. Again, this prioritisation reminder features in several plans in many 
variations such as People, Environment, Assets, Reputation (as used by Rio Tinto, the 
mining conglomerate, on all their plans), but the idea remains the same. The rest of 
the 21 pages consists of well authored advice couched in general but encouraging 
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terms and it concludes with a useful list of potential contacts and resources. Albeit that 
the document was not intended as a self-help manual for continuity, it nevertheless 
stands scrutiny with some far lengthier tomes. More importantly by far, it avoids the 
criticism that so many articles overcomplicate the topic. 
It is, in summary, a very good document (despite not being referenced) and is arguably 
ahead of its time. The advice is unbiased, value-free, based on case studies and very 
‘reasonable’ in all respects. It stands the test of time in being far more informative, even 
now, than many comparable recent BCI documents that have been included in this 
review.  
A Business Continuity Awareness Week 2016 White Paper 
The Home Office Handbook’s delightfully ‘value-free’ approach is a plaudit that cannot 
be bestowed on many BCI White Papers. This issue, which potentially denigrates 
practitioner advice, is illustrated with reference to Business Continuity Delivers Return 
on Investment, a Business Continuity Awareness Week 2016 White Paper (BCI White 
paper, 2016). 
This document was a contribution to the ‘awareness raising’ activities associated with 
this week in 2016. Three very precise and distinct claims were made in the introduction: 
BCR plans justify lower insurance premiums; BC activities can improve efficiency, and 
their adoption facilitates easier contract negotiations. The format of the document 
comprised three sections, each one dealing with one of the claims and sub-divided into 
an opening debate, a case study and ‘expert’ opinion. 
In contrast to many BCI publications, several references, within 14 lines of text, are 
offered in support of their contentions. However, in many cases, these are from their 
own publications. In one critical case for the justification of reduced premiums, 
McFarland (2014) is cited on (p. 2). It appears to be academic but sadly, on 
investigation, it transpires that this reference was simply part of a commercial website: 
(https://www.clouddirect.net/resources/10-key-components-of-a-business-continuity-
plan/advert). This site offers hosted resilience cloud services and a free BC planning 
toolkit in the form of a 23-minute webinar. On this commercial location, it was alleged 
that a 15% premium reduction could be gained through evidence of a BC plan. It might 
or might not be true, but it is not an authoritative source and it certainly was not value-
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free advice. Section one then continued the argument with the transcript of a 
representative of Zurich Insurance being interviewed. It was, however, noticeable that 
he suggested the BC plan be considered in the “grading approach…integrated in our 
pricing model.” (p. 3). This is not the 15% reduction trumpeted by McFarland (2014). 
In respect of Section 2, ‘BC improving efficiency’, the White Paper devotes 10 lines to 
the proposition before moving on to a ‘case study’ of improved efficiency generated by 
an organisation being certified to ISO 22301. The reference for the case study reveals 
that it was in fact authored not by the company concerned but by the organisation’s 
auditors, the BSI, (p. 5). In this section, the expert commentary is based on the 
achievement of resilience and, whilst intimating that efficiencies are gained, no 
specifics are cited nor is any monetary value, even in percentage terms. 
The final section, ostensibly concerning the benefits of BC facilitating contract 
negotiations, bizarrely hinges its argument around the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The 
‘White Paper’ (p. 8) notes rather alarmingly that the Act requires “organisations to 
provide assurance through a statement that their supply chains are slavery and human 
trafficking free” and that prosecution and fines are applied to those who fail to comply. 
This is technically true but very misleading. Only firms with a turnover of £36 million 
p.a. are expected to comply. As this turnover level is usually associated with medium 
or large enterprises, it applies to 0.7% of businesses as defined by HMG figures in 
(Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016). 
Furthermore, the Government advice in section 2.6 of (Gov.UK., 2015) indicates that 
failure to comply is addressed by an injunction to comply, which, if ignored, renders 
the company in ‘contempt of court’ which has unlimited fines. Strangely, the 
Government seems to take a back seat in terms of ‘policing’ the act. Section 2.8 of the 
guidance places the burden of monitoring “businesses not taking sufficient steps” on 
consumers, investors and NGOs! This is somewhat at odds with the apparent claim of 
the benefits of BC when it is inapplicable to the remaining 99.3% of businesses 
unaffected by the Act. 
The Case Study expounds on the benefits of ISO 22301 for a car maker. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, it was authored by their auditors, the BSI, and the following ‘Expert 
Opinion’ puzzlingly related to neither the Modern Slavery Act, nor to ISO 22301.  
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Whilst it was encouraging to see attempts at referencing and a further reading list being 
offered, the inexactitudes, misconstructions, self-referencing, commercial bias and 
inelegant phrases remain a constant. As another seminal ‘White Paper’, it says very 
little indeed and what it does contend is unproven and far from error and value-free. 
Discussion 
If there was any hope that the comments of those interviewed by the Elliott and 
Johnson (2010) report who advocated simplicity, clarity and avoiding the dangers of 
McDonaldisation (Ritzer, 2008) would have been taken to heart by the BS/ISO 
technical committees, they appear to have been dashed. Whilst some standards and 
guidance are better than others, generally, if these documents were not ISO 
standards, (which have clearly influenced several major organisations to adopt and be 
audited to their requirements and definitions) they would not stand too much scrutiny. 
Their language, syntax, grammar, logic and literacy are of questionable quality and 
their unsubstantiated claims with circular referencing to their own standards lacks 
validity in such an influential set of documents. This is not to say that the standards 
and guidance are wrong nor actually right. It is not possible to say; as Boin (2006) 
observed, nobody has sought to validate any of the approaches advocated nor the 
claims made. 
One cannot avoid making such swingeing criticisms when their claims of benefits are 
high and simultaneously the flaws in the works are starkly evident. However, taken as 
a whole the advice given is reasonably coherent, the terms reasonably defined and 
reasonably consistent. Perhaps, given that the works were authored in ‘international 
English’ by a technical committee, a ‘reasonably good’ ISO is all one can expect, (back 
to the test of the reasonable commuter). Also, one cannot refrain from observing that 
almost the entire ‘box set’ of ISOs on these topics have been authored by (without 
mentioning names and thereby personalising commentary) primarily the same people 
namely, two academics, five to ten consultants, four civil servants working in the area 
and a few assorted practitioners working within companies. This core group has been 
instrumental for the authorship of almost all the content. Unsurprisingly, this core group 
has close links to the BCI and in some cases to Cabinet Office. This is not offered as 
criticism, merely as comment, and a caution that such a cohesive group might be 
subject to groupthink as described by Janis (1982). All the authors are doubtless 
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genuinely experienced, but their repetitive self-referenced work does not, as Taleb 
(2010) and Le Carre warn, per se, convey validity on their work; but nor does it mean 
that they are wrong. It just begs a massive question as to the proverbial ‘elephant in 
the room’ and how one validates such guidance.  
In respect of the BCI, it is of concern that almost every publication which has been 
considered has suffered criticism, some of which verges on questioning the entire 
validity of so called ‘white papers’ and horizon scans. However, it should be recalled 
that the criteria to which the publications were subjected was neutral and not of the 
author’s design. Nor has the author deliberately selected questionable texts. In the 
author’s experience, these are the seminal texts that are read widely in the BCR 
community and can even be found on University reading lists.  
The BCI and the BSI, who audit the ISOs, have reached such a close working 
relationship that it might be termed symbiotic or, less charitably, incestuous. As noted 
in the body of the work, the ISOs appear to have become synonymous with best 
practice even though they are simply only an auditable standard, and both bodies 
reference each other’s materials. Evidence of this is that the BCI Horizon Scan 2018 
is being launched ‘in association with the BSI’. As a generalisation, their work and 
publications share similar deficiencies; their work is not value-free, it is not 
academically referenced nor validated. Claims for validity or efficacy are just 
hyperbolic marketing, it is poorly written, it seldom says anything of substance, its 
statistics are ‘creative’ at best and both organisations have evident economic motives 
for their activities.  
In contrast, the HM Government publications in general are balanced, erudite, 
informative and precise. They are certainly value-free and whilst they might favour the 
public sector and appear commercially naïve, the advice is coherent, cogent and as 
far as is possible correct.  
With reference to Kay (2011) and the idea of obliquity being used to tackle complex 
problems through a series of successive comparison it would appear that the advice 
on how the issues should be managed is little considered. There appears to be a 
implication that if the processes of the Good Practice Guide are followed or ISO 
certification is gained then the resultant plan will work. None of the sources considered 
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in this chapter offer any conceptual advice as to any management methods that are 
recommended for use in such events.  
The sadness is that, in the author’s experience, the accessibility of these materials 
and the far greater marketing of them to the BCI database renders them far more 
influential than all the academic bodies of literature. The authority of the BCI goes 
largely unquestioned and the British Standards/ISOs remains similarly highly 
regarded. Juvenal would conclude that nobody is guarding these custodians of 
standards and the resultant poor quality of products and materials are paradoxically 
counter to their intent of professionalising the discipline. 
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Chapter 7 Complementary popular literature 
Introduction  
This chapter tackles a growing section of the books and research papers which are 
authored for the practitioner. Some are authored by academics, some are 
collaboration between academics and practitioners and some are by practitioners who 
have made an attempt at referencing and an academic style is evident, but it is not 
peer reviewed. Naturally efforts have been made not to critique an individual piece of 
literature in isolation but rather in so far as it is representative of a body of knowledge 
and some individual criticism is necessary to distinguish the good exemplars from the 
bad. 
Academic/practitioner collaborative articles are not new but are necessary in BCR to 
penetrate the osmotic gap that has been highlighted. If, as has been shown, Good 
Practice Guides HMG advice and ISOs are a ‘Curate’s egg’, good in parts, and that 
BCI publications are academically illiterate and far from value-free, one turns to 
academic collaborations with or specifically for practitioners, to see if such work can 
better inform professional practice. Naturally both the quality and utility of such articles 
varies, and the selection offered is orientated around this idea so as to amplify this 
distinction thereby directing future endeavours. 
Research papers 
The first document considered is very encouraging indeed and contrasts excellently 
with the second document which is its antithesis. Both are academically authored for 
a practitioner audience and this provides an ideal comparative.  
The same plaudits for the HMG advice in the preceding chapter applies to Roads to 
Ruin (Airmic 2011). This is highlighted as an example of how the BCI literature might 
be presented in future. Despite commercial and trade association sponsorship it is 
value-free. Its highly academic authors have used appropriate language to present the 
materials to an informed, but non-academic, audience.  
Airmic, (2011), was selected for inclusion as it was authored by three professors and 
one barrister, for Cass Business School on behalf of AIRMIC and sponsored by 
Crawford and Lockton. This is an excellent examination of major corporate crises in 
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the last 10 years. It hinges around the question as to how can risk inform corporate 
strategy? It covers crises precipitated by explosions, rogue employees, IT, product 
failure, and pragmatically the organisation’s own managers. The work is well 
referenced, literate, precise and the critical lessons are drawn to the attention of the 
readers. For example, “underlying risks” (p. 5) are listed with a succinct paragraph 
outlining their nature and then they are cited later in more detail. Rather like the Home 
Office (1999) advice, it credits the readers with discernment and allows them to reach 
their own conclusions. As with anything that is first class, when there is little wrong, 
there can be correspondingly little criticism. 
Sadly, the lack of critique cannot be applied to the work of Denyer (2017). When a 
colleague thoughtfully sent me Denyer (2017), I rejoiced that here was, at last, 
academically-referenced evidence of the efficacy of resilience. Its claim to 
prominence and influence was as follows: 
The BSI teamed up with Cranfield School of Management to pull 
together the best available research evidence on Organisational 
Resilience. The evidence assessment, covering 181 academic 
articles, was supplemented with five case studies. (p. 5) 
This work had to be included in the review. It promised to be the best of articles in that 
it was a genuine collaboration between practice and academia, it was authored by 
prominent academics and, suitably referenced, it promised ‘evidence’. 
Having read the article, I wondered where to place it in the review as it was written by 
an academic with evident BSI input. Eventually, I felt it should go in this chapter. The 
academic ‘abstract’ has become a trendy ‘Snapshot’ The foreword, authored by the 
BSI, included the un-attributable illiterate but supportive margin quotes such as, 
Nine in ten [of what was not stated] saw resilience as a priority for 
their business, while eight in ten believed it to be indispensable for 
long-term growth. (p. 6) 
Sentences replete with jargon and a rather jarring five verbs in one sentence are 
typical of the style of the paper’s strident ‘call to action’. 
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Striving for excellence requires business leaders to challenge 
complacency, promote vigilance and embrace the need for 
continual improvement. (p. 6) 
Interestingly and encouragingly the academic authors had utilised an approach to the 
study which differed little from my own albeit that their ‘rapid’ evidence assessment’ 
was based only on web searches. 
This report summarizes the findings of a rapid evidence 
assessment (REA) and case studies of Organisational Resilience. 
First popularized in evidenced-based medicine, Rapid Evidence 
Assessments (REAs) are used to identify and evaluate claims about 
what works and provide an evidence-informed basis for managerial 
action. An REA is a tool for getting on top of the available research 
evidence within a relatively short timeframe. (Appendix 1 
unnumbered) 
This encourages the reader to expect a comprehensive provision of evidence to 
support the assertion that organisational resilience (presumably as defined by the 
BSI) has some efficacy and utility. 
The authors begin by offering a model of “the evolution of thinking on ‘resilience’ over 
the last “40 years”. Phase 4 which, according to a graph with no exact time scale, 
began some 20 years ago and is titled “Adaptive innovation”. Its definition is as 
follows;  
Adaptive innovation. Organisational Resilience is created through 
creating, inventing and exploring unknown markets and new 
technologies. Organisations can be the disruption in their 
environment i.e. progressive + flexible. (p. 7) 
Despite being involved in running a resilience consultancy for some 22 years the 
author and my senior colleagues were unfamiliar with this concept or term of 
“adaptive innovation”. The subsequent unsubstantiated, implausible marketing 
proposition combined with a sentence ‘left hanging’ and no authority being cited 
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causes some doubt as to the promised provision of evidence. The authors then 
develop these phases into a ‘tension quadrant’ in which competing behaviours react. 
The various phases are then analysed in a rather unusual fashion in which seemingly 
contradictory management advice is spun and jumps from authority to authority; very 
little of which is either to do with resilience nor is it any evidence of the ‘paradigm’ of 
resilience which is essentially, this paper’s proposition. An example is offered below. 
…leadership may be required to conflict, create controversy and 
foster discomfort (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009; Heifetz, 1994). 
Leadership can also help to create an atmosphere that tolerates 
dissent and divergent perspectives on problems (Heifetz and 
Laurie, 1997; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Innovation requires people to 
experience and observe the situation from multiple viewpoints, 
listen to dissident voices and encourage divergent perspectives on 
problems (Heifetz and Laurie, 1997). (p. 13) 
In other cases, as illustrated below, a 14-page academic article is cited and the single 
word ‘wicked’ is all that is quoted on the matter of behavioural change, but it 
presumably assisted in getting the requisite 181 references. A sample from the original 
is offered below. 
Problems that involve changing behaviour, values and priorities, or 
that are indeterminate in scope and scale, are particularly ‘wicked’ 
(Rittel and Weber, 1973, pp. 155-169) 
The paper culminates in the proposition of a new ‘4sight’ model of achieving resilience 
which in many ways is useful to have as a visualisation of a concept, albeit this section 
was almost void of references in support of the propositions. Unsurprisingly, the 
‘4sight model’ is compatible with the BSI’s familiar ‘Plan Do Check Act’ process and 
a rather contrived comparison is made. 
The criticism of this work is harsh because it falsely promised evidence. Instead, an 
amalgam of ‘rapidly’ gained material, as opposed to evidence not altogether germane 
to resilience, was stitched together with soundbite quotes of dubious relevance to 
form a tentative paradigm which is aspirational and untried. However, this is not the 
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worst of it. The worst of it is that a reputable team of academics, led by a professor, 
failed to find the evidence, substituting it for brief allusions to HRO systems, the works 
of Perrow, Reason and a few others together with a patchwork of authors on 
management to illustrate the difficulty of achieving the BSI’s standard. In doing so, 
the quantity of referencing triumphed over the quality of argument. If this is a genuine 
attempt to bridge the gap between academia and practice it is to be applauded and 
hopefully repeated. Metaphorically it exhibited the nerves of a ‘first date,’ and a ‘blind 
date’ at that. The value of future liaison remains uncertain. 
Advice and reference books 
The quasi military alternative 
Occasionally, a senior military officer feels the imperative to translate military doctrine 
or literature for civilian use However, the translation of military notions for civilian 
application can be uneasy and the results patronizing and faintly absurd. Tom and 
Barrons (2006) was selected as an example of this genre where the intention to 
civilianise military doctrine was laudable, but the result was disappointing. It was co-
authored by a business consultant on leadership and a Brigadier who had done a 
postgraduate degree at Cambridge. The Brigadier went on to become a full General 
in charge of the Joint Forces Headquarters, all of which should have given the book 
some credence. Importantly the book has been mentioned to me by practitioners and 
there is some personally based evidence that they do have an influence on 
practitioners. 
Wisely, their preface alludes to the reticence of business to adopt military doctrine and 
the authors admit it “has to be put across in the right way” (p. x). However, in making 
the doctrines accessible, some presentational compromises appear to have been 
made. It presents military doctrine in terms of the ‘Seven Secrets’ which makes it 
sound akin to a Papally prohibited prophecy. The need to appeal to a non-military 
audience, and the need to make the reader feel at home, led to the regular summaries 
entitled the ‘Commander’s Comfy Chair Session’ becoming faintly ‘Monty 
Pythonesque’. If the book is designed for civilian senior executives of ‘General’ calibre 
such concessions to popularity are arguably unnecessary and detract from the 
potential message. However, the ability to relate “Dynamic Manoeuvre…part 
philosophy and in part a guide to best practice in planning and in operations” (p. 241) 
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to the business sector was never going to be easy. In this case, it presents vignettes 
of cases studies without petty fogging detail which might bore the reader. For example, 
the Glaxo Smith Kline merger is dispatched in less than one page (p. 235), and the 
Korean War in less than half a page (p. 243). Consequently, its appeal and ease of 
reading is at some ‘academic’ cost. In this case, the “Principles of Winning Traffic 
Light” (p. 77), which is taken directly from the British Army Field Manual Principles of 
War (1985), is unreferenced and the headings are identical; it is sheer plagiarism. 
Referencing would have lent it more authority and, if sensitively done, would not have 
detracted from its appeal to a wide readership.   
However, this is not the end of the story, and the idea of Tom and Barrons was 
essentially good. It was the execution of the idea which was flawed, and the concluding 
chapter offers some gentler options for consideration in the translation of military 
literature to the civilian arena of BCR.  
Three contrasting self-help books and a definitive guide 
There are several BCR self-help books and the author has often observed a wide range 
of titles on visits to clients’ offices. For ease of review, three authors were chosen as 
being representative of this body of literature, together with what claims to be the 
‘Definitive Guide’. All the books are referenced to a greater or lesser degree, they are 
intended for practitioner use, are comprehensive in nature and of a similar length. The 
first authors Graham and Kaye (2006) are academically unqualified but respected 
practitioners with a major international law firm who are published by a rather obscure 
house with limited titles. The second author, Heath, R. (1998) is a managerial 
psychologist holding a doctorate degree who has worked in two Australian universities 
before moving to London as a consultant. Heath is published by the Financial Times. 
Reason (1997) was a professor of psychology at Manchester University. The Definitive 
Guide is an edited collection of chapters on the topic which are mainly authored by 
practitioners.  
Graham and Kayes a simple book 
Graham and Kayes’ (2006) book has been selected as representative of the stable of 
self-help business continuity and related fields that are published by Rothstein. Their 
400-page book is certainly very comprehensive. It is endorsed by the BCI, the BSI, 
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(who included PAS 56 in the annexes), the Disaster Recovery Institute and the 
(ironically titled, now bankrupt) BCR training organisation ‘Survive’. It contains advice 
and tables for almost every element of the discipline. It is liberally sprinkled with case 
studies which are commendably varied. They range from dramatic catastrophes 
though to mundane callout problems. The work is referenced to some extent, though 
most of the references are to open source commercial reports, the trade press and BCI 
papers; academic references are few, and only 13 references might be termed 
‘academic’. Strangely, the least referenced chapter is titled ‘Rehearsals and Exercising 
of Plans and Risk Decision Making’; one might have expected more referencing in this 
decision-making area.  
Their language grates on the ear and the syntax is often very unusual, for example,  
Could that information be transferred or better downloaded onto 
suitable, smaller computers that could be bought into use 
immediately to carry them through the period before the full 
mainframe service is reinstated. (p. 161). 
On other occasions, the advice does appear confused and incoherent.  
…the unthinkable event should form part of scenario 
management and the consideration of the more predictable 
event should form part of the risk assessment…. It is increasingly 
necessary for every organisation to evaluate “unthinkable” worst 
case scenarios. (p. 347) 
Despite the language being irksome, coherence patchy and referencing weak, the 
overall advice is good. The comprehensive nature of the consideration of all aspects 
of the discipline is of appeal to a practitioner. Certainly, a reader could follow this advice 
and make a good attempt at authoring the necessary documentation. The authors are 
also pragmatic as opposed to doctrinaire. They concede on page 350 that a small 
organisation does not need the management structures of a large firm, albeit their tasks 
remain similar. Fundamentally, this is a good book for the practitioner despite the lack 
of underpinning academic authority. 
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Heath, Crisis Management 
Heath (1998) authored one of the most comprehensive guides to resilience ever. 
Almost 20 years old, it still appears ‘up to date’. Several of the phrases used have 
recently been rehabilitated in practice, for example “Maximum Acceptable Outage” 
(MAO) (p. 60). In all respects the book is comprehensive, thorough, very well 
referenced and it goes far beyond its title, ‘Crisis Management’, giving clear 
explanations of all business continuity practices including risk assessments in chapter 
2. The advice is precise, simple and well argued. 
In reality, preparation for probabilistic events needs to be based 
on the fact that the event will happen – rather than using the 
mental traps of ‘won’t happen for a long time’ or ‘just happened 
so won’t happen for another long period of time’. (p. 39) 
Given the detail and consideration of the whole range of resilience topics it is therefore 
surprising that chapter 11, ‘Response and recovery plans’, is both one of the shortest 
and least referenced of any chapter. (A noted similarity with Graham and Kayes 
(2006)). Notwithstanding its brevity, its advocacy and content laid the foundation for 
many subsequent commentaries. Heath stressed “flexibility” (p. 253) even to the point 
that “planning that proves inaccurate is not a waste of management time” (p. 254). 
Whilst in the “components of a plan”, (p. 256) several of the headings might be better 
sited in a policy document, the proposal of distinguishing between immediate 
responses and subsequent recovery, (p. 259) has survived and has been incorporated 
into modern standards. He also advocates the use of checklists, almost to the point of 
excess, (p. 259), but his recognition of this necessity and the flexibility it engenders is 
endorsed by many other academics. His “hints on planning” (pp. 261-264) are some of 
the most pragmatic, concise and sensible found in any documentation, for example, 
“define a crisis by the effect on response resources rather than by type of incident”, is 
a proposition taken up by several subsequent academic and practitioner 
commentaries. Heath’s most notable chapter is the last, chapter 18, which devotes 
itself to a consideration of the development of the “resilient organisation or community” 
(p. 437); this predates the current resilience debate by about 15 years. 
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The reason of Reason  
Normally a book by James Reason (1997), a former Professor of psychology at the 
University of Manchester, would undoubtedly be placed in the academic review 
chapter. However, because of Reason’s own comments in his preface it has been 
included in the non-academic literature. In doing so, it provides a stark comparative 
for the proposition of “4sight” (Denyer 2017), reviewed earlier. It would be very difficult 
to propose a literature review without including the work of Reason (1997). Not only 
does Reason have a uniquely readable style, but he also adds notes to the references 
to assist the reader. For example, a reference is given to Weick (p. 39) following which 
Reason adds, “Karl Weick is one of the most perceptive of the social scientists writing 
about organisational accidents.” His concessions to the lay reader also extend to 
simple tables, diagrams and comparatives, for example almost all the explanation of 
“administrative controls” (pp. 62-63) is diagrammatic; were it in prose it would be turgid 
indeed.  
His prose has a lightness of touch and often memorable, subtle humour “The ‘Swiss 
Cheese’ Model of Defences” (p. 9) and importantly, pragmatism. In a discussion of the 
dangers of defences, he entitles a paragraph “Killed by their Armour” (p. 41) and 
illustrates the notion with a summary of the battle of Agincourt. Later (p. 171) he 
alludes to pragmatic factors such as budgetary constraints and the problems for 
regulators in a section titled, “Damned If They Do: Damned If They Don’t.” It is phrased 
in the accessible language of the pub discussion but made academic, and Reason is 
to be commended all the more so because this is exactly what he set out to do. In the 
Preface, he states bluntly, 
This book is not meant for an academic readership, although I 
hope that academics and students might read it. It is aimed at 
‘real people’ and especially those whose daily business is …the 
risks of hazardous technologies. (p. xvii) 
Reason distinguishes what his readership requires but achieves it without patronizing 
the layman; full references and complex arguments abound, there is nothing dumbed 
down here, rather his amazing skill is in making the complex, comprehensible. One of 
the criticisms of many other works is their concentration on the massive catastrophic 
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event which occurs seldom and only to specific types of industry. Reason 
apologetically justifies their inclusion, 
This is not intended to be another catalogue of accident case 
studies…. But the real test is whether or not these ideas can be 
translated into some improvement… (p. xvii) 
Whilst not all of Reason’s work can be applied to BCR planning, there remains a large 
corpus of the work that can indirectly inform planning considerations. 
Unusually, Reason is not shy of utilizing some controversial military references where 
it is of utility to the argument. On (pp. 67-68) he debates the legendary prowess of the 
German soldier in the first half of the 20th century. He notes the influence of the 
“Auftragssystem”, (‘mission command’ in modern UK military parlance). He continues 
to elaborate on this idea using Rasmussen’s work on skills, rule and knowledge-based 
performance levels. (p. 69). This is illustrative of a notion that can be applied directly 
to the planning process. If one were to apply or blend Borodzicz’s (2005) differentiation 
between incidents, crises and disasters to the respective skill, rule and knowledge-
based levels, the ‘fit’ is imperfect. Nevertheless, one can see that in incidents the skill 
and rule-based performance will be required, but in complex crisis or disasters ‘novel 
problems’ will call for ‘knowledge based’ solutions. Whilst this is far from any formulaic 
planning template it should inform the planner as to the nature of the ‘situations and 
control modes’, that can be reflected in a plan.  
Of all the literature so far reviewed, this is perhaps the best example of the effective 
bridge between academic and practitioner. It diminishes neither party and can be 
informative to both parties. It speaks with authority and offers far more than perhaps 
the author intended. It eschews commercial patronage and remains value-free. It 
meets what most or the contributors to the Elliott and Johnson (2010) study would 
deem valuable and laudable. 
The ‘Definitive Handbook’ 
The Definitive Handbook (TDH) (Hiles and Barnes,1999) by its title alone makes a big 
claim which is debatable, but it is an interesting historical document containing an 
insight into the development of business continuity. It was published in 1999 and has 
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been revised and republished since. The book of nearly 400 pages is a compilation of 
chapters authored by nineteen different authors. All the authors were, to the best of 
this author’s knowledge, and based on their declared job titles in the book, 
practitioners, mainly consultants and only one was academically qualified to doctorate 
level. Interestingly nine of the nineteen authors have listed companies and addresses 
that appear to be private houses as opposed to business addresses. Five of the 
authors are still known to be active consultants and of these, all are members or 
fellows of the BCI, one being the BCI’s former technical director. Twelve of the 
nineteen contributors were then ‘fellows or members’ of the BCI. One can therefore 
conclude that any variation between the BCI and the authors’ view is likely to be 
minimal. Furthermore, at risk of some guesswork one can also conclude from the 
addresses and titles mentioned earlier that the level of size and sophistication of the 
numerous consultancy companies was low, thereby indicating the relative infancy of 
the market place. Only the author with a doctorate offers any references at the end of 
the chapter. One can therefore perhaps assume that all the rest of the authors 
understandably expressed an opinion or insight based on their experience.  
This offers a glimpse into the real origins of the discipline, fundamentally it was based 
on the opinions of 18 men and one woman, one Belgian, one author from Bangkok, 
but not Asian, four based in the USA, one based in Australia, two from Canada and 
the remaining ten from the UK. One can therefore also perceive a ‘western’ 
androcentric bias, perhaps understandable of its day but echoed still in the BCI (2016) 
Horizon Scan. 
What is genuinely fascinating about the book is not the detail of the content, which 
now appears somewhat dated, but the order of events outlined in ‘Section Two, 
Planning for Business Continuity: a “how-to” guide’. The chapter or section headings 
are worth some comparison with both the ISO, the GPG, the Dummies Guide and the 
Law Society Guide authored at least 10 years later. Some discretion has been taken 
to better illustrate the correlation of topic headings and to best show this, the headings 
of the TDH have been left in their original order and other section headings in the other 
documents have been moved to reflect their correlation with the Definitive Handbook.  
Table 2 Comparison of literature development. 
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The Definitive 
Handbook (1999) 
ISO 22301 (2012) The Good Practice 
Guide (2010) 
The Dummies 
Guide (2012) 
The Lexcel 
Planning Toolkit 
(2011) 
The Business 
Continuity Planning 
Methodology 
Introduction Embedding BCM in 
the organisation’s 
culture 
Introducing 
Business Continuity 
Understanding the 
Importance of 
Business Continuity 
Introduction 
Project initiation 
and Management 
Sections 4 and 5 
Context of the 
organisation and 
Leadership 
Policy and 
programme 
management 
 Planning the project 
Risk evaluation and 
control 
8.2 Business 
Impact analysis and 
risk assessment 
Understanding the 
organisation which 
includes business 
impact and risk 
assessment sub 
sections 
Considering the 
Risks to Your 
Business 
Understanding the 
practice which 
includes risk 
assessment and 
business impact 
analysis 
Business impact 
analysis 
Focusing on What’s 
Important: Business 
Impact Analysis 
3 chapters on 
various aspects of 
BC strategies 
8.3 Business 
Continuity Strategy 
Determining 
Business Continuity 
Strategy 
Selecting the Right 
Continuity 
Strategies 
Policies strategies 
assumptions and 
scope 
Emergency 
response and 
operations 
   In an annex at the 
end of the guide 
Developing and 
implementing the 
written plan. 
8.4 Establish and 
Implement 
business continuity 
procedures 
Developing and 
implementing a 
BCM response 
Developing Your 
Business Continuity 
Plan  
The planning 
process 
Awareness through 
auditing training 
and testing 
9 to 9.3 
performance 
evaluation 
Exercising, 
maintaining and 
Reviewing BCM 
Validating Your 
Business Continuity 
Plan  
Training and 
exercises 
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Maintaining and 
exercising BC 
Plans 
8.5 Exercising and 
testing 
Selecting the tools 
to support the 
process 
 Supporting 
information 
Ten Top Tips for 
Keeping Your IT in 
Great Shape 251 
Ten Tips for 
Communicating 
Internally During a 
Disruption  
Ten Tips for 
Effective External 
Communication in a 
Crisis  
 
Supporting annexes 
Coping with people 
in recovery 
    
The missing 
elements 
   Background 
information 
 
The inescapable close correlation of chapter headings and even on occasion the 
precise language used is amenable to different interpretations aside from plagiarism. 
The most charitable is that the original Definitive Handbook was a work of such 
persuasive power and thoroughness that all subsequent processes modelled 
themselves on it; all that has taken place since 1999 is a gentle evolution and 
refinement of language and presentational techniques. The least charitable is the 
equally valid perception that nobody has bothered to think of anything significantly new 
in the last decade and so have contented themselves with minor inconsequential 
sematic debates.  
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The truth probably lies somewhere between the two polarised views. Howsoever one 
perceives the development of BCR, it does seem apparent that very little can be 
considered innovative. The reasons for this are equally intriguing and difficult to prove 
and prioritise. Undoubtedly the sway held over the profession by the BCI as evidenced 
by the understandable prominence of their members in the TDH and the subsequent 
GPG and ISO’s has ensured a degree of conformity. The lack of any academic critique, 
endorsement or validity to the assertions of the GPG or ISO or TDH is puzzling. The 
matter is not however inconsequential when one considers that the potential fate of 
many major companies and local economies depends on the implementation of plans 
that are devoid of any academic foundation. 
However, we have what we have, and these appear to be the best guides to business 
continuity that are available. To some extent their habitual use, and indeed their 
successful use, in invocations has partially redeemed their lack of academic validation.  
The ‘coffee table intellectual’ books 
Perhaps every five years, a ‘must-have book’ giving a startling insight into some facet 
of business or even physics is launched. Within days the book is casually placed on 
the desk, coffee table, study shelf to indicate to passers-by the erudition of the owner. 
Within a month, not only have competitive titles been authored but the original book, 
half read, has not been finished. The author has been asked by many clients as to his 
opinion on these types of books and one can thus assume that they have some 
influence on the resilience planner. Two books (noted below) on ‘risk’ fit this format, 
being lightly referenced, and a third one comes close, but it is not quite the same, as 
its references cover 28 pages of small fonts type; the books are: 
• Dembo & Freeman (1998) Seeing tomorrow; rewriting the rules of risk.  
• Berstein (1996) Against the Gods; the remarkable story of risk.  
• Taleb (2010) The Black Swan; The Impact of the Highly Improbable.  
Essentially these books seek to make difficult subjects; risk, probability, mathematics, 
uncertainty, philosophy and psychology amenable to a lay reader and entertaining at 
the same time. They all utilise ‘reader involvement’ with little games to illustrate 
complex theories. For example; 
Dembo & Freeman (1998, p. 111)  
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Imagine you inherit a modest cash sum, say $5000… 
Bernstein (1996, p. 285) 
 …you liquidated your long-standing IBM position at$80 a share. This morning you 
check your paper and discover... 
Taleb (2010, p. 138)  
Take a room full of people. Randomly pick a number... 
All three books are styled as a chatty conversational story, bringing you into the 
confidence of the author; almost like ‘Letter from America’ for those readers who can 
recall the down-home folksy delivery of the late Alistair Cooke. Some examples 
include: 
Taleb (2010, p. 136)  
one March evening a few men and women were standing on the esplanade... 
Bernstein (1996, p. 202)  
Arrow was born at the end of the first World War and grew up in... 
The ‘hard science bits’ are dealt with deftly and the theory, in this example taken from 
Taleb (2010, p. 58) “Confirmation bias”, italicised by Taleb, is discussed in relation to 
Wason’s experiments. But Wason is introduced thus, “the first experiment I know of 
concerning this”. ‘This’ is not a remote boffin in a white coat; it portrays Wason as 
Taleb’s ‘chum’. 
All three books, despite being hard going in places, do succeed in making the topic 
interesting, accessible and even fun. They privilege the reader with the sort of ‘factoid 
mesmeric’ knowledge; it has not made you an actuary but a comment on probability 
can be impressive at some dinner parties. They are harmless, and this is perhaps their 
drawback. One must take their assertions on trust and little counter arguments are 
admitted. They all explain how and why probability is difficult to apply and how risk 
perceptions can be skewed or flawed. All three authors have a lot more difficulty in 
detailing how this might be applied to lay risk assessments in the BCR planning 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 134 
 
process. All three books have an avuncular style which just misses being patronising. 
However, Taleb (2010, p. 332) is often too self-indulgent and strident. He often goes 
too far in condemning those who dispute his desired “Epistemocracy”, as “only fools 
and Platonists (or, worse, the species called central bankers)...”.  
It is almost impossible to assess the degree to which these books have influenced 
planning. We do however hear many clients wishing to prepare for a ‘black swan’ event 
without, it appears, ever having read the book or seen such a swan. It appears 
convenient for planners to use the ‘soundbite’ phrase ‘Black Swan’ to describe almost 
any implausible scenario. As a practitioner, it also appears that the influence of these 
books is transitory. When the book was published several clients mentioned it was 
quoted in several conference speeches; in the last two years I have seldom heard the 
phrase used. 
An internal publication 
The BP (2006) book Integrity Management: Learning from Past Major Industrial 
Accidents rather stands alone for several reasons. It is self-published by BP, it is 
clearly influenced by Toft and Reynolds’ (1997) idea of isomorphic learning, its aim is 
modestly expressed, but far reaching,  
This booklet’s only ambition is to be an awareness raising tool and 
to give useful references that may be needed for more detailed 
analysis. (p. 5)  
Any of the 11 chapters can be read individually and the ‘non-oil industry’ incidents that 
are considered are related back later to the oil industry. For example, chapter 8 deals 
with the “Management of Change”. It offers 13 pages on the topic, it lays out the 
essential elements of a change programme and then debates case studies and draws 
distinct lessons from them. It offers nine further academic and trade references for 
detailed reading. The language is business like but clear and simple, the presentation 
is similarly logical. It is highly informative and authoritatively authored. The author has 
yet to read a better case study book. Amazingly the author(s) is/are not credited. 
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Discussion 
Complementary popular literature is difficult to summarise in a discussion as it takes 
so many forms and guises. However, when one applies the criteria of criticism 
outlined earlier very few articles or books escape censure, but, when one applies the 
criteria of the ‘utility to the planner’ then a curious admixture of articles rises to 
prominence. 
Two academic authored works, Reason (1997) and Denyer (2017) were designed for 
practitioners. They have equal academic credentials in that they both were authored 
by Professors, but their quality and utility are poles apart. One can conclude that 
academic authorship does not de facto convey quality, utility, nor applicability.  
The value of two books which are less prominent and well regarded than many others 
and which would often go unremarked in a prose comparative. Graham and Kaye 
(2007) and the self-published BP booklet have greater utility to planning and in some 
respects planner education, than many of the other materials, even those in the other 
categories. This illustrates that an authors’ mediocre literary skills and low academic 
qualifications can be compensated for by pragmatic useful advice and resonant case 
study analysis. This level of authorship seems reasonable for the non-professional 
audience. Whilst Reason would perhaps be the preferred author for the more 
experienced BCR manager, applying the somewhat informal ‘Desert Island Disks, one 
book test’, if I was a new BCR planner I would choose Graham and Kaye (2007). 
In summary, only Graham and Kayes’ (2006) amateur excursion into authorship, 
Reason’s, gentle, pragmatic self-aware writings, the considered Home Office advice, 
Dr Robert Heath’s diligent referencing, and CASS business schools very simple brief 
report withstand any of the criteria of critique that might be applied to them. The 
question of what quality these authors maintain, whilst others do not, paves the way 
for the final chapter. In this chapter some additional materials, never designed for the 
resilience arena but complementary to it and being good exemplars of their genre, 
are offered for discussion.  
However, in the penultimate chapter one must return to debate the degree of 
professionalism. This was begged in the title as being inherent in BCR planning. If it 
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is a profession then the literature should be of a corresponding standard, if it is merely 
a business process then a lower standard might be appropriate.  
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Chapter 8 The Maturity of BCR as a profession 
Introduction 
The critical question debated in this chapter is whether or not BCR practice is a 
profession. The reason for this debate is that if BCR is a profession, then we have 
every right to be critical of the current literature; if is simply a managerial discipline 
then we might still be disappointed, but we can accept that it suffices to inform a 
relatively hybrid set of managerial skills. Pauchant & Douville (1992) made the 
suggestion that crisis management lacked an overall paradigm as might be defined by 
Kuhn (1996). This was echoed by Alexander (2013) who levelled the same criticism 
to ‘resilience’ lacking the power to drive a paradigm. If resilience lacks an overall 
paradigm, does the lack of this paradigm reflect the non-professional status of the 
discipline or does it cause it? This might account for some of the reasons why the 
uptake of academic work is slow, why the referencing of ISOs is self-serving and how 
the discipline seems mired in iterative, poor grade debate. The issue of the degree to 
which the discipline of BCR is a profession was alluded to in the introduction and 
methodology in terms of it being a criterion by which to judge available literature. Now 
we turn to the academic concept of the profession and professionalism to further 
examine the issues that confront BCR literature in almost all its guises.  
The nature of professionalism 
“All professions are conspiracies against the laity.” 
George Bernard Shaw, Act 1,The Doctor’s Dilemma (1911)  
Despite Shaw’s dramatic cynicism, over 100 years later, the popular notion of 
‘professionalism’ still mirrors Evett, Mieg & Felt’s (2006) summarised suggestion of a 
knowledge-based occupation, needing tertiary education combined with vocational 
training and experience. As Veloski, Sylvia, Fields, Boex and Blank (2005) noted, any 
profession jealously guards its attainment. However, linguistic or journalistic use and 
abuse has softened the meaning of professionalism. Evans (writing as a Professor at 
the School of Education at the University of Leeds) (2007, p. 1) wittily observed that 
with increasing disciplines seeking professional status, “Professionalism, it is generally 
believed, is not what it was”. Nevertheless, it remains a condition to which the BCI, on 
behalf of their members, aspires. Interestingly, Evans (ibid.) went onto explain the 
  
CHRIS NEEDHAM-BENNETT 138 
 
problem of the “widening of applicability from this profession, or that profession, to 
professions” with the inevitable corollary of diminishing value.  
This possible dilution of the concept of professionalism was considered by Perkin 
(1989, p. 3) who noted that 
as more and more jobs become subject to specialized training 
and claim expertise beyond the common sense of the layman so 
the opportunity to become professional permeates more deeply 
through the strata of society. 
However, this burgeoning quest for professionalism has also created waves of 
uncertainty as to what the concept actually is. Citing several authors in support of their 
contention, Gleeson, Davies & Wheeler (2005) argued very strongly that 
professionalism is in a state of flux and conflict: 
the blurring of public and private sector occupations, …and 
overlap between management and practitioner activities, 
suggests that traditional attempts to define professionalism, 
removed from the context of its practice, offers limited insight to 
its meaning. (p. 3) 
The limited literature to date on BCR’s assault on the gates of professionalism (in the 
UK at least) risks being confused, and appears to follow a simple syllogistic fallacy, as 
follows: 
1. Established professions are complex, knowledge-based jobs requiring 
considerable training. 
2. BC managers do complex, knowledge-based jobs with considerable training. 
3. Therefore, BC is a profession. 
Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 181) noted parallels between security practitioners’ 
tasks and business continuity and that the two-disciplines’ claim to professionalism is 
similar. However, the overly simplistic criteria problem in both their cases is illustrated 
as follows. In support of his assertion that security management is a profession, 
Simonsen (1996, p. 229) was captivated by a very convenient argument proposed by 
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Criscouli (1988, pp. 498-499) whose essay he described as ‘thoughtful’. Criscouli had 
observed that:  
Security can be considered a profession because it requires 
advanced training of a mental rather than manual 
nature…security…involves a complex body of knowledge, 
analytical abilities…as well as the effective use of an array of 
other managerial skills. 
This liberal definition might well be rejected by the reasonable person as being 
descriptive of almost any managerial role; by this definition a croupier, a bookmaker 
or an estate agent would be instantly professionalised. Simonsen’s criteria, too, must 
be questioned closely as many might seek to utilise them in the justification of 
professionalism. A précis of Simonsen’s list (ibid.) is outlined below. 
1. Defined standards and a code of ethics.  
2. An established knowledge base including professional journals.  
3. Recognised association(s) as a forum for discussion and development of 
the profession.  
4. A measurable set of competencies along with appropriate certification 
programmes.  
5. An educational discipline preparing the student in the profession’s specific 
functions and philosophies.  
The BCI appear to believe that all these elements are in place and, de facto, BCR is 
a profession. However, the BCI would not be impressed by the cynicism of Perkin 
(1989, p. 6) who noted, perhaps a little harshly, that the professions  
...live by persuasion and propaganda…claiming that their 
particular service is indispensable to the client…By this means 
they hope to raise their status and through it their 
income…With luck and persistence they may turn the human 
capital they acquire into material wealth.  
Therefore, does the evidence presented for the professionalism of resilience 
management amount to little more than a propagandist syllogistic trap or is it logically 
sound, worthy of accompanying high grade literature? As ‘Professionalism’ is, 
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according to Perkins, (1989) a potentially valuable notion, any such claim should be 
comprehensively proven, and the onus of proof should be on the person or group 
making the assertion to prove it to an unbiased audience. As Jones and de Villiars 
(2009, p. 209) noted, as a principle ‘no man should be judge in his own cause’. Thus, 
the industry cannot judge itself; the industry can only present its case for 
professionalism. With a neat paradox, this in large measure evidenced by the quality 
of the literature that informs its practice.  
Are BCR managers inherently professional? 
Lindstedt (2007, p. 198) noted in relation to business continuity planning that “At the 
most fundamental level, a profession that is not well defined cannot ultimately 
prosper”. His implication being that BC practice was too ‘blurred’ with the 
complimentary activities of IT and disaster recovery, at present, to be a distinct 
profession. This sentiment was echoed by a study by EDUCAUSE (2007, p. 155), 
cited by Lindstedt. It noted that: 
BC continues to be…a back engineered process whose technical 
aspects are left to IT and whose business aspects are only 
investigated after the fact. Once…attention is brought to bear on 
BC questions…uncoordinated action, unclear funding and 
ambiguous ‘ownership’ of BC are ready to flourish. 
Whilst this latter quotation is from the US it has applicability in the UK too. With the 
broadening of business continuity into the supposed paradigm of resilience, it is 
genuinely difficult to find significant academic or economic endorsement of BC 
professionalism. 
However, writing on security management, Borodzicz and Gibson (2006) listed many 
roles which are also believed to be in the remit of the business continuity manager. 
(They are highlighted in bold by the author.) 
A rapidly growing industry of practitioners involved in a number 
of diverse tasks ranging from the management of situational 
crime through crisis management, consequence management, 
business continuity management, resilience management, 
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internal audit, health and safety functions to insurance, counter-
terrorism, kidnap and rescue, private information brokering, 
security consultancy, and the increasingly critical cyber security 
and protection of critical infrastructure. (p. 181) 
Notwithstanding the bewildering array of responsibilities, Borodzicz and Gibson 
concluded that the diversity of tasks did not in itself professionalise security nor, 
potentially by implication, in this case, business continuity. It was found to be “like any 
other management issue…about the management of finite resources in the face of an 
infinite range of threats” (ibid. 194). This begs several questions. If professionalism is 
not about a complex job that not everyone could do, if it is not all about the education 
and qualifications required, if it is not about dealing with an array of issues with a 
Brobdingnagian skill set, then what is left? 
So, on what criteria should the BCR discipline be reasonably deemed to be 
professional? Based loosely on the academic references cited, a non-exclusive list 
similar to McGee’s (2006, p. 101), might include: 
• The degree to which the discipline is knowledge based, amenable to study and 
codification (Evett et al., 2006). 
• The evidence for a professional project taking place (Larson, 1977). 
• The identification of an ethical stance and internal disciplinary processes 
(Brown and Ferrill (2009) citing Reynolds (1994)). 
• The degree to which cognitive commonality has occurred (Larson, 1977, p. 40). 
• The use of criteria developed for the assessment of other related professions 
(McGee, 2006, p. 101). 
These criteria will now be utilised to examine the evidence for the professionalism of 
BCR. 
The degree to which the discipline is knowledge based, amenable to study and 
codification. 
Almost axiomatically the Business Continuity Institute, (BCI), is the main influence on 
BC in the UK. If we analyse the BCI website, (BCI. 2018) we can see that roughly 
speaking the following is the suggested programme of training for a novitiate. BCI 
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training commences with the category of ‘Entry level Business Continuity Management 
Training’ described as: 
This comprehensive programme of training covers the complete 
Business Continuity Management (BCM) Lifecycle in depth and 
is our top recommendation for candidates preparing for the BCI 
Certificate Examination. 
It should be noted that this course is described as ‘comprehensive’ and ‘in depth’. The 
course normally lasts five days but is also offered in a three-day intensive version, or 
32 hours of flexible learning over eight weeks. Potentially, and not compulsorily, this 
is followed by a total of 13 more days of optional varied training in different skills 
ranging from business impact analysis to plan writing, and then an optional 30-week 
distance learning module of 3-4 hours a week taught at Bucks New University, then 
possibly an MSc at the same location. However, none of it is compulsory and many 
very competent BC managers known to the author are unqualified in the terms of the 
BCI’s courses. 
Even with a charitable, pro-professional view of business continuity, it is difficult to 
deem this sufficient evidence of professional training akin to law, medicine, dentistry 
or engineering, in which a range of well-established qualifications define competency 
to practice. However, echoing Evett et al. (2006), the traditional endorsement of 
professionalism in the UK still tends to stem from and be based on tertiary education. 
It is hard to recall any profession which does not mandate some form of tertiary 
education, even if only a conversion diploma from a prior degree (as required by the 
legal profession). The growing professionalism achieved by business continuity can 
be identified by the rapid growth of university-accredited degree courses available 
(Barclay Simpson, 2017). Whilst some distinctions and emphases in the titles of the 
courses blur the issue, the thrust of risk (howsoever defined) and business continuity 
shines through. Importantly, employers are apparently valuing the degrees offered. 
The list below is taken from Barclay Simpson (2017), which is one of the largest 
recruiters and placement agencies in this and related fields. They place considerable 
credence on the degree qualifications in obtaining employment: 
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There are now many universities that offer post graduate 
diplomas, BSc and MSc courses in disaster, emergency 
management and business continuity including Coventry, 
Birmingham, Leicester, Portsmouth, Cranfield, Hertfordshire, 
Leeds and others. Many of the courses will give the option of 
studying full-time, part-time or remotely. This level of education 
will in some cases give you the advantage and many employers 
will value your commitment to personal development. 
Nonetheless, one needs to be mindful that despite Bucks New University offering an 
MSc in ‘Organisational Resilience’, by distance learning, their publicity material 
(Bucks.ac.uk, 2018) reveals the genuine difficulty they appear to have in precisely 
defining the topic: 
Organisational resilience requires, because of the growing inter-
relationship and blurred boundaries between the various elements, 
and the constant development of new risks and the need to mitigate 
them; the development of organisational and individual capability 
and knowledge across a range of contributing areas and of the 
organisational behaviours needed to support them. Therefore, this 
programme is designed to attract and educate those with a 
specialist interest in the following areas and sub-disciplines: 
• security 
• business continuity 
• crisis and incident management 
• emergency management 
• disaster response and recovery 
This is very interesting, as it places BC as a subset of the dominant paradigm of 
resilience; yet the summary has evident difficulty in defining resilience and resorts to 
inclusion of references to the five “sub-disciplines”. 
It is beguiling to endorse professionalism on the basis of burgeoning academic tuition, 
but one must bear in mind that there are several university courses that would not, in 
the view of the reasonable commuter, necessarily convey professional status. 
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It would be foolishly arrogant to equate business continuity ability with academic 
qualifications. Nevertheless, as a coarse guide to employers, the degree of personal 
competence that could be expected of a graduate remains a persistent theme. Few 
organisations would entrust the portfolio of responsibilities outlined by Borodzicz and 
Gibson (ibid.) to any but the most evidently qualified and competent employee 
However, sadly but understandably, perhaps as this might “unintentionally 
discriminate against some members”, the BCI does not hold records of academic 
achievements of their membership. Personal communication to the author Patrick 
Alcantara 31/02/18 . Similarly, Barclay Simpson does not hold data on the percentage 
of graduates amongst their applicants (personal communications to the author). The 
evidence thus presented is arguably inconclusive to the reasonable person in that the 
discipline offers degree courses, but, critically, they are not yet a pre-requisite for 
practitioners. 
The evidence for a professional project taking place 
Wilensky cited by Larson M S (1977, p. 31) commenting on the quality of the body of 
knowledge required of a profession, noted that:  
If the technical base of an occupation consists of a vocabulary 
that sounds familiar to everyone…or if the base is scientific, but 
so narrow that it can be learned as a set of rules by most people, 
then the occupation will have difficulty claiming a monopoly of 
skill or even a roughly exclusive jurisdiction. (p. 31) 
Based on this observation, the activities of the BCI and other bodies of knowledge on 
business continuity might not, by themselves, clear Wilensky’s hurdle. Even combined 
with ISO standards and self-help books they seem to fall considerably short of the level 
of professional. Paradoxically, most of the BC materials presented by the BCI and 
others are intentionally amenable, designed to be easy reading and capable of 
implementation with minimal special vocabulary (other than numerous three and four-
letter acronyms. As to any ‘scientific’ basis, it seems regrettably elusive (Boin, 2006). 
Whilst perhaps failing the Wilensky criteria, the BCI is evidently committed to achieving 
protectionism from an open market with no barriers to entry, the same issues that 
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Larson (1977) intimated as being the intent or aim of becoming a profession, the 
professional project.  
The BCI established itself as a membership organisation in 1994 and has recently 
developed a training organisation to train applicants in business continuity. This makes 
the BCI demonstrably different to their equivalents like the British Medical Association 
(BMA), the General Medical Council (GMC), the Bar Council or the Law Society. The 
main distinguishing feature is that none of the latter train their members in their 
disciplines which is the preserve of teaching hospitals, universities and law schools. 
In contrast, the BCI and their ‘approved affiliates’ have set themselves up as both the 
authors of content and process and the approved deliverers of training. In some ways, 
this virtually makes the BCI a training company for a discipline. It remains to be seen 
if this duality of purpose will lead to a conflict of interest or will actively promote the 
professionalism project. The concept of the representative membership organisation 
training and examining its own members is unusual for a profession and the lack of 
independent third-party validation might prove problematic in the medium to long term. 
The BCI has also devised a variety of membership grades which one might feel at first 
glance to be complex rather than helpful. However, it is certainly evidence of the 
exclusivity and protectionism requisite to an embryonic profession, even if some of it 
is slightly propagandist in Perkins’ (1989) terms:  
Statutory membership of the BCI provides internationally 
recognised status and demonstrates the member’s competence 
to carry out BCM to a consistently high standard. Increasingly 
employers ask for BCI membership when employing new 
business continuity staff and throughout the world major 
companies, when issuing tender documents for business 
continuity consultancy and services, insist on BCI membership. 
The Statutory Professional Grades of Fellow (FBCI), Member 
(MBCI), Associate Member (AMBCI) and Specialist (SBCI) are 
certified grades and members within these grades have 
undergone a rigorous application process allowing them to use 
the relevant post nominal designation.  
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Even though the BCI membership and other grades require considerable ‘time served’ 
and evidence of skills in all aspects of BC, it is only with a leap of charitable 
interpretation that one can grant the term professional to such basic training even 
when augmented by experience (which could be with a single employer), but it does 
seem reasonable to concede that the BCI’s ‘professional project’ is well and truly 
underway. 
The identification of an ethical stance 
Brown and Ferrill (2009), citing Reynolds (1994), stressed the altruistic element of 
professionalism and the nature of service creating the perception of professionalism 
in the mind of the public. 
This element, so clearly evident in the medical professions, does seem to have been 
addressed by the BCI’s code of conduct, the preamble of which is outlined below (BCI 
2018): 
The wider role of the BCI and the BCI Partnership is to promote 
the highest standards of professional competence and 
commercial ethics in the provision and maintenance of business 
continuity planning and services. 
In the accompanying code of conduct, the BCI reserves the right to withdraw 
membership status for serious breaches of the code and thus has similar powers to 
the more recognised professional bodies. According to a BCI spokesperson (personal 
communication to the author 11.09.12) the process has been invoked ‘a couple of 
times’ since its inception; so it can be seen that the process is not a toothless tiger, 
although this does not seem a very frequently imposed sanction. 
The ethical stance of the BCI is not as developed perhaps as the caring professions, 
but the self-regulatory element is undoubtedly present. Although the Code of Conduct 
uses the words ‘profession(al)’ 21 times, the extent of the BCI codes seems to be no 
more ethical than that which might reasonably be expected of any qualified trade. It 
seems to lack the detailed debate and high ethics often seen in other professions. It 
is too convenient to allege that such altruistic ethics are not required of BC managers 
because they are not taking decisions about life and death or the curtailment of 
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personal liberty. In reality, their plans might be the basis of such decisions, if not for 
the managers themselves then at least for their organisations. Consequently, the 
codes of conduct might warrant some reinforcement if they are to be considered truly 
professional.  
The degree to which cognitive commonality has occurred 
Larson’s (1977, p. 40) pre-condition that “Cognitive commonality, however minimal, is 
indispensable if professionals are to coalesce into an effective group”, should be vital 
evidence in the identification of emergent professionalism. Evidence for this cognitive 
commonality, if not quite coalescence, can be found in several surprising sources: 
standards, self-help books and social media debates.  
ISO standards can be seen as relatively neutral in terms of authorship, albeit 
implemented commercially by audit firms. The codification inherent in ISO standards 
and the self-evident commonality is prima face a compelling argument for 
professionalism. BS 25999 and ISO 22301 standards could be seen as evidence of 
cognitive commonality. The concentration of attention has to be on the new ISO, which 
inherits the mantle of the original BS 25999 that was withdrawn on 1st November 2012. 
This 22-page document, ISO 22301 (2012, p. v) ‘specifies requirements for setting up 
and managing an effective Business Continuity Management System (BCMS)’. It uses 
the word “effective”, which seems to imply some guarantee that, if followed, the 
resultant plan will be effective. It seems safer to assume that the management system 
has the efficacy, not the resultant plans whose format, content and actions remain 
largely at the behest of the organisation concerned. This is an important topic which 
will be revisited later. 
Although ISO 22301 (2012) para 8.4.4 is the only paragraph (approximately one page 
of bullet points of points for inclusion in plans) relating directly to ‘Business Continuity 
Plans’, several other sections, for example section 8.4 and 8.4.2, the ‘incident 
response structure’, might be thought by many plan authors as belonging in the plan. 
However, the advice or, in fact, auditable components are expressed in a general 
fashion, for example: para 8.4.1 (c) ‘be flexible to respond to unanticipated threats and 
changing internal and external conditions’. It is difficult to see how this could be easily 
evidenced in any plan. All the advice is sensibly pragmatic and, in many ways, 
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curiously obvious, but it does not explain how to write a plan nor how it is best 
presented, etc. It could, therefore, be debateable how this professionalises the 
industry when the all-important end result, noted by Elliott and Johnson (2010), the 
plan, receives so little detailed attention from the standard. However, it can be argued 
that the ISO is merely an auditable standard and we should search elsewhere for 
cognitive commonality and coalescence. Additionally, nowhere in the standard is any 
recognition of Kay’s notion of Obliquity (2011) (First authored two years before the 
ISO) The idea that the standard recognises the need for some ‘judgement and 
knowledge of context’, p.67. in the case of a ‘complex problem’ remains unaddressed 
in the standard. 
Software and the detailed examination of programmes offered to BCR planners were 
excluded in the limitations to the study. So far as the author knows, software has never 
been used as a criterion for cognitive commonality let alone professionalism. However, 
the growing number of software BC planning tools, most of them adhering to a 
common framework, are based on BCI best practice guidelines and ISO standards. It 
is at least indicative of the standardisation of knowledge. The growing range of 
software and templates available to assist the author of business continuity plans is, 
however, plagued with exaggerated claims, ‘one size fits all’ advertisements and much 
of the advice and content is merely regurgitated procedures that once resided in paper 
manuals. Offers of self-completion templates range from a very socially-responsible 
template offered by Walsall City Council (2018) to ‘Express BCP’ (2018), a commercial 
company offering a programme that offers a “Zero risk, 100% satisfaction guarantee”, 
and the facility to “create a business continuity plan in less than one day!”. 
Thus, it can be seen that the planning process is becoming ‘productised’ with greater 
or lesser degrees of assurances by the vendors. Whilst any profession suffers its share 
of ‘hype’, at least some of the better software programmes do encourage a systematic 
approach which could be deemed to enhance proficiency or competence. Yet again, 
that which seems to professionalise the approach to BC does not of itself 
professionalise the outcomes. The content of the plans remains in the control of the 
author, and it is the content that matters and which still cannot be guaranteed. 
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Combine available, even free software, with good old-fashioned books on the topic 
and a professional project looks more coherent. Such ‘self-help’ manuals range from 
the all-encompassing and precisely titled Definitive Handbook of Business Continuity 
Management (Hiles, 2010) to the inadvertently patronizingly titled, but well intentioned 
and informative, Business Continuity for Dummies, published by the Cabinet Office 
(Stirling et al., 2012). Almost all such manuals offer advice templates and diagrams 
for the plan authors use, often on a CD or web links. Constructive as this seems to the 
cognitive commonality ideal, it has significant drawbacks. The internet lists several 
instances of lay people landing aircraft in emergencies², and in purely technical terms 
an average person might, in an emergency, conduct an appendectomy following the 
instructions in a book of home medicine, but neither emergency pilot or operative 
would ever be considered professional. The problem is that the simple formulaic 
reproduction of a set of ‘recipes’ for business continuity as outlined in such books and 
software arguably demonstrates the antithesis of professionalism. The professional 
understands more than the simple procedures repeated on the basis of instructions. 
Thus, these sorts of publications militate against BC being deemed professionalism. 
Lord Steyn and any ‘reasonable commuter’ might question the professional status of 
their doctor if he or she reached for the ‘Diagnosing for Dummies’ book when 
examining them. However, the fact that these books have been authored does in fact 
demonstrate growing professionalism by their authors if not their readers. Whilst 
inconclusive in terms of evidence, another grain is tipped into the balance for 
professionalism.  
Any assessment of professionalism using social media is error prone, but it could be 
indicative of professional status. The 4,166 ‘resilience interest groups’ ‘hits’ and the 
3,531 ‘business continuity interest group’ ‘hits’ on LinkedIn (sample date 12-01-18) 
bodes well for the future of the discipline in terms of sheer interest and volume. 
However, the plethora of BC LinkedIn debates on a raft of definitions, terms and 
processes, some mundane, others important, reveals a lack of cognitive commonality. 
So many disparate groups and commentaries are paradoxically evidence of an 
anarchic babel, not cognitive coalescence; to be professional, some rationalisation 
has to occur.  
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The BCI makes a highly debateable claim to thought leadership (it being one of their 
website banners); it also publicises white papers and case studies. The content of the 
articles and frequency reveals both a concentration on surveys and, possibly, an 
inevitable commercial taint, with many articles being placed by major companies and 
consultancies. These can be prone to being seen as thinly veiled marketing to the 
readership, a charge that the BCI is apparently well known for avoiding with every 
attempt being made at editorial fairness and balance. The simple fact is they have to 
publish available material and, in the absence of peer review and strict academic 
criteria, then commercialism will occur despite attempts to minimise it. In summary, 
these endeavours appear to endorse the evidence for the professional project but not 
the achievement of professionalism. 
This section of the debate has been artificially divided into discrete parcels to aid the 
analysis of what constitutes reasonable proof. In doing so it has perhaps avoided what 
could be termed the cumulative weight or synergy that the various endeavours 
generate. When this synergy is taken into account, then the case for cognitive 
commonality becomes far stronger and the rationalisation of the body of knowledge 
underpinning BC activities is far more robust. We should recall that Larson (1977,  
p. 40) was suggesting that the coalescence and cognitive commonality is a precursor 
of professionalism, not its result. Therefore, in summary, the cumulative evidence 
suggests only that the process is underway but is incomplete. 
Criteria identified for other related professions 
McGee (2006, p. 101), writing on the degree of professionalism in the security industry, 
identified five stages through which the progress of a professional project can be 
measured. These criteria seem more appropriate than Simonsen’s. They do not have 
the binary compulsion of Simonsen’s list, outlined previously, and appear more fluid 
and amenable to gradation. This is important as the professional project is not often 
at a defined point. The criteria are: 
1. Engaging in collective dialogue to establish shared will and consensus 
regarding the professional project. 
2. Developing the capacity for occupational negotiation. 
3. Defining the profession’s boundaries. 
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4. Instituting the boundaries through professional qualification. 
5. Creating a professional monopoly by controlling the supply of professionals. 
In the case of BCR, considering all the evidence presented above, it seems more 
appropriate to judge that asymmetric progress has been made in these areas of the 
five stages and that no stage is yet 100 per cent complete. Again, the reasonable 
conclusion is that the professionalism of BC is still in gestation. 
Discussion 
Despite progress, the BC manager’s professional project remains, as Lindstedt (2007) 
suggested, fragmented across differing disciplines. The results are eclectic but 
promising, with some good academic degrees emerging. Although progress is 
asymmetric when considered against the criteria above, it nevertheless remains 
progress. One must remain mindful of timescales. The BCI was formed in 1994. 
Professionalism projects tend to move slowly, even glacially. The advances made in 
a short timeframe are considerable and worthy of praise.  
Nevertheless, a curious question seems to have arisen. It is perhaps more germane 
than might first appear. The ‘professional project’ clearly exists but it is less clear whom 
it intends to convince. As observed earlier, professions are such because the external 
observer considers them as such, not because the practitioners believe it to be so. All 
the recognised professions are acutely aware that anything bringing them into 
disrepute with the public jeopardises their status (Veloski et al., 2005). In the case of 
the BCI’s efforts, the focus seems more internalised. They appear to be trying to 
convince themselves and their membership, as opposed to the wider professional or 
broader public community. It would be a non-sequitur to consider oneself professional 
if this was not recognised externally. However, the degree to which the BC manager 
is public facing is usually negligible and therefore the internalisation of the effort is 
understandable. Perhaps the measure of professionalism is more towards the 
acceptance that the BC manager is equal in merit, contribution and status to other 
more traditional departmental heads, such as finance, HR, IT, etc. 
That the BCI, the ISO and other bodies have doubtless done much to improve the 
competence and proficiency of their members is indisputable, but their publications 
and courses, like anyone else’s, can only do so much. The Good Practice Guidelines 
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can be followed, the Business Continuity Management System can be audited, using 
ISO 22301 without non-conformances, yet the resultant plan can still be of dubious 
utility.  
This recurrent theme is that the quality of the plans, and therefore the ultimate 
professionalism of the BC manager, is not vouchsafed by any of the endeavours to 
professionalise the BC management process. This idea was anticipated by Larson 
(1977, p. 41). Larson observed that:  
However standardised, knowledge is applied by individual 
professional producers; it is therefore inseparable from the 
cognitive makeup and whole personality of these individuals.  
In other words, it does not really matter how professional the discipline is seen to be, 
the acid test is how professional are the individuals practising the discipline. It is this 
critical point that now moves the debate away from professionalism, competency or 
proficiency of the process of BCR. It directs us to the ‘elephant in the room’ issue. 
Even if professionalised, now or in due course, the application of standardised 
knowledge would still be differentially applied by ‘producers’ of plans. Thus, the 
question as to the professionalism of ‘planner of the plans’ is left unanswered but 
acknowledged by this debate. 
This idea of professionalism being practically assessed in action, at least in terms of 
the quality of the eventual plan (as opposed to being created a priori by the 
management process), is echoed by Brown and Ferrill (2009) who were commenting 
on the developing professionalism of pharmacy students. 
It does not matter how much a student knows about 
professionalism. What is important is how well a student 
performs as a professional. The usefulness of an organized 
taxonomy of professionalism depends on having developmental 
objectives that relate to performance in a professional setting. (p. 
56) 
In other words, can the BCR manager author a good, ‘professional’ plan using the 
training, the materials and advice available, or are other factors at work beyond the 
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scope of professionalism? It appears that the concentration of effort has focused, so 
far, (echoing Perrow’s ideas) on that which is easier to professionalise, the 
management process, and has until recently neglected the critical professionalisation 
of the practitioners. 
So, it appears, given the evidence presented against the criteria offered, that 
BC/Resilience is not yet a profession and, in many respects, does not deserve to 
become one, yet. Consequently, the literature, its standards and level of authority 
seems to be appropriate for the discipline in its current guise. Whilst it might be 
disappointing that the specific applicable BCR literature is not of better quality, it is 
understandable given the relative youth of the discipline. The next chapter offers some 
encouraging options if the standard of literature and consequent professionalisation of 
resilience is to evolve. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
Summary of the findings 
The ‘plight of the planner’ remains that authoritative, referenced, well-written and 
applicable work is rare. The pure seminal academic literature is remote from most 
practitioners. Only highly diluted references and summaries permeate the osmotic 
membrane and appear fleetingly in some ISO standards. Complementary academic 
literature is often oblique to the practical business of plan authorship. For example, the 
work of Tversky & Kahneman, Lopes, de Bono and Morgan is fascinating but intensely 
difficult to utilise and apply in a plan. Other academic work, for example Smart and 
Vertinsky (2006), is a model of explanation, but challenging to apply in a plan. The 
excellent ideas of Janis paradoxically challenge boards of directors and their own self-
perception. The relevance of many case studies and the advocacy of Toft and 
Reynolds for cross-sector learning is limited in appeal when many companies still do 
not identify easily with lessons from large scale disasters. The work of Heath (1997) 
and Lindstedt (2007) who observed that, ‘Continuity plans should not be a manifold of 
individual threat-based responses’ p.201, on the brevity of generic planning is largely 
un-regarded when planners are under pressure from auditors for comprehensive 
plans.  
The attempts of academics to reach out to practitioners in works as authored by 
Reason and AIRMIC (2011) stand out as being worthy of emulation, however, working 
with commercial organisations to achieve this aim can result in confused articles, such 
as Denyer (2017). In this case the uneasy partnership between the BSI and Cranfield 
led to an over-referenced article which proposed a model as opposed to offering 
evidence for the efficacy of resilience. The BSI and the ISOs are arguably so poor in 
standards of publications that iterative criticism or review at this stage seems 
superfluous. Unless significant review of the standard of standards is undertaken the 
growing bureaucratic burden of substantially similar standards risks alienating the 
market. 
Her Majesty’s Government’s advice remains useful and well considered. There is 
some informal suggestion that it suffers from ‘delay’ in that its advice is subject to too 
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much scrutiny prior to publication so that it inevitably lags behind the curve of progress. 
This is an ill-founded critique as evidenced by the Home Office (1999 and 1996) advice 
which predates many later initiatives, including the proposal of a broader ‘resilience 
church’. If there is a criticism it is the apparent lack of empathy shown to micro, small 
and medium sized enterprises, which comprise more than 99% of the business in the 
UK; they are not motivated to devote scarce resource into activities that in all likelihood 
will never occur. However, one can perceive that this has been addressed in great 
measure by the increasingly detailed advice given on BCR by local authorities’ 
websites in discharging their obligations under the Civil Contingencies Act and, 
following the strategic defence review, the publication of the Dummies Guide, Sterling 
et al (2012). 
Self-help and advisory books and manuals are undoubtedly useful to the planner. The 
content of such books has suffered from the lack of any serious academic investigation 
and validation. This has led to the iterative similarity of presentation and process that 
was commented upon and analysed comparatively in tabular format earlier in this 
work. The quality of the books varies from the badly written but comprehensive guide 
by Graham and Kaye (2006), to the really very basic Dummies Guide and the 
questionable validity of the Good Practice Guide. Nothing will ever control the supply 
of the self-help books and nothing other than the origins of the author will affect the 
quality of the content. Perhaps the durability of Heath (1997) makes his work one of 
the best of this genre, and his referenced works could be usefully emulated by 
subsequent authors.  
A consensus view amongst my colleagues is that the BCI is probably the main 
influence on planners. Sadly, since commencing authorship of this work little appears 
to have altered in the BCI. The most recent BCI ‘White Paper’, ‘Resilience Is Your 
Competitive Advantage’, was launched on 12th January 2018. The pertinent content 
was only five pages; it was entirely self-referenced to previous BCI studies or articles 
and offered no metrics of what the ‘competitive advantage’ might be. Claims in the 
‘grey’ literature thus continue to lack authority, and commercial and industry 
association research is of poor quality. The remainder of the chapter offers some 
potential solutions to improve the literature in the medium term. Such a potential 
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improvement would be welcome, irrespective of the perception of the degree of 
professionalism inherent in BCR practice. 
Such a potential improvement also has to deal with the predilection for theory building 
and the lack of any quantitative studies that might validate practice and build a 
paradigm, as noted by Smith and Elliott (2006), Pauchant and Douville (1992), Boin 
(2006) and Alexander (2013). One might have presumed that, when viewed in its 
entirety, a methodological ‘balance’ would be found between the varying approaches 
or positions of literature and research. However, based on Patel’s (2015) 
comprehensive table to illustrate the ‘position’ of research, the BCR world seems 
content never to stray into quantitative positivism, a view endorsed by Boin (2006). 
Whilst this study notes some academic research complementary to BCR is 
quantitative, e.g. Knight and Pretty (1997), most research specific to BCR tends 
towards qualitative and loosely interpretivist studies. The research conducted by 
companies and/or the BCI is often poorly conducted pragmatism, such as Denyer 
(2017). Yet paradoxically, the BC management process expressed by the BCI and 
ISOs has a resolutely positivist ontological air in that it is perceived to be the sole 
reality and is inviolate. It is perhaps this academic imbalance that is the catalyst for 
hyperbolic claims and illogical defence of the status quo that generates such inertia in 
the development of the discipline. 
Notwithstanding all the criticism and current lack of professional attainment, the 
discipline remains a cognate area with its own identity; there exists a broad systemic 
similarity between BCR responses, albeit their causes differ significantly. Were this 
not to be the case, all of Toft and Reynolds’ work, together with much of Turner’s, 
Reason’s and Perrow’s, would have little basis for broad corporate application. It is, 
therefore, possible to develop doctrines and principles to inform its behaviours, but 
this remains an area to be developed. 
Implications of the findings 
By implication, therefore, the utopian vision is that academics will also write for the 
trade press, not just peer-reviewed journals, and that research attention will be 
diverted from the qualitative views or opinions of practitioners to quantitative 
evaluation of the BCMS process (Boin, 2006). The reality appears to be that any 
criticism of BCR, its educative process, its attainment of professionalism, its value, its 
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standards and its relevance is so counter to the vested interests of practitioners, 
consultants and trade bodies that it is quickly swept under the carpet. As the dominant 
representative body, the BCI, which should be leading resilience thinking, appears to 
suffer from a duality of purpose. It states that it is a “membership and certifying body 
of choice…for professionals” (‘Resilience is your competitive advantage’, BCI, 2017, 
a.). Realistically, it needs to determine if being both a representative body for the whole 
industry or a commercial enterprise that dabbles in certifying practitioners and thought 
leadership is compatible. It is simply not behaving as a ‘professional’ membership 
organisation arguably should. If it desires professional status, it might emulate the 
British Medical Association (BMA) which represents Doctors’ interests but does not 
train them or qualify them. Furthermore, the thought leadership in their publication, the 
Lancet (an international peer-reviewed general medical journal owned by Elsevier) is 
led by practitioners not by retained researchers reflecting commercial partners’ 
interests. Irrespective of any decision on the matter, the BCI’s commercial taint with 
sponsors needs to be eradicated or plainly stated as might be applicable. Its research 
process should be tightened and improved, as advocated by Minger (2000). It should 
call on a wider range of authors and permit contrasting views that challenge orthodoxy 
(Damer, 2009). Very simply, tighter discipline and editorial scrutiny are required if the 
fear mongering ‘paradoxers’ whom Sagan (1974) despised are to be eradicated.  
Recommendations  
Up to this point the debate has focused on the quality and utility of the literature that 
is likely to have been applied to the planning process by BCR practitioners. The debate 
now considers literature which is seldom applied to BCR, but which has both academic 
credibility and pertinence. This primarily deals with the potentially abstracted lessons 
that military doctrine might have for the development of professional BCR practice. It 
must be stressed that the author is not advocating taking unfiltered military doctrine 
and steamrolling it into practice. The materials selected are more illustrative of a style 
and tone of literature that might bridge the academic/practitioner chasm. Such work 
might lay a sound doctrinal foundation for BCR that would stand the test of time and 
pave the way for professionalism. Again, it is caveated that BCR is not a military 
operation, but that similarities exist in planning terms. This is most especially evident 
at the doctrinal and principle levels of both activities, which is perhaps the start point 
of a paradigm for BCR.  
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It is surprising to find that military doctrines, derived from military history, which 
axiomatically deal with crisis and contingencies, have, aside from some very brief 
references by Quarantelli (1996), Lengnick-Hall, Beck, & Lengnick-Hall (2011, p. 247) 
and Reason (1997), been disregarded in BCR. Perhaps the greatest expenditure by 
any single national organisation on any resilience planning is conducted by the 
military. World Bank Group (2017) and UK Public Spending (2017) reports estimate it 
to be approximately 2% of UK GDP or around £44 BN per annum respectively. It 
should also be borne in mind that the UK military has centuries of experience, has 
‘played’ for the highest of all stakes, national sovereignty and lives, and the 
development of coherent military doctrine and planning pre-dates BCR by centuries. 
The MOD ‘regiments’ the British Army’s four main functions as to “Protect the UK, 
Prevent Conflict, Deal with Disaster, Fight the Nation’s Enemies”. (ARMY BE THE 
BEST, 2018). Like most military forces, they often perform a variety of functions in 
unpredictable situations to which they must respond rapidly. Therefore, it seems 
prudent to examine the principles and characteristics of military doctrine to identify any 
lessons for corporate BCR models. Potentially the lessons learned by the military over 
centuries might have considerable benefits for BCR planning, because the armed 
forces have two features denied to corporate entities. The first is a longer ‘corporate 
memory’ from traditions and practices built up over time. The second is the luxury of 
being able to debate and develop theory and to practice it for its own sake in their long-
established staff colleges. 
Furthermore, military history and resultant doctrines maintain relevance today and the 
older texts that are cited still retain their currency. For example, Camon (1907) writing 
on the Napoleonic wars of the early 1800s is still relevant today. Frederick the Great’s 
(1747) work on ‘Military Instructions for the Generals’ is still applicable to modern 
circumstances. The US General Patton noted the value of historical analysis in respect 
of an operation in 1943. He commented that a previous invasion of the island of Sicily 
had "many points in common with our operations" (p. 283). He referred to an account 
authored some 900 years previously (Blumenson, 1974). A more current example is 
taken from Abratov (2000): “The conflicts in Kosovo and Chechnya deserve careful 
study as models for the conduct of future wars and for insights on how to prevent 
them.” (un-numbered Abstract). He cited this as being influential on the recent 
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transformation of Russian military doctrine. 
The reason for the dearth of discussion of military literature hitherto in this work is 
simply that, at least in the author’s experience, it has not been seen to influence the 
planning process. However, there have been studies which have paralleled the idea 
of establishing principles. Norris et al. (2008, p. 143) described, very gently, their five 
‘principles’ thus: 
…we describe five stops along this road that are likely to be 
necessary for most travellers, although other stops undoubtedly 
could be made as well. First, to increase their resilience to 
disaster,…Fifth, communities must plan, but they must also plan for 
not having a plan; this means that… 
Quarantelli (1996) made a far more concrete link to principles and the military version 
of them. However, he was imprecise in distinguishing principles from strategy and 
tactics: 
This the military considers the province of tactics. Thus, if we think 
in parallel terms, we can equate good disaster preparedness 
planning with the best strategy that could be followed in readying a 
community for a sudden disaster, while good managing involves the 
use of the best tactics for handling the specific contingencies that 
surface in the emergency time of a particular disaster. (p. 3) 
However, just as the military finds it possible to discuss tactical 
principles, disaster researchers can point to some tactical 
considerations that are involved in efficient and effective disaster 
management. (p. 5) 
Notwithstanding the slight imprecisions of terminology (some principles, notably 2 and 
3, are actually tasks), Quarantelli’s list, albeit in the field of disaster management, is a 
commendable, if neglected, start point: 
(1) correctly recognizing differences between response and agent 
generated demands; (2) adequately carrying out generic functions; 
(3) effectively mobilizing personnel and resources; (4) generating an 
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appropriate delegation of tasks and a division of labor; (5) adequately 
processing information; (6) properly exercising decision making; (7) 
developing over all coordination; (8) blending emergent and 
established organisational behaviors; (9) providing appropriate 
reports for the news media; and (10) having a well functioning 
emergency operations center. (p. 5) 
However, the inclusion of such military parallels at this stage depends on three pivotal 
notions being considered. Without them being addressed, the idea of military literature 
being a template of abstraction for BCR literature is questionable. The first notion is 
that the ideal literature to inform BCR planners is a suitable blend of the practical and 
theoretical; this is similar to military doctrine pamphlets. Secondly, is the idea that, like 
military history, the simple purpose of study and the analysis of the past, even the 
distant past, is only valid if it can convey insight into current practice and/or the 
education of the BCR practitioners’ minds (this is already evident to some extent in 
some case study analysis, e.g. Clark (2014)). The third is the establishment of 
compelling parallels between the respective activities of military and BCR planners. 
These are issues addressed below: 
Morillo with Pavkovic (2017), commenting on Sir John Keegan’s academic position on 
military history (he was a former lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and 
a visiting Professor at Princeton), noted a readership for whom such histories and 
literature were a qualification for their job and that ‘Professional Military Education’ 
(PME) literature was both technical and practice oriented. Critically, however, PME 
remains appropriately academically informed but slightly less so than the purely 
academic treatise. This sounds to be the ideal blend of theory and practice to bridge 
the academic/practitioner gap alluded to earlier. 
Kiszely (2006, p. 13) notes two purposes for the teaching of military history. The first 
being to offer ‘operational history’ simply so that soldiers could be “better at their jobs”, 
and the second, endorsing Clausewitz’s view, “to educate the minds of the military 
commander” whilst avoiding straying into “school solutions”. Once again, the idea of 
the past informing current practice is germane to BCR planning. 
Most importantly, it must be demonstrated that the characteristics of military 
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operations and BCR planning are similar. To establish this, two sources are used. The 
first is the 100-year-old work of Prussian theoretician, von Clausewitz (1976), the 
second is the British Army Field Manual, BAFM (1985) and its more modern web-
based iteration Army Field Manual (2017). (The field manual is a synthesis of accepted 
current doctrine, compiled by various members of the Army and retained academics.)  
Almost 200 years ago, Von Clausewitz (1976, p. 104) observed that, “Four elements 
make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance.” His choice of 
elements could equally well describe corporate BCR responses. Perhaps Clausewitz’s 
most well-known dictum which gave rise to the sound bite phrase the 'fog of war' has 
close empathy with BCR responses made in the realm of uncertainty, 
War is the realm of uncertainty; three-quarters of the factors on which 
action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser 
uncertainty. (p. 101) 
BAFM (1985, p. 29) adds that in some combat situations, 
With only a flawed picture of the situation he may have to make his 
decisions on incomplete information or intelligence, relying on his 
judgement and a feel for the situation based on experience and 
knowledge..., the quality the Germans call fingerspitzengefuhl*.  
*fingertip feeling or gut feeling 
Superficially most contingency or risk management problems sound simple yet their 
resolution can be enormously complicated. This factor too was commented upon by 
von Clausewitz thus (p.119): 
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The 
difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is 
inconceivable unless one has experienced war. 
The BAFM (1985, p. 29) suggests that the appropriate response is the development 
of simple and flexible plans, plans having these qualities being more likely to survive 
the hazards of war. This resonates with the ideas in BS 11200 and those of many 
other academic authors. It endorses the requirement of contingency plans to be as 
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simple as is reasonably possible to improve their robustness in the face of the threat 
((Darling, 1994, p. 7), (Boin and McConnell, 2007), (BS 11200, 2014, p. 10), 
(Regester, 1987, p. 75), (Smith, 2013, p. 7), (Heath, 1998, p. 261)). 
In summary, both battle and crisis management situations are typified by: danger, fear, 
uncertainty, the operation of chance, and that simple tasks become difficult to perform. 
Having established clear parallels between the military situation and the BCR 
response characteristics of a civilian organisation it is worthwhile examining the 
doctrine and principles that inform the British Army’s planning process. 
Principles and Doctrine 
Interestingly, the Army Doctrine Primer (2011) in defining doctrine in the forward (p.i). 
offers clear links to three key elements of this thesis, professionalism, knowledge and 
the primacy of doctrine.  
We pride ourselves in being a profession, which by definition has a 
body of knowledge which it studies, it develops through interaction 
with it,…doctrine is our military body of knowledge.  
The document distinguishes high level doctrine comprising “philosophy and 
principles”, and low-level doctrine encompassing, “practices and procedures” (p. 3 
section 1). 
The Levels of Doctrine. Higher levels of doctrine establish the 
philosophy and principles underpinning the approach to military 
activity. Such doctrine provides a framework of understanding for 
the employment of the military instrument and a foundation for its 
practical application. The lower levels of doctrine, which are 
broader, describe the practices and procedures for that practical 
application. (Chapter 3, p. 1) 
In considering doctrine’s centricity to an army, writing in 1926, Fuller (1993) linked 
sound doctrine to the establishment of effective principles, and the subsequent debate 
restrains itself to this level of doctrine. Over considerable time and on the basis of 
extensive research, the British Army has proposed ten 'Principles' of warfare. It is of 
note that in 33 years between the author being given the BAFM (1985) and 2018 web 
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version of the Army Field Manual (2017), the only change has been the renaming of 
‘administration’ to ‘sustainability’.  
It suggests that the principles are useful considerations in the authorship of any military 
plan. Their application to planning is explained in Army Field Manual (2017):  
the Principles of War provide comprehensive considerations at all 
levels for planning and executing campaigns and operations. They 
are not absolute or prescriptive, …. With the exception of the master 
principle, which is placed first, the relative importance of each may 
vary according to context. (annex 1A p. 1-11)  
They are listed in the BAFM (1985, p. 29) as:  
1. Selection and maintenance of the aim 
2. Maintenance of morale 
3. Offensive action 
4. Surprise 
5 Concentration of force 
6. Economy of effort 
7. Security 
8. Flexibility 
9. Co-operation 
10. Administration [“Sustainability” in (Army Field Manual, 2017)] 
It is not the author’s aim to debate these principles in detail nor to translate them into 
a definitive and prescriptive set of BCR principles. Some of the categories have a more 
obvious application to risk and contingency planning than others. However, with a 
subtle change of emphasis to reflect a civilian orientation, it can be seen that most 
principles merit consideration in BCR planning. Their relevance in this work is to 
highlight that BCR does not have a set of established, academically endorsed and 
uniformly acknowledged principles that inform planning. 
Now, it should be noted that some of the ideas debated here are obliquely referenced 
in ISO 22301 and some other supporting guidance documentation, but they are not 
offered in the nature of guiding principles. These principles and their interpretation 
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above are used militarily as mental checklist to inform the planning process. The table 
6 below is offered as a prototype illustration of how they might translate into the civilian 
BCR environment. 
Table 2. Military principles and their civilian equivalents. 
Military Principles Possible Civilian 
equivalent 
Outline example of their application. 
1. Selection and 
maintenance of the 
aim 
Setting an 
appropriate 
response strategy 
Identification of a simple clear 
strategic aim. This serves to inform all 
concerned of the overarching intent 
and allows a focus on what is 
important to be maintained.  
2. Maintenance of 
morale 
Maintaining the 
passage of 
information to staff 
and stakeholders  
An effective communications plan with 
clearly identified stakeholders, 
understanding of their concerns, an 
identified predetermined point of 
contact and a clear ‘message’ tailored 
for the recipient group given and 
updated at an appropriate frequency.  
3. Offensive action Taking decisive 
prompt action to 
regain BAU 
Ensuring regular reviews of progress 
to determine that actions have been 
carried out and are completed. 
4. Surprise The retention of 
an element of 
surprise in the 
recovery phases 
which can be 
published with a 
Perhaps in a cyber or ransomware 
event it might be that an element of 
security, see below is warranted and 
equally in the ‘move’ against the 
extortionist an element of surprise 
might be an advantage. 
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positive angle 
5 Concentration of 
force 
Focus of the 
essential issues 
and matters 
The BIA should have identified the 
most critical issues and items for 
recovery. Focus on these issues. 
6. Economy of effort Effective 
delegation of 
tasks 
Dependent on the management 
structure do not fall into the trap of 
overcontrolling or directing minutiae 
which should be dealt with by a 
subordinate team. 
7. Security The ability to 
maintain a degree 
of secure 
operations and 
confidentially 
during an incident  
Often the issue will not be immediately 
in the public domain and an element of 
security is required to maintain this. 
8. Flexibility Maintaining viable 
alternative 
response options7 
Ensure that some of the response 
team are working on alternative 
options and plans so that if the initial 
plan is frustrated another option is 
ready and instantly available. 
9. Co-operation Cooperation with 
emergency 
services and other 
regulatory or 
authoritative 
agencies 
Maintain effective liaison with such 
units prior to any incident, agree 
responsibilities and decision-making 
boundaries as well as PR primacy.  
                                                          
7 This seems to have some echoes of Kay’s (2011) concepts of Obliquity and the idea of successive limited 
comparisons of options. 
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10. Administration Ensure that plan 
is supported by 
effective logistics 
Ensure that the plan is not aspirational 
in that any intent in the plan needs to 
have been rehearsed in advance and 
the logistic requirements identified and 
suitable budgets made for the required 
resources. 
 
British Military Doctrine Pamphlets 
The principles outlined above are essentially ‘what’ the planner should be thinking 
about in the context of a given situation. The next stage is to examine advice given by 
the military about ‘how’ to think. Military publications suffer from what might be called 
the ‘Mainwaring’ syndrome where comedic association with ‘Dad’s Army’ is never far 
away. It arguably leads to an aversion to utilising the pantheon of military doctrine 
which inform the Army which is arguably the largest ‘resilience planning’ organisation 
in the UK. This was noted by Tom and Barrons (2006), who commented (p. xi) “you 
might not like the military but that should not stop you learning from their mistakes and 
what they have learned to do right”. This is a shame, as modern UK military pamphlets 
(somewhat akin to the HMG advice and BSI and BCI documents) are of a quality 
superior to most other publications. (A point apocryphally noted during WW2 by the 
German General Rommel in 1940.) It is far beyond the scope of this work to undertake 
an extensive examination of military publications. Therefore, a single document has 
been identified with the assistance of a former instructor at the Defence College, who 
is also familiar with civilian resilience practice. The aim was to identify documentation 
that was close to some of the topics dealt with by other authors and sources on 
resilience and which has the potential to make a contribution to the doctrine of BCR. 
The document to be considered is Joint Doctrine Note 3/11 (2011) Decision Making 
and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors (2011) MOD Swindon – 
hereinafter JD3/11 (2011). This document, Joint Doctrine Note 3/11 (2011) is a thin 
‘A5’ printed 40-page pamphlet with some short annexes. It was chosen deliberately as 
it has now been ‘archived’ and is available on web links. It has just been replaced with 
a slightly more modern version which illustrates the constant updating of doctrine in 
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the military. The original is contributed to by four academics. Professor Karen Carr, 
Doctor Peter Tatham and Doctor Teri McConville (all from Cranfield University) and 
Professor Theo Farrell (from the Department of War Studies at King’s College 
London).  
The pamphlet is easy to read (it takes less than one hour); each section has 
comprehensive references, and some cases studies (both civilian and military) are 
used to elaborate on points made. It is explained that the work is designed to be read 
in conjunction with three other complementary guidance manuals. The aim of the 
guidance is clearly stated in the preface as “to improve our decision making in all 
complex problem solving”. It seldom references other military documents as authority; 
the clear majority of references are academic civilian publications. There is no debate 
of definitions which indicates a ‘cognitive commonality’ of understanding by the 
readership. Interestingly, the document is self-critical, as opposed to ‘protectionist’, of 
its own organisation; it references earlier military campaign failures to illustrate the 
need for improved thinking. The lack of hyperbole is welcome, and it is entirely ‘value-
free’. It maintains a ‘light touch’ in terms of academic referencing and a lot of the 
content is summarised in easy to absorb tables. 
In offering some detail to support my contentions, it is most illustrative to ‘clip’ a visual 
section of the document into the thesis. This might be unconventional, but it avoids 
referencing conventions that would render an explanation of the ‘clip’ almost 
unintelligible. (The ‘ARC’ letters are part of the MOD ‘archiving’ process and are 
indelible.) 
Figure 2. Extract from Joint Doctrine Note 3/11 (2011) 
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In summary, the tone, construct and content seem ideal to inform a professional 
audience and introduce them to new concepts, and the references allow them to 
explore the topic in more detail if required. The pamphlet has most of the intellectual 
validity of an academic paper whilst remaining accessible, readable and simple. 
Essentially, it explains the relevance of the material and its application to operations. 
The pamphlet is an ideal template, which could be used profitably by the BCI and BSI 
type of publications.  
Discussion 
In 1962, Kuhn (1996) proposed that a paradigm was a set of "universally recognized 
scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a 
community of practitioners” (p. 10). There is considerable doubt as to the power of 
‘resilience’ to fuel a paradigm (Alexander, 2013). Earlier, the absence of a paradigm 
being the cause or effect of a lack of BCR professionalism was raised. It alluded to 
this issue being responsible for BCR remaining a discipline. Essentially, one might 
conclude that BCR is still a discipline without a paradigm, and without a paradigm it 
can never be professional. The establishment of BCR doctrine, principles and the 
development of credible informative supporting literature, modelled on some of the 
military literature examples offered above, might assist in the development of such a 
paradigm. 
It has been demonstrated that the academic literature in isolation is difficult to apply to 
planning. Most of the BCI and ISO materials are not value-free, and they verge on 
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straying into becoming ‘paradoxers’ (Sagan, 1974). Professionalism has not been 
attained and text books are of variable quality. But, if the BCI, or better still the industry 
practitioners themselves, wishes to make the practice of BCR professional, then the 
solution lies in an evolutionary approach to the improvement of the literature that 
supports BCR resilience. To build a paradigm, as defined by Kuhn (1996), proof of 
efficacy of BCR processes is required. Fundamentally, this requires extensive 
quantitative research and there are several areas in the planning process and 
principles of BCR, which would need tender development in order to practically inform 
practice. Emulation of the military in first establishing doctrinal principles and then 
blending academic and practitioner comment is a critical foundation upon which 
professional literature can be constructed and a paradigm built. 
The future 
This leaves the question of what can be done to develop such a potential paradigm. 
Ideally there should be some unification and standardisation of the courses being 
taught in the universities currently. One might also hope that the BCI could embark of 
becoming a chartered institute thereby raising barriers to entry and consequent 
standards of practice. However, at a very personal level one has to be genuinely 
mindful of one’s strengths, weaknesses and practical limitations. Therefore, I have 
taken my own weaknesses into account and I consider that my contribution will remain 
focused on the practitioner’s plight and that my oral and trade press focused 
proselytization for a paradigm will reach and be more persuasive to more practitioners 
than might be the case if my focus remained solely on academic publication. My 
business experience suggests that a multi-faceted but bounded approach is more 
likely to succeed in the medium term as opposed to only, or preliminary, academic 
publication.  
The problem can be deconstructed into three issues, the content, the audience (which 
will determine the degree to which the content is ‘academic’) and the communication 
medium. The following table outlines some of the options that are being considered. 
Please note that, albeit referenced in the table below, the propensity for academic 
paper publication has been considered and for the time being rejected. This only due 
to the time pressure on the author and his inability at present to devote sufficient time 
to the construction of high-quality peer reviewable academic papers. However, a great 
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deal of preparatory work needs to be undertaken before any communication of any 
type takes place. 
Table 3. Possible development of a paradigm 
No Content  Intended audience/ 
topic 
Format/ Medium/ 
distribution 
Comment/action/resp
onsibility 
1 Development of the 
principles into prose 
and diagrammatic 
format with a 
justification and 
explanation of each. 
Likely to be for 
practitioner comment 
Powerpoint and word 
Possible to release 
through BCI or at a 
BCI conference 
speech 
To be done internally 
by 5 Needhams staff. 
Academic overview 
would be provided by 
A Wakefield. 
2 Deconstruction of 
specific chapters 
into publishable 
trade press articles 
Practitioners 
The issues of 
professionalism and 
the notion of the 
paradigm seem most 
important 
Referenced but not 
peer reviewed 
Mainly author to 
action. 
3 To develop some 
educative doctrine 
guides 
Practitioners/ 
Readable in 30 mins 
to cover significant 
academic work and 
their potential 
application to practice 
Referenced but not 
peer reviewed 
Web site/ trade press/ 
BCI 
Author and his 
colleagues 
4 Possible use of the 
‘Conversation’ site 
to outline ideas and 
engage in formed 
debate prior to any 
academic  
publication 
Academic and 
practitioners  
International web 
hosted debating 
forum 
‘The Conversation’ is 
described at the web 
link below. 
http://uopnews.port.a
c.uk/2018/10/29/writi
ng-for-the-
conversation-meet-
the-editor/ 
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5 Development of an 
academic paper on 
the issue of the 
absent paradigm 
Academic and 
practitioner  
Appropriate journal 
TBC 
Author with support 
from the university 
staff if possible and/or 
co authorship with 
one of the established 
academic authorities 
on the topic. 
6 Publication of an 
essay on 
Professionalism 
which was the 
subject of an earlier 
module and which 
was assessed as 
being virtually 
publishable in its 
current format. 
Academic and 
practitioner 
Appropriate journal 
TBC 
Author with support 
from the university 
staff if possible and/or 
co authorship with 
one of the established 
academic authorities 
on the topic. 
It is hoped that by following this logical and phased approach that the needs of the 
academic and practitioner communities can be, engaged and developed.  
Finally, it has been kindly suggested that, in conclusion, I offer a definition of resilience. 
I respectfully decline for the following reasons. First, it just adds to an existing, and in 
many respects from the planner’s perspective, frustrating pantheon of definitions of 
which I have been critical. Second, any definition I offer will be subject to the same 
degree of debate to which all the other definitions are prone, and this seems less than 
helpful to the planner. Third, any definition I derive is like to be repetitious and closely 
akin to those twenty-one definitions already catalogued by Norris (2008). Fourth, 
based on the remark attributed to Da Vinci, that ‘simplicity is the ultimate 
sophistication’ and furthermore that ‘simplicity is a virtue’, Comte-Sponville (2001) I 
would go no further than iterating that ‘resilience’ is a general noun derived from the 
Latin, ‘re’, back and ‘salire’, jump. The definition itself needs to remain this simple so 
that it can then be validly and differentially applied by the planner who operates in a 
variety of contexts, locations, and activities. Finally, at risk of last-minute pragmatism, 
I far prefer the abductive reasoning approach of, if it looks like resilience and 
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behaves/’walks’ like resilience then it probably is resilience and I have no intention of 
fuelling the propensity for this noun to develop into a verb.  
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